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Introduction 
A t first blush, "self-regulation" seems to be self-contradicting.
l If govern-
ment regulation of an industry or problem2 is considered necessary, how 
can that responsibility then be returned to those from whom it was taken? Notwith-
standing this apparent contradiction, audited self-regulation3 is used successfully 
by federal regulatory agencies. It is apparently adopted, however, on an ad hoc 
basis: in one industry or application but not in another that possesses similar 
characteristics. 4 This article reviews these previously uncollected efforts at audited 
self-regulation to evaluate the general usefulness of this regulatory technique across 
industries and applications. 5 These insights would be relevant not only to reform 
current federal agency regulation6 but also to design new programs, Sillce new 
schemes of self-regulation are continually appearing.7 
1. See Richard A. Booth, Self-Regulation in a Democratic Society, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 491, 491 
(1985); BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RECULATION 15 (1980). 
2. "Government regulation," for purposes of this article, is defined as federal government regula-
tion of an entity by legislation and implementing the regulations of either an independent or Execu-
tive Branch agency. Government regulation as so defined is usually created to cover all aspects of 
a particular industry (banking, meat packing) or an identified problem or issue across all industries 
(workplace safety, environmental protection, fair competition). See ROBERT E. LITAN & WILLIAM 
D. NORDHAUS, REFORM INC FEDERAL REGULATION 44-45 (1983). For further definitions and general 
description of the scope of this article, see infra part I. 
3. "Audited self-regulation" is defined infra part I.A. 
4. Many different programs have been tried-by federal agencies, by state and local agencies, 
and by governments overseas. We have built up what lawyers would call "case law": lots of 
useful precedents about what works and what doesn't. The trouble is that, unlike case law, these 
precedents aren't easy to find. Congressional staff or agency employees designing new programs 
have no systematic way to find out what has been tried before and how well it has worked. 
AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS 
LESS; REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW 117 (1993). 
5. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger C. Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview, in STUDIES 
IN PUBLIC REGULATION 1, 40 (Gary Fromm ed., 1981) (noting that "[vlery little research is available 
on the comparative outcomes of different regulatory institutions," and that "to those who believe 
some regulation is desirable or simply inevitable the absence of guidelines on how to accomplish 
it most efficiently is an important void in scholarly research"). As part of a research agenda, Joskow 
and Noll describe goals similar to those of this article: 
Viewing regulatory commissions as organizations and concentrating on the process of regulatory 
decisionmaking gives useful insights into what is actually happening. The attempts to model and 
understand regulation from this perspective often give researchers a more complete static and 
dynamic structural model of regulation rather than just a reduced form. For those interested in 
incremental policy reform within the context of prevailing institutions as well as exploring possible 
institutional alternatives, such structural models are extremely useful for positive policy analysis. 
Id. at 53. 
6. In October 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order No. 12,866, which directs federal 
agencies to, among other things, "identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation." 
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993-1994); GORE, supra note 4, at 8 ("Our goal is 
... to reinvent the way the government does everything. It is not simply to produce a more 
efficient government, but to create a more effective one. "). 
7. The Food and Drug Administration adopted in 1993 interim rules for certification ofmammog-
raphers, relying on private accrediting bodies. 21 C.F.R. § 900.11 (1994). The use of self-regulation 
remains under active consideration by the FDA. Telephone Interview with Morris Bosin, FDA 
Planning Office (Feb. 7, 1994). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is also considering 
a program relying in part on self-regulation. See Transcript of Proceedings, Plenary Session of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States (Dec. 10, 1993), at 13. 
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This article concludes that, within specific limits, experience has shown that 
audited self-regulation is a useful technique which should be considered in a 
systematic fashion by government agencies when formulating regulatory policies. 
Part I defines and narrows the scope of the term "audited self-regulation" to 
make possible a careful inquiry, and distinguishes other related forms of regula-
tion. Part II discusses the potential advantages and limitations of audited self-
regulation. Part III extrapolates from these advantages and limitations the char-
acteristics of the regulation, agency, industry, and self-regulatory organization 
which suggest that self-regulation would be successful. In addition, part III 
discusses the principal legal requirements of such programs. Part IV is a survey 
of federal agencies'S use or attempted use of audited self-regulation in administra-
tion of their statutes, with an evaluation of each against the principles described 
in parts II and III. Part V combines the theories of parts II and III with the 
programs surveyed in part IV to distill essential elements of a successful program 
of audited self-regulation. Finally, part VI evaluates the options for achieving 
the systematic consideration of the use of audited self-regulation. 
I. Definition of "Audited Self-Regulation" 
A. TYPES OF REGULATION INCLUDED 
Each component of the term "audited self-regulation" is subject to a wide 
variety of interpretations. This article focuses only on a subset of those interpre-
tations, namely, one that provides a useful model for study and extension. In 
order to define "audited self-regulation," each term is explained separately 
below. 
"Regulation," as distinguished from other modes of government activity, is 
Aside from the dozens of self-regulatory organizations surveyed in this article, there are hundreds 
of organizations that operate on a completely voluntary basis outside any federal mandate. New 
programs are created constantly; a few recent examples suggest the variety. Both industry and 
environmental groups are seeking to establish programs to oversee chemical companies' programs 
of community awareness and emergency response to accidents and are looking to self-regulatory 
efforts in the hospital accreditation and nuclear power industries for models, discussed infra parts 
IV.B.1 & IV.C. Emma Chynoweth & Karen Heller, Wanted: A System to Audit Care, CHEMICAL 
WK., June 17, 1992, at 28. A private foundation is considering alternatives for a program of 
self-certification of safety by motor carriers. Telephone Interview with David Madsen, Volpe Na-
tional Transportation Systems Center Ouly 1, 1993). Banks and financial institutions have histori-
cally been prolific in self-regulation in areas where control is necessary and profitable but government 
regulation lacking. David G. Oedel, Private Interbank Discipline, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 327, 
339-48 (1993). 
8. The following independent agencies and executive departments were surveyed for this article: 
Department of Agriculture (Agricultural Marketing Service, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service, and Food Safety Inspection Service), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Department of Education, Environmental Protection 
Agency, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal 
Trade Commission, Department of Health and Human Services (Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration), Department of Labor (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), National Indian 
Gaming Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission, Department of Transportation (Federal 
Aviation Administration), and Department of the Treasury (Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency and Office of Thrift Supervision). 
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the altering of people's behavior by the federal government. 9 Furthermore, that
alteration is accomplished by "the imposition of rules ... backed by the use
of penalties."'" For purposes of this article, a "penalty" includes a denial of
conditional government benefits." The terms "rules" and "penalties" in turn
suggest that the essential activities of federal regulation are the creation and
enforcement of rules.
"Self-regulation" is delegation of the power to create and enforce rules to
an entity outside the federal government. Such entities, often known as "self-
regulatory organizations" (SROs), are composed principally of regulated entities
and their representatives. The source of the delegated authority is a federal
agency to which Congress has delegated such authority, with permission or
command to delegate it further." Because wholesale creation and enforcement
of rules is not and likely cannot 3 be passed off by Congress or agencies to other
groups, however, the scope of delegated activity is limited to what is here defined
as "implementation" of rules. Implementation includes the authority to inter-
pret rules imposed by the agency or Congress, to make new rules within the
scope of delegated authority, if any, and to enforce these rules by imposing
penalties for their violation.14 Thus, "self-regulation" for purposes of this article
9. A broader definition would include as a regulator any entity not directly involved in the
activity in question. MITNICK, supra note 1, at 4-7; FRED THOMPSON & L.R. JONES, REGULATORY
POLICY AND PRACTICES: REGULATING BETTER AND REGULATING LESS 8 (1982). This article is concerned
only with the federal government as regulator.
10. THOMPSON & JONES, supra note 9, at 12. This distinguishes regulation from government
activities such as persuasion, taxation, direct expenditure, or public ownership. Id. at 9.
11. Thompson and Jones exclude "direct expenditures" from their definition of "regulation,"
but they use the term direct expenditures to refer apparently to unconditional benefits: "grants,
subsidies, and transfer payments to individuals and to firms." Id. at 9. A penalty for failure to
comply with a regulation is not distinguishable for purposes of this article from the denial of a
benefit for failure to comply with a condition of that benefit.
12. Express congressional authorization of a self-regulatory program is an essential component
of a successful program. See infra notes 490-93 and accompanying text. Direct delegation by Congress
to a private group is ordinarily accompanied by review of that private group by a federal agency
(itself with delegated powers) rather than by Congress directly. See David A. Lipton, The SEC or
the Exchanges: Who Should Do What and When? A Proposal to Allocate Regulatory Responsibilities for Securities
Markets, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 527, 537-40 (1983) (delegation of authority to securities exchanges
and associations, subject to review by the Securities and Exchange Commission). For a more
complete discussion of the development of regulation of the securities industry, see infra part IV.A. 1.
13. See infra part III.B.I for a discussion of the limitation on Congress's ability to delegate its
functions, known as the "nondelegation doctrine."
14. The addition of enforcement power is necessary to make the function "regulation" at all.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The statement that agencies themselves enforce rules
departs, of course, from a strict "separation of powers" theory of government. Davis, however,
succinctly disposes of any reliance on such a theory in defining the role of administrative agencies:
Except for the clear facts that the main legislative power is in Congress, the main executive
power in the President, and the main judicial power in the courts, an outstanding characteristic
of the American government is the non-separation of the three kinds of powers.
A thousand questions of [legislative-executive-judicial] classification could be asked that are
. .. difficult (or impossible). ...
To the extent that we have avoided such unnecessary questions, we have done well. And we
have escaped from a strict version of the theory of separation of powers. Our legislative bodies
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is defined as delegation of the power to implement federal laws or federal agency
regulations by the federal government to a nongovernmental entity.
"Audited" self-regulation is the exercise of this delegated power, subject to
review by a federal agency. 15 The term "audit" is not used in strict reference
to the functions performed by independent public accountants in opining on
financial statements, though that function is a useful analogy. The federal agency
relies on information produced by the SRO, but verifies that the processes used
by the SRO are sound, that those processes are complied with, and occasionally
examines the information directly to spot-check its accuracy.16 Yet the essence
of "self-regulation" as defined above is that the "audit" itself is not a complete
review of every action taken by the SRO. In the course of its review, the agency
retains the power to require new methods to be used by the SRO and residual
regulatory authority over the regulated entities themselves. Thus, this power
of "audit" can be defined as retention by the delegating agency of the powers
of review and independent action. As used in this article, the term "self-
regulation" always refers to "audited self-regulation" in contrast to purely
private and voluntary self-regulatory efforts.
Putting the parts of each of these paragraphs together completes the definition.
"Audited self-regulation" is defined as the delegation by Congress or a federal
agency to a nongovernmental entity the power to implement laws or agency
have conferred all three kinds of powers-and more-on our administrative agencies, and our
courts have not disapproved.
1 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 72-74 (2d ed. 1978).
15. Congress does not perform this "auditing" function directly. See supra note 7 and accompa-
nying text. Indirect review by Congress takes place through hearings on new legislation, appropria-
tions for the agency, or on general oversight. See LITAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 2, at 62-66
(concluding that congressional oversight is "generally weak and highly sporadic"). Cary gives a
different assessment, however, after describing the same basic methods of congressional review:
[lilt seems clear that regulatory agencies do not have so much power as they are thought to have.
Collectively, as a group of commissions, they do cover a wide spectrum of cases involving many
industries and companies within them. . . . However, as far as any policy making by an agency
is concerned, it seems clear that any major move is subjected to minute scrutiny by Congress.
WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 58 (1967). In specific areas, Congress
can be extremely effective in oversight, even to the point of directing an agency to retain rules it
believes unwise or illegal. See Susan L. Bloch, Orphaned Rules in the Administrative State: The Fairness
Doctrine and Other Orphaned Progeny of Interactive Deregulation, 76 CEO. L.J. 59, 60 (1987).
16. This is analogous to an auditor's evaluation of the internal control structure of the entity
whose financial statements are being audited. Prior to testing and verifying the actual records of
the entity, an auditor is required to evaluate the internal control structure of the entity to confirm
the extent to which those underlying records have been accurately produced.
Tests of controls directed toward the operating effectiveness of an internal control structure policy
or procedures are concerned with how the policy or procedure was applied, the consistency with
which it was applied during the audit period, and by who it was applied. These tests ordinarily
include procedures such as inquiries of appropriate industry personnel, inspection of documents
and reports indicating performance of the policy or procedure, observation of the application of
the policy or procedure, and reperformance of the application of the policy or procedure by the
auditor.
CODIFICATION OF AUDITING STANDARDS, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 55 § 319.35 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1989).
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regulations, with powers of review and independent action retained by a federal
agency.
B. OTHER TYPES OF REGULATORY REFORM DISTINGUISHED
This definition of audited self-regulation delineates a particular area of govern-
ment regulation that is a current focus of regulatory reform efforts. Other closely
related areas are distinguished below.
Congress and federal agencies frequently delegate to private standard-setting
bodies the setting of specifications, features, contents, tolerances, and so forth
of various things subject to regulation.17 The key distinction, however, is that
these standards are voluntary; compliance is not mandated without some action
by a federal agency. 8 Of course, "voluntary" standards that are virtually uni-
versally recognized may have much the same impact as government-mandated
standards.' 9 Without explicit enforcement by the government, however, these
voluntary standards lack an essential attribute of "self-regulation." 20 And when
standards are adopted in federal regulations, enforcement remains with the
17. "The private sector of the economy invests extensive resources each year in developing and
revising written standards for products, materials, systems, services, processes, and practices.
• . . In their totality, nongovernmental standards concern virtually every aspect of modern society.
They exist in bewildering variety and serve many purposes." Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of
Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56
TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1331 (1978). Hamilton estimated in 1978 that there were at least 60,000 such
standards then in use. Id. at 1332.
18. The scope of agency adoption of voluntary standards and the processes of adoption were
the subjects of Hamilton's investigation. See id. at 1446-84. See also Office of Management and
Budget Circular No. A-i 19, "Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary
Standards," 47 Fed. Reg. 49,496 (1982) [hereinafter OMB Circular] (adopting new policies for
agencies in using voluntary standards for regulatory and procurement purposes).
19. See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 570 (1982)
(characterizing the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), a standards-setting body,
as "in reality an extra-governmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint
of interstate commerce" (quoting Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941))).
A Federal Trade Commission staff report concluded that "private standards and certification can
be used to exclude competition or to convey deceptive and misleading information, to the substantial
detriment of consumers and the competitive process." BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION 65 (1983) [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT].
The Department of Justice raised similar concerns in its response to the Office of Management
and Budget's policy on the use of standards. See OMB Circular, supra note 18, at 49,499 (quoting
a letter to OMB from the Department of Justice stating that "private [standard-setting] activity
is not, by virtue of governmental participation or approval, shielded from the antitrust laws").
Not only might failure to comply with "voluntary" standards result in a competitive disadvantage,
but there is also a risk of legal liability if the noncompliant product or process resulted in injury.
An unanswered question at this time is the extent to which such standards are actually enforced
in some way by each of these private organizations or otherwise become effective indirectly
because noncompliance would result in a greater likelihood of liability in product-liability suits
or other litigation brought by persons whose interests have been injured.
MICHAEL S. BARAM, ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION: MANAGING RISKS TO HEALTH, SAFETY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 58 (1982).
20. Enforcement is an essential element of regulation. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
The extent to which that enforcement may occur through illegal, nongovernmental means is not
relevant to the present typology and analysis of regulation by lawful governmental enforcement.
SPRING 1995
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agency adopting the standard; thus the standards themselves are not "self-
regulation" in any meaningful sense.
Regulation of entry into and practice of professions and occupations is
pervasive in state and local governments. 2' Typically, the legislature desig-
nates a board of appointed private citizens to certify entry and to restrict
practice in the trade. 22 This regulatory scheme is distinct from audited self-
regulation in two broad respects. First, it lacks a self-regulatory organization
outside the board or agency; there is no membership organization or private
group involved in regulation. 23 Second, the delegation by the legislature to
the appointed board is typically complete; the regulation is not "audited"
by the legislature that delegates the authority. 24 Such unsupervised delegation
has no federal counterpart and raises different legal issues not applicable to
audited self-regulation.25
21. See BARAM, supra note 19, at 62 (noting that "over 550 occupations are now licensed in the
United States").
22. A survey of Alabama law indicates the pervasiveness of this type of regulation.
Designed to regulate every aspect of professions, licensing statutes are frequently amended; the
drift of the amendments is increased regulation and complexity. Most statutes define the practice
of the occupation regulated, criminalize unlicensed practice, create a board of examiners for the
occupation, and establish licensing, revocation, and appeal procedures.
Note, Professional Self-Regulation, 29 ALA. L. REV. 679, 683 (1978).
23. It could be argued that the profession or trade being regulated is the "self-regulatory organiza-
tion," since that group is normally the chief sponsor of the occupational regulation in question as
well as the group normally involved, at least indirectly, in implementation. See BENJAMIN SHIMBERO
ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND POLICIES 12 (1973):
A significant characteristic of most occupational licensing is that the regulatory agency is usually
composed of practitioners from the trade or profession in question. The impetus for licensing
has seldom if ever come from the public in response to a demonstrated need, but rather from
associations of practitioners who have usually sought themselves to secure the passage of regulatory
legislation.
However, the members of the profession are not given formal control (outside of board membership)
over the regulatory process in contrast to the models of self-regulation in this study, though some
of the Medicare PROs discussed infra part IV.B. I.e. may lack membership organizations. See infra
note 373 and accompanying text. This is not to say that the informal control is not important or
powerful. Occupational licensing generally has been frequently criticized as collusion thinly coated
with a faint public interest. See, e.g., Jonathan Rose, Occupational Licensing: A Framework for Analysis,
1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 189; Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
6 (1976), SHIMBERG ET AL., supra at 13-14.
24. "Once a profession acquires from a legislature the exclusive right to regulate entry, it is
expected to regulate itself thereafter to some extent." BARAM, supra note 19, at 62. Supervision
may be available through the courts by a statutory appeal or by a writ of mandamus. See Note,
supra note 22, at 683 nn.49-50. Supervision by the legislature could also occur, see supra note 15,
but such actions are entirely discretionary. There is no systematic review of the delegate's activity
comparable to the "audit" discussed supra part I.A. In some states, however, the occupational
regulation is centralized in one agency, and in some cases that central agency supervises licensing
boards. DOUG ROEDERER & BENJAMIN SHIMBERG, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING: CENTRALIZING STATE LICENSURE FUNCTIONS 4-5 (1980) (describing two models from six
states of occupational licensing involving partial or total control by state agencies over licensing
boards). Although this involves "auditing" in the sense intended in this study, the underlying
activity is nonetheless not "self-regulation." See supra note 23.
25. There are typically three legal issues involved in an occupational licensing and regulation
statute. First, the extent of the state's power to interfere with otherwise private activity may be
questioned. See Note, supra note 22, at 686-96. Second, assuming the legislature possesses the power
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Additionally, regulators often recruit "delegates" to certify compliance by
regulated entities with applicable standards or regulations. If the qualifica-
tions of these "delegates" are determined and enforced by a private organiza-
tion, this would be a program of audited self-regulation, and several are
discussed below. 26 Where the "delegates" are qualified directly by the agency
itself, however, clearly no self-regulation is involved. Nor is the action of
the delegate appropriately considered self-regulation, because the degree of
supervision by the agency is significantly greater. For example, the Federal
Aviation Administration certifies individuals to conduct inspections, tests,
and training in various areas of pilot and aircraft certification, 7 and the
Department of Agriculture certifies veterinarians to make various inspections,
examinations, and certifications under animal health statutes and regula-
tions.2 8 The impetus in both areas is primarily a shortage of federal employees
to perform these functions.29
Self-regulation is also distinct from a weaker form of regulation: "self-
reporting" in the absence of a self-regulatory organization. This is distinct from
true self-regulation because the regulated entity is usually given little or no
power to interpret any regulation, but rather merely reports as required by
the regulation. And enforcement of the regulation, of course, is limited to the
government, except to the extent that a regulated entity "enforces" a law or
regulation upon itself through compliance. Self-reporting is a common regula-
tory technique. Banks, for example, periodically report on their financial condi-
tion, disclosing whether they are in compliance with required capital adequacy
standards.30 Regulation of air pollution relies to a large extent on "emissions
reduction credits" that are determined, monitored, and traded by holders of
to regulate the activity in question, its ability to delegate that power to a private group may be
limited. This is a vital question in state constitutional law though it has long passed to a condition
of some somnolence on the federal level. See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental
Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 649-50 (1986) (criticizing the state court decisions in this area and noting
that "[p]rivate exercise of federally delegated power is no longer a federal constitutional issue.").
For a more complete discussion of the validity of federal delegation, see infra part III.B.1. Third,
antitrust laws may affect the validity of these boards' actions. See infra part III.C.1 (regarding issues
of professional organizations generally); RANDOLPH P. REAVES, THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
AND CERTIFICATION 287-93 (2d ed. 1993) (regarding issues of state occupational licensing agencies
in particular). Additionally, many other issues are involved in the application of the regulatory
statutes. Seegenerally id. (discussing practice issues in licensing, application, and disciplinary proceed-
ings).
26. See, e.g., infra part IV.A.4 (accountants) and part IV.B (accrediting organizations).
27. See 14 C.F.R. § 183.1-33 (1994).
28. See 9 C.F.R. §§ 160.1-162.13 (1994).
29. Regarding delegates under the Federal Aviation Act, "[t]he legislative history of the statute
indicates that the purpose of this delegation was to avoid a substantial increase in the number of
Federal employees." Andrew J. Dilk, Negligence of Federal Aviation Administration Delegates Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 J. AIR L. & COM. 575, 575 (1976). Regarding delegation to "accredited
veterinarians," the Department of Agriculture regulations state that the accreditation program "is
intended to ensure that an adequate number of qualified veterinarians are available in the United
States to perform [the specified activities]." 9 C.F.R. § 161.1(a) (1994).
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (quarterly "reports of condition" required
of all financial institutions whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
SPRING 1995
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those credits.3 Holders of permits to discharge water pollution report regularly
on the content of the discharged water, disclosing thereby whether they are in
compliance with the terms of their permits.32 Similarly, a program during the
mid-1980s of allowing refiners to trade "rights" to add lead to gasoline required
reports by each refiner on the amount of "rights" held, used, purchased, sold,
or saved.33 Perhaps most familiar is the annual report by each taxpayer of
income and tax, disclosing thereby compliance with the tax laws.
34
Audited self-regulation is also distinct from a much larger concept known
generally as "privatization.''" Techniques and issues involved in removing
government functions entirely from the public sector may begin with self-
regulation but quickly move far beyond it.
36
Of course, as a technique of regulatory reform, audited self-regulation is
distinct from deregulation, which ordinarily means removal of regulation alto-
gether.37 Deregulation, simply defined, is the removal of regulation; and regula-
31. Under the Clean Air Act, discharge of pollutants is limited by various overlapping regulations.
The EPA's program of emissions reduction credits is a series of economic incentives made available
to regulated entities to make compliance with these provisions easier and more flexible. The regulated
entities can themselves determine the best methods of compliance with the EPA air standards, and
by their reports disclose their compliance or noncompliance with the overall standards. See generally
Emissions Trading Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon
L. Hester, "here Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J.
ON REG. 109 (1989); RICHARD A. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION (1986); THOMAS
H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING (1985).
32. Under the Clean Water Act, the primary method of regulating discharge of pollutants is
the issuance of permits to discharge by the EPA or approved state programs. See 2 LAW OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION § 12.05[2] (Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds., 1993). Absent such a permit, any
discharge of any pollutant is unlawful. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988). Each permit holder is
responsible for monitoring its own discharge and reporting the results thereof. See 40 C.F.R. §
122.41(l)(4) (1994). If those reports disclose that the terms of a permit have been violated, the permit
holder may face significant penalties, either in private litigation or administrative proceedings. See
Frank M. Thomas Jr., Citizen Suits and the NPDES Program: A Review of Clean Water Act Decisions,
17 [News and Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,050 (1987) (discussing enforcement of
permit conditions through private litigation); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (1988) (outlining administrative
penalties).
33. Under Section 21 l(c)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993), the EPA may control the production of any fuel additive "which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger the public health or welfare." Id. The lead rights program entitled a refiner
to rights based on the amount of leaded gasoline produced and the current EPA standards for lead,
which were diminishing during the course of the program. If the actual lead content was too high,
excess rights had to be obtained; if the lead content was lower than permitted, the excess rights
could be sold or saved. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg.
49,322 (1982); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits. Lessons for Theory and
Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 381-83 (1989).
34. See 26 U.S.C. § 6001 (1988) (describing the general requirement of recordkeeping and re-
turns).
35. See RONALD C. MOE, PRIVATIZATION: AN OVERVIEW FROM A PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERSPEC-
TIVE (Congressional Research Service Rep. No. 88-201 GOV, 1988).
36. See id. at 5 (listing "methods for privatization" of "divestitures (selling) of corporate bodies;
contracting-out for the performance of services; imposition of user fees; use of vouchers; awarding
of franchises; and voluntarism").
37. MITNICK, supra note 1, at 418. See generally Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD.
L. REV. 86 (1986) (describing reconstitutive law as an alternative in the middle of a continuum
with proscriptive regulation on one end and deregulation on the other). Reconstitutive law, defined as
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tion, in turn, is the alteration of persons' behavior by the government." Since
audited self-regulation by definition assumes a continuing governmental role,' 9
it is not deregulation.
II. The Comparative Advantage of Audited Self-Regulation
This part lays the general background against which audited self-regulation
can be evaluated. In general, this method of regulation offers comparative ad-
vantages in implementing certain types of regulation, with limited potential
drawbacks.
A. ADVANTAGES OF AUDITED SELF-REGULATION
Lawyers, economists, and political scientists have created a diverse literature
on government regulation. Overall, they have identified five distinct advantages
of audited self-regulation over other regulatory techniques. First, rules can be
more effective because of the self-regulator's superior knowledge of the subject
compared to the government agency. Second, self-regulation allows for more
diversity in methods of compliance with legal rules than is possible for a govern-
ment agency to provide. Third, self-regulation may result in better compliance
with rules, no matter who promulgates them or how they are designed, because
self-enforcement is more effective and more easily accepted by the regulated
entities. Fourth, self-regulation can result in cost savings to the government,
and these savings may be greater than the costs imposed on private groups,
thus resulting in less costly regulation overall. Finally, self-regulation is consis-
tent with modern regulatory reform characterized by the retreat from bureau-
cratic "command and control" methods of regulation.
1. Technical Expertise
Private organizations are by their nature composed of individuals or groups
with an interest in and knowledge of the subject area around which they are
organized. This makes them useful repositories of expertise to which government
regulators can turn. Indeed, this is a primary motivation for government use of
private standard-setting organizations. 40 Self-regulatory organizations typically
"federal reconstruction of the decisional rules and structures that constitute the several institutional
subsystems that make up the greater society," id. at 87, would include audited self-regulation as
well as the other regulatory reform methods discussed in this section.
38. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
40. See Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Industry Self- Regulation-Tested by the Crash, 45 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1297, 1306 (1988) (noting expertise created by higher salaries, and the ability to
achieve consensus in rulemaking); BARAM, supra note 19, at 53 ("[p]rivate industry invests
considerable resources each year in developing and revising its own standards"); Hamilton,
supra note 17, at 1377 (private committees have "an expertise that probably cannot be matched by
the technical staffs of most, if not all, agencies"); Lawrence, supra note 25, at 656-57 ("[p]rivate
delegation may be a practical method of obtaining that sort of otherwise unavailable expertise'');
Lipton, supra note 12, at 546 (in regulation of certain aspects of stock exchanges, each "would
be most familiar with the unique trading structure and needs of its own market"); Thomas P.
Grumbly, Self-Regulation: Private Vice and Public Virtue Revisited, in SOCIAL REGULATION: STRATEGIES
FOR REFORM 93, 110 (Eugene Bardach & Robert A. Kagan eds., 1982) (discussing incentives
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begin with "the development of common policies and standards," progressing
to monitoring compliance with those standards, and often but less frequently
to enforcement of those standards. 4' It is more efficient for government to rely
on that collected expertise than to reproduce it at the agency level.42
2. Flexibility
A product of the expertise of self-regulators is that they retain the ability to
modify their rules in response to technological change more readily than does
the government agency.4 3 More important, however, the self-regulator is better
able to determine when a rule may be changed to result in better compliance
apart from any change in technology. The bureaucratic organization of govern-
ment agencies and the rigid requirements imposed on their rulemaking inhibit
innovation and response to subtle changes in the environment of the regulated
entities.44 The regulated entities retain both a more informal structure and the
desire created by competition to keep their rules current and cost-effective. 45 This
is an especially important advantage of self-regulation because the regulatory
initiatives of the past few decades have created rules that cut across industry
lines. These are difficult for an agency to implement by general rules applicable
to all situations and better suited to individual rules designed and implemented
by each regulated entity.
46
It is possible that the auditing function may reintroduce bureaucratic inflexibil-
ity through agency rules that concern the rulemaking process rather than substan-
tive requirements."' Thus, the maintenance of flexibility at the regulated-entity
level requires some amount of residual expertise at the agency level as well.
for reform of meat and poultry inspection, one of which was "the fundamental argument that
an objective assessment of critical production points carried out by industry personnel could
provide better consumer protection than a program in which [federal] inspectors . . . made subjec-
tive determinations").
41. KENNETH E. YOUNG ET AL., UNDERSTANDING ACCREDITATION 59-60 (1983).
42. The agency will need sufficient expertise in any area in which it regulates, however, to assure
the reliability of the delegates' expertise on which it relies. In some areas, the agency may be the
source of that expertise. In general, the decision should be made by the entity that can acquire
the knowledge in the most cost-effective fashion. Lipton, supra note 12, at 545.
43. See Hamilton, supra note 17, at 1378.
44. See Karmel, supra note 40, at 1305-06; Lawrence, supra note 25, at 654-55.
45. See Karmel, supra note 40, at 1306; EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE
BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 241 (1982) (noting that private deci-
sionmakers will be sensitive to the adverse consequences of overzealous regulation and "are more
likely to resist literal interpretations of the rules, to accept substantial compliance, and to fight for
discretion when the requirements are inappropriate or unduly burdensome in particular cases").
See also BARAM, supra note 19, at 58.
46. See infra part II.A.5 for a discussion of reliance on self-regulation as an effective means of
implementing modern regulatory statutes.
47. Bardach and Kagan follow this process to its logical extreme, resulting in virtual replacement
of the self-regulator's rules with agency rules:
The more regulators or advocacy groups mistrust the motivation of the self-regulating enterprises
as a class, or the more regulatory inspectors lack the expertise to evaluate a particular self-
regulation system, the more likely they will insist that the enterprise adhere strictly to the written
procedures.
The result, of course, is that government "guidelines" come to be treated as binding rules
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3. Incentives for Compliance
Self-regulation has the potential to provide greater incentives for compliance.
As shown above, self-regulation is likely to produce rules from an expert's
knowledge base, tailored to the conditions of the particular industry or
workplace. The rules therefore are perceived by the regulated entities, because
of their own participation, as more "reasonable" from the outset compared
with the more inflexible counterparts issued by government regulators. 48 In
addition, certain types of conduct are more effectively regulated by the regulated
entity itself.49 Thus, incentives are increased not because the regulated entity
is now suddenly more willing to comply 0 but because compliance has become
and privately formulated procedures come to be treated with the same legal sanctity as direct
government regulations.
BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 45, at 236-37 (1982).
48. See id. at 102-19 (describing how technical regulations create resentment, minimal compliance,
lack of cooperation, and resistance on the part of the regulated entities); Lawrence, supra note 25,
at 653 (describing advantages of "pluralism" in self-regulation); Richard W. Jennings, Self-Regulation
in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
663, 678 (1964) ("[Ilndustry self-government surely is psychologically more acceptable to the indus-
try regardless of cost. No one likes external controls, least of all businessmen. Opportunity to
participate in the regulatory process makes it much more palatable."); Tamar Hed-Hofmann, The
Maloney Act Experiment, 6 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 187, 210-12 (1965). But see BARDACH &
KAGAN, supra note 45, at 219 (cautioning that even the private inspectorate "tends to occupy an
outsider or even pariah status").
49. Consider ethical standards of broker-dealers, for example. Although there is no particular
structural reason explaining the difference between "ethics" rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the government agency) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (the self-
regulatory organization), "in its role of self-regulator of the interrelationships of its members, the
NASD has promoted ethical standards of conduct. As a result, the securities business carries out
its contractual obligations much more promptly than required by law and performs contracts even
in cases where the law does not impose an obligation to perform." Hed-Hofmann, supra note 48,
at 210. Accord, Karmel, supra note 40, at 1304. During hearings on the legislation that was to
become a key piece of securities industry self-regulation, see infra part IV.A. 1, SEC Commissioner
George Matthews testified in 1938 that
[elven if the funds were furnished for a direct government regulatory program, and even if an
adequate staff were provided ... a great many of the abuses in the securities business are not
matters of definite illegality; they are matters of ethics. . . .There is a vast field for the control
of ethical practices in this business, which is not a field which the Government can very well
occupy.
SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, H.R. REP. No. 1519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1972) [herein-
after SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY] (quoting SEC Commissioner George Matthews). See Jeffrey R.
Cohen & Laurie W. Pant, Beyond Bean Counting: Establishing High Ethical Standards in the Public
Accounting Profession, 10 J. Bus. ETHICS 45 (1991) (surveying accountants, finding that they believe
self-enforcement of ethical standards is more effective than imposing such standards by government
regulation).
50. Most regulated entities possess an "inherent" willingness to comply with even direct govern-
ment regulation. Anecdotal evidence suggests compliance rates of 80%-90%:
Reflecting on his experience as Office of Price Administration administrator during World War
II, Chester Bowles said that 20 percent of the regulated population would automatically comply
with any regulation simply because it is the law of the land, 5% would attempt to evade it, and
the remaining 75 percent would go along with it as long as they thought the 5% would be caught
and punished. In practice, OSHA relies to a great extent on the presumption that businesses,
once apprised of their legal obligations, will abide by the law.
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easier (less costly) and has been recognized as consistent with and not impairing
or opposing the entity's goals.
4. Cost Savings to the Federal Government
Self-regulation can result in cost savings to the government if the resulting
supervision of regulation requires fewer resources than direct regulation. Al-
though the savings should be readily quantifiable, such calculations are made
rarely.51 Such cost savings would be a net societal gain, of course, only if the
net increase in costs to the industry were lower than the government's cost
savings.52 It is possible, however, to argue that such costs should have been
borne by the regulated entities in any event, as are most costs of regulation,
and thus the net savings to the federal government is good even if viewed in
isolation.53 The solution to limiting government-imposed costs of regulation on
private individuals and industry, it is argued, would be to budget this resource
as is done with direct government expenditures."
5. A Cornerstone of Regulatoty Reform
Audited self-regulation has the potential to lead modern regulatory reform.
Regulatory legislation in the past thirty years has shown a dramatic shift in the
scope of the government's role in society. The agencies' inability to correspond-
BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 45, at 65-66. "Experienced regulators acknowledge that if most
regulated enterprises were inclined to comply only when the threat of inspection and punishment
was imminent, then the entire regulatory program would quickly collapse." Id. at 60. One study
of OSHA enforcement reviewed existing literature on deterrence, concluding that "[rieviews of
empirical studies have found only weak evidence that detection and punishment is a primary factor
in deterring noncompliance. The complexity of perceptual processes that intervene between the
threat or experience of legal sanctions and illegal actions may weaken the link between enforcement
activities and deterrence." Wayne B. Gray & John T. Scholz, Does Regulatory Enforcement Work? A
Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 27 LAW & Soc'y REV. 177, 178 (1993) (citations omitted).
51. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission estimated savings of approximately
$400,000 from the 1983 transfer of direct regulation to the National Association of Securities
Dealers of the few remaining small broker-dealers who were not already members of and regu-
lated by the NASD or an exchange. H.R. REP. No. 106, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted
in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 592, 597. Also the Commodity Futures Trading Commission estimated
the initial savings from the creation of the National Futures Association to regulate futures
traders at approximately $3.5 million in direct savings and over $16 million in additional costs
avoided over the first three years of the program. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION: REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 237 OF THE FUTURES
TRADING ACT OF 1982, 132-33 (1985) [hereinafter CFTC REPORT].
52. Neither the SEC nor the CFTC studies, supra note 51, attempted to measure the additional
compliance costs incurred by the self-regulatory agencies. Karmel suggests that "[t]o the extent
that self-regulation can operate more casually and without regard to constraints that are imposed
upon government regulators, self-regulatory organizations may achieve goals more efficiently and
at a lower cost." Karmel, supra note 40, at 1305. Jennings, however, estimates that "it is at least
doubtful that the existing two-tier structure [of direct regulation and supervised self-regulation in
the securities industry] costs less than direct regulation." Jennings, supra note 48, at 678.
53. The supporting theory is that the majority of firms in a regulated industry would comply,
and incur the costs of compliance, without government direction or enforcement in any event.
BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 45, at 66.
54. See, for example, the proposals for a "regulatory budget" in LITAN & NORDHAUS, supra note
2, at 133-58, and THOMPSON & JONES, supra note 9, at 176-89.
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ingly shift their methods of regulation has been the source of the almost universal
discontent with their performance. Self-regulation is widely regarded by re-
searchers as having great potential to produce effective results from the sweeping
mandates of modern legislation.
Controls over corporate and social conduct enacted by Congress since the
1960s differ fundamentally from those enacted in the other two great regulatory
periods in American history, the Progressive Era55 and the New Deal.56 Each
of the earlier episodes focused federal regulation on particular industries or
discrete segments of the economy.57 However, the third period, from the mid
1960s to the late 1970s,58 was unique in its focus on consumer and environmental
protection across any recognized industry lines. 59 The third period also far
eclipsed the other two in the number of programs begun and new agencies
created. 6o
55. The reforms of the Progressive Era date approximately from 1900 to 1915. David Vogel,
The "New" Social Regulation, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 155, 156 (Thomas K. McCraw ed.,
1981); Thomas K. McCraw, Regulatory Change, 1960-79, in Historical Perspective, in JOINT ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., SPECIAL STUDY ON ECONOMIC CHANGE VOL. 5, GOVERNMENT
REGULATION: ACHIEVING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BALANCE 8-9 (1980) [hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY
ON ECONOMIC CHANGE] (dating this period through 1921, but listing the 19th Amendment as the
only significant "regulatory" effort after 1914). Others begin earlier. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin,
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1216 (1986) (dating this period
beginning with the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890).
56. Rabin, Vogel, and McCraw date the period of New Deal reforms from 1933 to 1938. Rabin,
supra note 55, at 1243-53; Vogel, supra note 55, at 156-57; McGraw, supra note 55, at 8.
57. There are exceptions, of course. There were significant reforms, for example, in the labor
movement and in the electoral system during both periods. Also, the Progressive Era resulted in
many other reforms on the state and local level. See Vogel, supra note 55, at 160; McCraw, supra
note 55, at 9-10.
58. Vogel dates the period from 1964 to 1977. Vogel, supra note 55, at 157-58. McCraw dates
it from 1960 to 1979. McCraw, supra note 55, at 12. Others date the period generally from the
mid 1960s to the middle or late 1970s. See Paul W. MacAvoy & Dorothy M. Tella, The Impact of
Regulation on the Performance of Industry, in SPECIAL STUDY ON ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 55, at
187-88; Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 339 (1990); CHARLES
L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 2 (1977).
59. See Rabin, supra note 55, at 1278-84 (describing the roots of a primarily environmentalist
and consumer movement he titles the "Public Interest" era). See also A. Lee Fritschler, The Changing
Face of Government Regulation, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: ESSAYS ON POWER AND POLITICS
40 (Howard Ball ed., 1984) (comparing pre-1960s "[i]ndustrial and economic regulation [which]
generally had a fairly well-defined and narrow focus" to the post-1960s social regulation which
"focuses less on the formal means and output of production and more on the side effects of produc-
tion"); Vogel, supra note 55, at 162 (observing that new laws "cut across industry lines, ...
undermining much of the historic distinctions between regulated and unregulated industries");
McGraw, supra note 55, at 5 (noting that the across-the-board coverage of new laws does not mean
the impact has been uniform; rather, there has been a disparity between large and small firms and
other varieties of classification within industries "to such a differential extent that it has changed
the basis of competition within those industries").
60. Vogel's comparisons are illustrative.
From 1900 through 1965, only one regulatory agency was established at the federal level whose
primary responsibility was to protect either consumers, employees or the public. . . . Between
1964 and 1977, ten federal regulatory agencies were created with this as their mandate. ...
• . . In the broad area of consumer safety and health, five new laws were enacted by the
federal government during the Progressive Era, eleven during the New Deal, and a total of
sixty-two between 1964 and 1979. Job safety and other working conditions were the focus of a
total of five pieces of national legislation during both the Progressive Era and the New Deal;
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The resulting almost universal dissatisfaction with the agencies' implementa-
tion of these new laws is traced by most researchers to the resilience of the
"command and control" method of regulation used in the older, single-industry,
price-and-entry regulatory schemes. 6 This regulatory technique responded well
to the original problems addressed, namely, the rise of near-monopolies in many
industries. 62 The new regulation of the 1960s and 1970s, however, dealing with
different types of market failures across different industries, does not fit with
the command-and-control technique. Identifying individual problems and their
solutions via agency rule is impossible because of the sheer magnitude of individ-
ual problems. Moreover, any general rule destined for cross-industry application
will have occasional absurd results.
63
A major benefit of the command-and-control technique has been its ability
to limit discretion in enforcement. This is a value generally heralded in American
government. 64 In addition, the predisposition to legalistic rules-specific stan-
dards, allegations of violations, and a trial-type adjudication of the facts-was
apparent from the lawyers who historically had controlled the field. 6' This tech-
nique also had the political advantage of immediate response; once a problem
had been identified, a law could be passed and an agency created to promulgate
regulations immediately. 66 The regulated entities would have the benefit of objec-
from 1960 through 1978, twenty-one laws were approved in this area. Two statutes regulating
energy and the environment were enacted by the federal government during the Progressive Era,
five during the New Deal, and thirty-two during the most recent period of increased government
intervention.
Vogel, supra note 55, at 161-62. See LITAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 2, at 44 (counting more than
forty pieces of "social legislation" from 1960 to 1976); Fritschler, supra note 59, at 41-43 (listing
five Progressive Era programs and ten New Deal programs, with one in each era categorized as
"social regulation," and twenty-three programs from 1962 through 1975, with seventeen categorized
as "social regulation").
61. See Stewart, supra note 58, at 341; McGraw, supra note 55, at 7, 17; SCHULTZE, supra note
58, at 46.
62. See MacAvoy & Tella, supra note 58, at 178-79. But see THOMPSON & JONES, supra note 9,
at 52-53 (disputing the translation of these economic rationales into regulatory practice).
63. See Stewart, supra note 58, at 343 (observing that because "[b]ureaucrats in Washington
simply cannot gather and process the vast amount of information needed to tailor regulations,"
they "adopt uniform regulations that are inevitably procrustean in application").
64. See, e.g., McGraw, supra note 55, at 7 ("Lawyers and political scientists ... emphasize
administrative structure, political feasibility, and due process of law. They hold these values dear,
and they expressed them in such laws as the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946."). See generally
KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969) (exploring the use of discretion in the American
legal system).
65. THOMPSON &JONES, supra note 9, at 103-04; LITAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 2, at 95 ("We
characterize such a regulatory philosophy, which simply orders that which is broken to be fixed,
as the 'lawyer-regulator's approach' to regulation. ... ); McGraw, supra note 55, at 6; SCHULTZE,
supra note 58, at 73.
66. See MITNICK, supra note 1, at 360-61 (comparing "incentive" and "directive" regulation,
concluding that the latter may be the response of choice in a crisis situation); THOMPSON & JONES,
supra note 9, at 104 ("[A]ternatives that involve incentives for performance change may seem
indirect and may not have the [political] appeal of an immediate 'solution .... ' "); MacAvoy &
Tella, supra note 58, at 187 ("[Elquipment and design standards were appealing because they
tended to speed up the regulatory process and thus allowed the agencies to show more evidence
of regulatory activity .. ").
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tive rules, limiting the discretion of the agency, and the regulators and reformers
would have the benefit of an impressive array of citations issued under the new
law, demonstrating its benefits.67
In the late 1970s, however, the preeminence of command-and-control began
to deteriorate. 68 The rules issued had been demonstrated as largely ineffective,
particularly when compared with their CoStS. 69 Limitation of agency discretion
through the promulgation of precise rules led in many cases to ineffective regula-
tion. 70 The proliferation of cross-industry agencies with no requirement of coor-
dination resulted in businesses being subject to multiple and often contradictory
commands.7' In addition, economists had entered the scholarly debate along
with the lawyers, 7' advocating and demonstrating that regulation based on stan-
dards of output, rather than characteristics of input, can be more efficient.73
67. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 45, at 34-36.
68. By the late 1970s . . ., the expansionist period of the Public Interest Era had . . . run its
course. For the first time in a century, a discernible political movement sought to reassess the
need for regulatory programs that administered markets as a means of promoting the health of
particular industries. This movement was exceedingly widespread: The regulatory system came
under close scrutiny by policy institutes and journals, academic disciplines, and politically influen-
tial public officials who all came to focus on a clear and dominant emerging theme-deregulation.
Rabin, supra note 55, at 1316.
69. What is particularly important about this criticism is that it came not only from the regulated
entities but also from the interest groups responsible for the regulations' passage in the first place.
See MacAvoy & Tella, supra note 58, at 176-77.
70. As rules extend into increasingly complex areas of our environment, workplace safety, health
and social rights, their consequences-both deliberate and unintended-also grow. As this hap-
pens, we introduce more and more safeguards into the rulemaking process. The result is not
always what we want. Hearings, reviews, revisions, more reviews, more hearings, and even more
reviews are cumbersome, costly, and time consuming.
GORE, supra note 4, at 118. See also JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 38 (1978) (noting that while the limitation on discretion
was originally intended and hailed as a protection of freedom, "for the individual who must relate
to them, usually in a role of subordination or dependence, bureaucracies too often appear concerned
primarily with formalistic adherence to their own rules, rather than with seeking a personalized
response to the peculiarities of his specific circumstances"). Bardach and Kagan review the develop-
ment of this legal environment and conclude that stricter statutes providing for tough sanctions
without discretion increase the power of enforcement officials but also "the incidence of unreason-
ableness and unresponsiveness." BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 45, at 57. See also Cass R. Sunstein,
Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 413-15 (1990) (demonstrating how reliance
on stringent standards leads to the paradox that "overregulation produces underregulation"); Mac-
Avoy & Tella, supra note 58, at 187 (noting that proscription of inputs by regulation "meant that
regulation dealt with matters once-removed from the aims of the legislation and, probably largely
for this reason, was destined to have far less impact than was hoped on accident rates or on the
quality of the environment"); SCHULTZE, supra note 58, at 74 (arguing that command-and-control
approach is not appropriate for complex forms of social intervention with output-oriented legislation
and stating that "[r]egulations, however detailed, cannot be written to cover all the individual
situations that arise").
71. See LITAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 2, at 44-49; MacAvoy & Tella, supra note 58, at 187.
72. See McCraw, supra note 55, at 6-7 (describing the historical influence over regulatory philoso-
phy, in turn, of lawyers, political scientists, and, finally, classical economists).
73. See, e.g., THOMPSON & JONES, supra note 9, at 81-82 (concluding that in only one of four
conditions for beneficial regulation, antitrust, is it "unambiguously" the best option, and that
reliance on market-based incentives is likely superior under the other three conditions); LITAN &
NORDHAUS, supra note 2, at 94-98 (discussing the rise of economists' critiques of regulatory policy,
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Also, the delegation of power to agencies bent on specific rules became self-
sustaining, as there remained no political check on the use of agency power.74
Lawmakers and administrators began cautiously to accept the demise of com-
mand-and-control regulation. Ironically, the first changes came in traditional
single-industry price-and-entry regulation. 75 Eventually, the administrators of
"social" regulation began experimenting with output standards instead of input
standards, specifying results to be reached and leaving the method of achieving
those results to the regulated entities.76 Thus began the broader acceptance of
alternative methods of regulation.
77
Audited self-regulation is likely to be a fundamental part of regulatory reform
in the foreseeable future. If properly implemented, it promises efficient reorgani-
zation of regulation to meet the challenges ahead.78
demonstrated through numerous studies). Even the traditional antitrust regulation has begun to
yield to the economists' suggested use of market-based incentives. See Elizabeth E. Bailey & William
J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, I YALE J. ON REG. 111, 134-36 (1984).
74. This is what Stewart hails as the source of "Madison's nightmare."
Rather than offsetting each other through mechanisms of countervailing power, as Madison
envisaged, these [interest] groups have instead divided power among themselves. This parcelling
of power has been accomplished though [sic] congressional delegations of authority to functionally
specialized bureaucracies....
... The post-New Deal constitutional jurisprudence of majoritarian politics has helped produce
this result, because the demands for national regulatory and spending programs have outstripped
the capacity of the national legislative process to make decisions that are accountable and politically
responsive to the general interest. This has subverted the very premises of Madisonian politics.
Stewart, supra note 58, at 342. The judiciary, he adds, has only compounded this problem by
retreat from review of such issues, while judges claim, without enthusiasm, "the superiority of
political processes for resolving issues of social and economic policy." Id. at 348; see also Sunstein,
supra note 70, at 434-37 (criticizing reviewing courts' unwillingness to interpret regulatory statutes
to require cost-benefit balancing and concluding that this leads to counterproductive overregulation);
SCHULTZE, supra note 58, at 74 ("[B]y applying the principle and technique [of detailed regulation
with adjudication of individual cases] to situations in which social intervention must be pervasive
and continuing, we have ended up extending the sphere of detailed governmental control far beyond
what is necessary to accomplish the objectives we seek.").
75. See MacAvoy & Tella, supra note 58, at 193-94 (discussing deregulation of prices by the
Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Power Commission).
76. In the area of environmental regulation, one commentator characterized command-and-
control regulation as having four components: (1) writing general rules, (2) writing specific permits,
(3) operating in compliance with permits, and (4) enforcement; only the third was under the control
of private parties. Barry Breen, Beyond Command and Control Regulation: Innovative Approaches to Environ-
mental Protection, in I LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 3.07, 3.07 [2][a], at 3-51 (Sheldon
M. Novick et al. eds., 1993). "In most environmental contexts," he notes, "this pure command
and control approach has now been altered at least modestly" as "[eixisting law has granted private
parties varying degrees of influence over each of the steps in which government is the prime actor."
Id.
77. Stewart recognizes that "reconstituting" regulatory laws to "steer the overall tendency of
institutions' decisions in the desired direction without attempting to dictate particular outcomes in
every situation" is the most promising solution to existing regulatory inefficiency "of the centralizing
command and control techniques relied upon so heavily in recent decades." Stewart, supra note
58, at 352.
78. Stewart suggests that two "powerful external constraints" on command-and-control regula-
tion will force future reliance on other modes of regulation: the political constraint on increased
federal spending and the need to maintain international competitiveness. Id. at 355-56.
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B. DISADVANTAGES OF AUDITED SELF-REGULATION
The same researchers and analysts have identified three principal potential
shortcomings of audited self-regulation. First, because the regulated entities are
left directly or indirectly in charge of implementation, self-regulation raises the
possibility of not only inadequate enforcement of a regulatory program but also
concerted anticompetitive conduct in opposition to the program's goals.79 Sec-
ond, even if the self-regulator conducts itself properly and implements the pro-
gram vigorously, regulation by its nature increases the amount of unreviewable
discretion exercised by the self-regulator and even the auditing agency itself.
Finally, there are political limitations on the scope and types of regulation that
Congress would likely permit to be delegated, no matter how efficient that
delegation might be in theory.
1. Inadequate Enforcement
Leaving the regulation to the regulated brings the possibility that an agency
could be thereby or was already "captured" 80 by the subject industry. It might
thereby subvert the regulatory goals to its own business goals, when the purpose
of the regulation in the first place was premised on some market failure. 8 It
is widely asserted that even the agencies themselves are subject to significant
interest-group pressure,8 2 and that pressure could be expected to be even greater
upon a group composed of industry members. Even with the best of intentions,
industry members or self-regulatory groups may be unwilling to commit the
resources that vigorous self-enforcement would require.83
79. See, e.g., Grumbly, supra note 40, at 98.
80. For a summary of the political and economic theories of capture, see MITNICK, supra note
1, at 206-33 (providing evidence suggesting "some support" for capture theories); THOMPSON &
JONES, supra note 9, at 95-101 (describing development of economists' "supply and demand" theory
of regulation); and BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 45, at 44-45 (describing the capture theory as
"a tenet of academic political science"). The avoidance of capture was a frequent goal of the social
legislation of the 1960s and 1970s. BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 45, at 45.
81. Bardach and Kagan make the somewhat contradictory point that self-regulation can become
as burdensome, as fraught with legalistic rules, and as ineffective as direct regulation. Id. at 234-
38. They seem, however, to lay the fault mostly at the feet, again, of the government regulators,
who impose unreasonable procedural requirements in place of the unreasonable substantive rules.
Id.
82. ROGER G. NOLL & BRUCE M. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION 29-41
(1983) (using "interest group" model of the regulatory process and concluding each regulation is
beholden to the interest group that originated or currently controls it). Sunstein calls this the
regulatory paradox that "independent agencies are not independent." Sunstein, supra note 70, at
426-28. He notes that although this is not necessarily more true of independent agencies than
executive agencies, the potential is certainly greater. Id. at 427-28.
83. Karmel, supra note 40, at 1310 ("Vigorous policing by self-regulators of their own members
is inherently difficult. Furthermore, [where self-regulators) compete against each other . .. , it is
extremely difficult for one . . . to uphold a standard that a competitor does not enforce."); BARDACH
& KAOAN, supra note 45, at 219 ("[F]irms may not be induced to hire professional specialists in
quality control or safety or environmental protection, or, if they do, to give them any intracorporate
clout."); Sam S. Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical Examination, 42 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 853, 862 (1985) ("SROs generally do not appear to have any greater access to industry
expertise than their governmental counterparts.").
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Furthermore, because any effective industry self-regulatory body consists al-
most by definition of a large combination of members, any activity taken in
concert to standardize their conduct, however wholesome, runs the risk of viola-
tion of the antitrust laws if it produces injury to competition.84 This is a point
often raised by both antitrust enforcement agencies85 and the courts.86
2. Exercise of Unreviewable Discretion
Self-regulation entirely discards what was supposed to be one of the major
advantages of command-and-control regulation, namely, the implementing
agency's adherence to strict rules and regulations, furthering the fundamental
American tenet of reliance on the "rule of law."" This change, however, is
also a source of one of the perceived advantages of the process: the implementing
officials' ability to tailor enforcement to particular industries or practices, making
it more effective.88
It is impossible to predict in the abstract whether an increase in discretion
is likely to lead to overregulation or underregulation as measured against any
politically or economically "ideal" amount. Pressures push both ways on the
decisionmaker, and the results would be very fact-dependent.89 It is also impossi-
ble to reconcile the benefits of more discretion with the perceived harm of
unreviewable discretion.9" The solution is to properly review and limit the discre-
tion, not to eliminate it altogether,9 or to concede that the exercise and control
84. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 19, at 254-68 (describing how even voluntary standard-setting
programs can result in unfair practices and unfair methods of competition); Miller, supra note 83,
at 867 ("Negative impact on competition may be the most severe drawback of self-regulation.").
85. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
86. See infra part III.C.1 for a discussion of how to design self-regulation to best avoid antitrust
concerns as expressed by courts.
87. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
88. This advantage was cited by critics of command-and-control regulation's inevitable produc-
tion of broad regulations unsuitable for use by any regulated entity. See supra notes 70-71 and
accompanying text.
89. For example, Miller demonstrates how both could happen even in the same agency: "Para-
doxically, SROs are charged with providing insulation from more effective governmental regulation
as well as with a tendency to overregulate." Miller, supra note 83, at 860 (footnotes omitted).
90. This problem arises not only from the philosophical standpoint of what amount of discretion
is acceptable but also from the practical standpoint of designing efficient rules. See Colin S. Diver,
Regulatory Precision, in MAKING REGULATORY POLICY 199, 202-05 (Keith Hawkins &John M. Thomas
eds., 1989) (describing the countervailing considerations of "transparency, congruence, and simplic-
ity" in writing efficient rules).
91. Davis summarizes the contradictions and the solution.
A rule of law must permit needed discretionary power. It should not eliminate or try to eliminate
all discretionary power. . . . Discretion is indispensable for individualized justice, for keeping
law abreast of new conditions and new understanding, for new governmental undertakings for
which rules have not yet been developed, and for some programs for which no one knows how
to write rules.
A main goal of a rule of law should be to eliminate unnecessary discretionary power. American
law and practice are shot through with discretion that can and should be eliminated.
DAvis, supra note 14, at 115. The unnecessary discretion, he continues, can be checked, among other
ways, by providing guiding standards when rules are not feasible and by requiring open statements
of standards, findings, and reasons for action, and adherence to precedent when discretion is exercised.
Id. at 115-17. Bardach and Kagan caution that supervision of self-regulation can result in documenta-
tion concerns and responsibilities. BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 45, at 238-39.
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of agency discretion is a constantly evolving or revolving phenomenon with no
one proper result for any agency or type of regulation.
92
3. Political Restrictions on Delegation
In some areas of protective regulation, it is simply unnecessary to ask even
hypothetically if a particular problem should be delegated to self-regulators.
Though Congressional oversight of agencies and their programs is often limited,
there are clearly topics beyond peradventure.93 No matter how efficient banks
or industry groups might be, Congress certainly would not consider turning
any portion of safety and soundness inspections over to the industry in the wake
of the savings and loan and bank failures of the 1980s and 1990s. 9"
III. Elements of Effective Audited Self-Regulation
Part II, in describing the development of self-regulation and its attendant
advantages and disadvantages, suggests that certain characteristics of an indus-
92. Keith Hawkins and John M. Thomas review Davis' and other scholars' works on discretion
and conclude:
The regulatory process is populated by bureaucracies intent on avoiding criticism, since after
all they are government agencies whose policies reflect external political demands. To fail to
recognize this dynamic is to assume that an optimal degree of discretion can be defined and
structured.
In addition to the well-known constraints of the external political environment, the exercise
of discretion is a function of the type of decisionmaking task and the professional values of
officials. As a consequence, it is highly problematic to control and change the amount of discretion
in the regulatory process.
Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas, Rule-Making and Discretion: Implications for Designing Regulatory
Policy, in MAKING REGULATORY POLICY, supra note 90, at 272-73.
93. William Cary, generalizing from his experience as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, concluded that "[ilt may seem lacking in courage, but I believe it is safe to conclude
that agencies seldom take controversial steps under their rule making power which do not have
some support from Congress." CARY, supra note 15, at 53.
94. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS pts. I-IV (1991) (proposing, in addition to capital mainte-
nance and insurance reforms, increased and improved supervision). But see Oedel, supra note 7,
at 333-74 (describing early banking self-regulation). There are other examples. One is the Federal
Communications Commission's "fairness" doctrine. See Bloch, supra note 15, at 66-84. Another
example is the Department of Agriculture's meat inspection system. Although physical inspection
of each animal slaughtered is required by law, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 604-605 (1988), such inspection
is not effective in identifying bacterial infestations that are today considered a primary cause of
food-borne illnesses. Carole Sugarman, U.S. Meat Inspections Come Under Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Feb.
9, 1993, at B9. Nonetheless, Congress rebuffed the Department's attempts to modify the physical
inspection system, ultimately removing all funding for the program. See FSIS to Withdraw SIS but
Repropose Cattle Inspection Charges, FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Aug. 3, 1992 at 31; Daniel P. Puzo, Does
Streamlined Beef Inspection Work? L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1992, at H37. The vitality of this impression
was demonstrated by the Department's response to the January 1993 outbreak of illness and deaths
apparently linked to contaminated beef sold in Washington fast-food restaurants. The initial response
was to require additional inspectors in the slaughterhouses, despite the current inability to test for
microorganisms. See generally Sugarman, supra (discussing the need to update the meat inspection
system); Richard Gibson & Scott Kilman, Tainted-Hamburger Incident Heats Up Debate Over U.S.
Meat-Inspection System, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1993, at BI (discussing measures to improve meat
safety).
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try, regulatory agency, and regulatory statute are required for self-regulation
to be effective. These are summarized in part A below. In addition, various
provisions in the Constitution require that the self-regulatory process provide
fundamental procedural fairness; these are discussed and applied in part B be-
low. Finally, part C discusses the design of a self-regulatory system to avoid,
to the extent possible, liability under antitrust or tort law doctrines.
In general, the following conclusions are reached. First, the private entity to
which self-regulatory authority is granted must have both the expertise and
motivation to perform the delegated task. Second, the agency staff must possess
the expertise to "audit" the self-regulatory activity, which includes independent
plenary authority to enforce rules or to review decisions of the delegated author-
ity. Third, the statute must consist of relatively narrow rules related to output-
based standards. It may be either inter- or intra-industry in scope, but it should
not be limited to traditional rate-and-entry regulation. Finally, the agency's
and delegated authority's decisions must observe rules for notice, hearing, im-
partiality, and written records of proceedings and decisions.
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDUSTRY, REGULATION, AND AGENCY
1. The Industry
The most important component of effective self-regulation is, of course, the
industry itself,95 or group of industries subject to the regulations.96 There must
be within each firm or organized industry group individuals who are able and
willing to implement the regulations at hand.
Ability requires expertise. There is no evidence that government is inherently
able to attract better experts than private industry or industry groups. What
is required is a preexisting investment by the industry in human and perhaps
physical capital as well, with the capability to translate the government-mandated
general standards into firm-specific rules to produce the desired results. 97
More important, the regulated entities must be motivated to comply. This
motivation can be supplied by a preexisting professional group that performs
many facets of self-regulation; 9' by the spotlight of public scrutiny from interest
groups of workers, consumers, or others;9 9 or by the industry's recognition that
95. See THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 305-06 (1984) (concluding that "[flor
all parties who seek to understand regulation, the most important single consideration is the appropri-
ateness of the regulatory strategy to the industry involved").
96. In the case of the newer inter-industry regulations, it is difficult to conceive of a particular
"industry," save for the regulatory experts, to be conscripted for self-regulation, for example, safety
engineers or environmental officers at the thousands of different work sites and emissions sites
subject to regulation.
97. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
98. This was the case with many of the self-regulatory programs discussed below; see infra part
IV.A. 1 (securities exchanges), part IV.B.l.a (hospital accreditation); part IV.B.2 (college and uni-
versity accreditation).
99. Vogel notes a significant difference in the social regulation of the 1960s and 1970s from
earlier regulation in that it was largely imposed on the regulated with outside support from citizen
and consumer groups. Vogel, supra note 55, at 171-75; see also Alfred W. Blumrosen, Six Conditions
for Meaningful Self-Regulation, 69 A.B.A. J. 1264, 1269 (1983) ("Only in this situation will the
regulated institutions believe that regulation is permanent.").
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effective regulation is in its own economic self-interest.00 In addition, incentives
can be created by the self-regulatory program itself if it is carefully designed
to increase certainty of regulatory outcomes, simplify the process, and provide
measurable benefits to outweigh the "start-up" costs of implementing and inter-
nalizing the new regulatory scheme."°1 Indeed, the roots of self-regulation lie
in the spirit of government/industry cooperation in the 1920s, created from the
compulsory regulation of many of those same industries during World War 1.102
A meaningful grant of autonomy in the self-regulation arrangement will itself
serve to motivate.1 °3 There may be a certain amount of "inherent" motiva-
tion, 114 though this will serve mostly to ensure compliance with the regulations
once adopted. Of course, in instances in which direct government regulation,
however cumbersome, is a realistic alternative, it must always be present in
the minds of the regulated entities.105 Whether the initial force is external or
internal,1"6 the result must be a genuine willingness on the part of the industry
to implement the regulation effectively.
Effective implementation, in turn, means that the "incentive" to comply must
not be created by making other groups worse off that are the intended beneficiaries
of the regulatory program in the first place. In rate-and-entry regulation, for
example, industries are perceived as having monopolistic powers and consumers
as being unprotected. There is little reason to expect significant self-regulation
in traditional rate-and-entry regulation, as it is the cooperation in pursuit of
self-interest that is the source of the public injury in the first place.l17
100. See, e.g., MCCRAW, supra note 95, at 201-02 (contrasting the approaches taken by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in regulating over-the-counter dealers, where it had the indus-
try's cooperation, and in reorganizing public utility holding companies, where it had the industry's
virulent opposition).
101. Michael H. Levin, Getting There: Implementing the "Bubble" Policy, in SOCIAL REGULATION,
supra note 40, at 90-91. Indeed, one measure of a regulatory program that is a good candidate
for self-regulation is that it is currently so unwieldy that it would yield such incentives upon reform.
102. See Ellis Hawley, Three Facets of Hooverian Associationalism. Lumber, Aviation, and Movies, 1921-
30, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 55, at 97-101 (referring to programs of Secretary
of Commerce Herbert Hoover, building on the initiative of private enterprise demonstrated during
World War I).
103. See Gerald P. Berk, Approaches to the History of Regulation, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE,
supra note 55, at 197 (citing as examples the period of "Hooverian associationalism" discussed by
Hawley, see Hawley, supra note 102, and the self-regulation of the over-the-counter securities market
by the National Association of Securities Dealers since 1939).
104. Even with direct government regulation, the rate of voluntary compliance is ordinarily high.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 99, at 1267 ("Meaningful self-regulation will be undertaken
when the regulated community perceives that it is the lesser evil.") This concept is the source, in
federal regulation of securities exchanges and broker-dealers, of the popular historical references
to the "big stick" or the "shotgun behind the door" in characterizing the government's reserved
powers of direct regulation. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF
SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 501-02 & 693-98 (1963)
[hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY]. See also infra part III.A.3 (residual authority of the agency).
106. Blumrosen, supra note 99, at 1268-69 (suggesting that the best incentive for self-regulation
in employment discrimination law comes from a combination of pressures from the regulating
agency for reports and compliance plans and from the public in the form of residual liability).
107. This is the type of regulation primarily done by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
Federal Maritime Commission, Federal Communications Commission, and formerly by the Civil
Aeronautics Board and Federal Power Commission. Regulation of rates and service typically involves
two diametrically opposed groups in a "zero-sum" negotiation over the price, which makes this
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2. The Regulation
It is apparent from part II that self-regulation is related primarily to the
"social" regulation of the 1960s and 1970s. The major characteristics of
those laws are their application across industry lines and the typical focus
on "internalizing externalities" in the economic sense; that is, requiring
industries to account for costs of production previously unmeasured, such
as pollution, unsafe working conditions, and unsafe products. It is precisely
these types of laws that can be implemented in a uniquely efficient manner
by industry because they affect the costs of production, which are complex
factors unique to each firm. On the other hand, these "externalities" can
be effectively "internalized" only if the costs can be efficiently transferred
to industries, something the industry will not like. This is why traditional
health and safety regulation has been considered a poor candidate for self-
regulation as long as consumer and labor groups are unable to provide a
check on management's motivation to comply with the regulation when it
has no economic incentive to do so.'0
8
In addition, the requirements of the law must be objectively stated, ideally
in terms of output requirements or standards. 0 9 An objective statement of stan-
dards allows the self-regulators concretely to measure, and the agency to review,
their performance in the same terms as the legal requirements.' This also
reduces the amount of unreviewable discretion, both by the regulators and the
reviewing agency, to a minimum, consistent with standards that are still suffi-
ciently adaptable to be realistic."' The desire for specificity should not, however,
deteriorate into command-and-control minutiae." 
2
type of regulation a poor candidate for self-regulation. Telephone Interview with Gerald Vaughn,
Deputy Bureau Chief for Operations, Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commis-
sion (Feb. 26, 1993). But see Bailey & Baumol, supra note 73, at 115-25 (suggesting that market-based
regulation is possible even in traditionally near-monopolistic industries).
108. Telephone Interview with Neil Eisner, Assistant General Counsel for Regulation and En-
forcement, Department of Transportation (Dec. 7, 1992).
109. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY 143 (1993) ("[Instead of complicated
laws, the federal government should enact simple laws that would help private arrangements work
better."). Schoenbrod suggests four characteristics of a statute that provides adequate direction:
(1) it provides "a clear answer" in most cases; (2) by resolving most cases, it indicates the weight
the legislature gives to conflicting goals; (3) courts, rather than agencies, have the final say in its
interpretation; and (4) it must be changed by legislation. Id. at 183. Moreover, providing such
"clear answers" does not mean that Congress need replicate agency regulatory efforts through
legislation. Id. at 135.
110. See Blumrosen, supra note 99, at 1268 (asserting that for self-regulation to be effective,
standards must be established by law and the results to be achieved must be measurable).
111. See Diver, supra note 90, at 226 (demonstrating that concrete guidelines are especially im-
portant in "[p]rograms administered on a highly decentralized basis"). Rules enforced through
self-regulation would likely fit into this category.
112. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 45, at 236-37 (indicating the ease with which agencies
could replace unworkable detailed substantive standards with unworkable detailed procedural re-
quirements for meeting substantive standards); SCHULTZE, supra note 58, at 87-88 (cautioning that
incremental replacement of command-and-control with incentive-based regulation is essential to its
success).
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3. The Agency
The most important characteristic of the agency, apart from its legislation
discussed above, is expertise.13 Each of the areas of potential self-regulation
requires the "auditors" to have technical knowledge sufficient to evaluate com-
pliance, as well as a knowledge of how to test compliance itself. 114 There will
remain inevitable discretion to be exercised even in supervision of compliance
with the clearest standards." 5 Furthermore, discretion is required in the agency's
own exercise of its reserved enforcement powers. The agency must take sufficient
independent action to motivate self-regulation without stifling it." 6 Expertise
in discretion is difficult to identify,' 7 but it is necessary.'
B. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
In part A, the components of the industry, the regulations, and the agency
necessary for effective self-regulation were described. This part discusses legal
rules of procedural fairness applicable to any program of group self-regulation.
1. The Nondelegalion Doctrine
The Constitution limits the ability of Congress to delegate its lawmaking
function to others. This limitation is broadly referred to as the nondelegation
doctrine. The only certainties about the nondelegation doctrine are that it
lacks a precise constitutional foundation,"' it is incapable of precise formula-
113. See Grumbly, supra note 40, at 116 (concluding that if an agency's technicians are not held
in high regard by the industry, "any move toward self-regulation may have to be accompanied
by substantial efforts to upgrade the regulators' technical and scientific proficiency").
114. One reviewer of the Securities and Exchange Commission's regulation of securities ex-
changes confirmed this need:
SRO [self-regulatory organization] initiative dampens SEC incentive to develop capacity to review
SRO actions in a meaningful way. The SROs, though considered public institutions under the
law, view investor and public interest through the lens of their members' welfare. Self-regulation
thus makes the regulator's task both simpler and more difficult.
Walter Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755, 779 (1984).
115. For example, agencies must avoid impatience in adopting incentive-based regulation that
may create instead a replica of the prior command-and-control system. See supra note 112 and
accompanying text.
116. Blumrosen posits requirements for successful self-regulation that hinge on these discretionary
abilities. Blumrosen, supra note 99, at 1268 ("A vigorous enforcement program must exist to provide
incentives for self-regulation."), 1269 ("Administration and interpretation must support and encour-
age self-regulation.").
117. Successful supervision of self-regulation requires the ability to "exploit the natural incentives
of regulated interests to serve particular goals that the regulators themselves have carefully defined
in advance." McCtAw, supra note 95, at 308 (footnote omitted).
118. See Lipton, supra note 12, at 541-48 (developing rules in securities regulation for determining
whether duplicate authority should be exercised in a specific instance by the agency or by the
self-regulatory authority, but acknowledging that such rules are not comprehensive and that their
"application often requires a subjective interpretation of a regulatory problem").
119. "The nondelegation doctrines are derived from the separation of powers principle, which
is implicit in the structure of the Constitution." Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government:
The Private Regulators and Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 187 (1989). The
specific constitutional foundations are the vesting of legislative power in the Congress in the first
sentence of Article I and the vesting of executive power in the President in the first sentence of
Article II, see HaroldJ. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive. Congressional Delegations of Administrative
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tion and application,' 20 and it is doubtful whether it even exists at all.' 21
Paradoxically, although the nondelegation doctrine perhaps is nonexistent,
the principles underlying it have always been clear: "Administrators should not
have unguided and uncontrolled discretionary power to govern as they see
fit.' ' 22 The fundamental issue is thus not whether Congress may delegate its
power, because clearly it may do so, 2 3 but rather due process.' 24 Although the
process due in each case cannot be stated in the abstract, 125 the law does, or
sound public policy should, 126 in each case provide fundamental process rights.
Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62, 71-72 (1990), and the vesting of
judicial power in the courts as well in the first sentence of Article III, see Abramson, supra, at 194-
97. Courts rely on other grounds equally, however, including the Due Process Clause and the
antitrust laws. See id. at 199-208 (procedural due process and state action); George W. Liebmann,
Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650, 656-57 (1975) (state
action and antitrust law); Stewart, supra note 58, at 343-44 (discussing the development of "new
subconstitutional principles of administrative law to replace the now waning separation of powers
jurisprudence").
120. See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 119, at 208 (arguing that commingled concepts have resulted
in "murky rationales" from the Supreme Court); DAvis, supra note 14, at 160 (charging that limits
on delegation are "so vague as to be meaningless"). Interestingly, the most severe criticism is
usually reserved for cases discussing delegations to private parties. See Krent, supra note 119, at
94 (such delegations "coexist with our current understanding of the separation of powers doctrine
only uneasily, at best"); Abramson, supra note 119, at 187 n.124 (quoting various commentators
referring to delegation to private parties as "not crystalliz[ing] any consistent principles," "largely
confused and unprincipled," and "a conceptual disaster area").
121. See DAVIs, supra note 14, at 150 ("the nondelegation doctrine has . . . no reality in the
holdings"); Stewart, supra note 58, at 350 (reinvigorating classic nondelegation doctrines would
"amount to a constitutional counterrevolution"); Lawrence, supra note 25, at 649 ("Private exercise
of federally delegated power is no longer a federal constitutional issue."). The recent cases invalidat-
ing analogous congressional innovations-Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), and INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)-do not, strictly speaking, involve delegations of legislative, executive,
or judicial power, but rather attempts by Congress to expand its powers beyond those granted by
Article I. See Krent, supra note 119, at 77-78 & n.40.
122. DAVIS, supra note 14, at 206. Davis also states, "But the courts have found by experience
that that purpose cannot be accomplished through the traditional nondelegation doctrine." Id.
123. Id. at 149-50. This is as true of delegation to public agencies or employees as to private
groups, since decisions under the nondelegation doctrine have not distinguished between delegations
to government employees and those to private parties. See Krent, supra note 119, at 69; Abramson,
supra note 119, at 210. But see SCnOENBROD, supra note 109, at 135 ("The Supreme Court has said
that time limitations require Congress to delegate but supports this conclusion only with the observa-
tion that the federal government does delegate." (footnote omitted)).
124. See DAVIS, supra note 14, at 207 (purpose of the doctrine should be "protection against
unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power"); Abramson, supra note 119, at 209 & n.260
(many commentators have suggested replacing the nondelegation doctrine with the Due Process
Clause).
125. The specific requirements themselves are unclear, and in the case of private parties, there
is the threshold question of the existence of "state action" making the private activity subject to
constitutional requirements in the first place. See Abramson, supra note 119, at 199-208. In addition,
the expansion of procedural rights in reviewing administrative discretion has come to a pronounced
halt. Further "judicial innovations" would "respond more to the symptoms of the problem than
its underlying roots .... Moreover, the current and likely future federal judiciary has little enthusi-
asm for it." Stewart, supra note 58, at 348-49.
126. For example, Davis's argument for a reconstituted nondelegation doctrine focused on pro-
tecting against uncontrolled discretionary power, which he admits would be a "sweeping" change.
DAVIS, supra note 14, at 206-07.
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These include rulemaking with broad participation by all affected groups,12 7
disqualification of decisionmakers who have conflicting interests, 28 and adjudica-
tion on notice, with an opportunity to be heard, following binding general rules
and with explicit findings and reasons.'
29
2. Due Process Requirements
An alternative source of process requirements is the Fifth Amendment, which
applies to nongovernmental entities only if they are engaged in "state action"
involving an individual's liberty or property interest. 3 ' Although courts have
difficulty with the threshold question of state action in some instances,131 self-
regulatory organizations clearly are so acting.'32 Assuming that one of the pro-
tected interests is involved,' the issue once again is what process is due in
each case. The Supreme Court has remained steadfast in its reliance on a
balancing test'34 to determine what process is due, a test that has been criticized
127. See Stewart, supra note 58, at 347. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the
United States have generally endorsed the rulemaking requirements under the Administrative Procedure
Act with slight modifications. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
Public Participation in Administrative Hearings, 1 C.F.R. § 305.71-6 (1994); Procedures for the
Adoption of Rules of General Applicability, 1 C.F.R. § 305.72-5 (1994); Procedures in Addition to
Notice and the Opportunity for Comment in Informal Rulemaking, I C.F.R. § 305.76-3 (1994);
Interpretive Rules and Statements of General Policy, 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1994).
128. This requirement applies equally to rulemaking and adjudication. See Decisional Officials'
Participation in Rulemaking Proceedings, I C.F.R. § 305.80-4 (1994) (rulemaking); Abramson,
supra note 119, at 202. See also infra note 129 and accompanying text (adjudication).
129. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044,
1132 (adherence to precedent, if any, established by general rules), 1145 (notice, opportunity for
hearing, independent decisionmaker); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory
Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 475 (1986) ("the participation
of an independent adjudicator is . . . an essential safeguard [regardless of context], and may be
the only one").
130. Others have suggested that due process is a common-law requirement. See WILLIAM A.
KAPLIN, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 568-69 (2d ed. 1985); Courts Oulahan, The Legal Implica-
tions of Evaluation and Accreditation, 7 J.L. & EDUC. 193, 223 (1978).
131. See Abramson, supra note 119, at 203 & n.219.
132. Id. at 169 (characterizing programs such as audited self-regulation as "formal governmental
deputizing of private persons"), 213 (concluding that "[slince, by definition, the private actor has
been made a public actor, its action will constitute state action"); see also Intercontinental Indus.,
Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 941 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972)
(due process required in stock exchange delisting proceeding); Villani v. NYSE, 348 F. Supp. 1185,
1188 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'dsub nom., Sloan v. NYSE, 489 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1973) (beyond question
that due process rights apply to exchange disciplinary proceedings because the exchanges are exercising
federal powers); Eleanor D. Kinney, Suits by DisappointedApplicants: Due Process, etc., in PRIVATE ACCRED-
ITATION IN THE REGULATORY STATE 2 (American Bar Ass'n Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory
Practice ed., May 21, 1993) ("Given that the decisions of private accreditors in these disputes pertain
directly to certification for participation in government-sponsored health insurance programs, the
determination of whether state action exists should be straightforward .... ).
133. It is likely that a program of audited self-regulation will affect liberty or property interests,
as with the brokers and listed companies in Villani, 348 F. Supp. 1185, and Intercontinental Indus.,
452 F.2d 935. But see O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 786-88 (1980)
(holding that the government decision to strip a nursing home of accreditation and thus eligibility
to participate in Medicaid does not involve residents' Fifth Amendment interests). It is difficult
to state in the abstract what interests will qualify for protection. See Abramson, supra note 119, at
214 n.286.
134. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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and is difficult to apply in the abstract.' 35 The requirements in decided cases,
however, are very similar to those applied under the nondelegation doctrine
above: an unbiased decision maker, 3 6 notice, an opportunity to be heard, and
a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, for example.137
C. LIABILITY OF SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS
An additional area of concern in designing a program of audited self-
regulation is certainly the exposure to liability of the self-regulatory organizations
or individual actors. The major sources of any such liability are the antitrust
laws and tort law. Although the background issues are discussed below, it is
impossible to state in the abstract the "proper" extent of exposure in these
areas, since that decision involves policy judgments and the position of the
actors in each industry that admit of no "right" answer. For example, although
the regulators would likely desire that their liability be severely limited if not
eliminated altogether, sound reasons can be given for permitting broad liability
under antitrust'
3 8 and tort law.' 39
1. Antitrust Liability
Self-regulation involves by its very nature collusive conduct in restraint of
competition, the activity at the very heart of the antitrust laws.'4° It is virtually
impossible to obtain an explicit statutory exemption from the antitrust laws.141
Nor would such an exemption necessarily be wise policy, since antitrust proscrip-
135. Abramson, supra note 119, at 201-02.
136. See Villani, 348 F. Supp. at 1190-91; Rite Aid Corp. v. Board of Pharmacy, 421 F. Supp.
1161, 1169 (D. N.J. 1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 951 (1977) (holding that due process, applicable
in this case because of "state action" subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, requires an impartial
tribunal, and that a board composed of plaintiff's competitors could nonetheless be impartial pro-
vided that they have no immediate pecuniary interest).
137. Intercontinental Indus., 452 F.2d at 941-43. See generally Oulahan, supra note 130, at 225-26
(concluding that due process in educational accreditation "would seem to require, at the minimum,"
published criteria for measurement, published procedures for review or appeal of an adverse decision,
opportunity for a hearing with representation, and a decision on the record showing the basis of
the decision).
138. See, e.g., Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1963) ("the antitrust laws are peculiarly
appropriate as a check upon anticompetitive acts of exchanges which conflict with their duty to
keep their operations and those of their members honest and viable").
139. See Peter H. Schuck, Liability to those Injured by Negligent Accrediting Decisions, in PRIVATE
ACCREDITATION AND THE REGULATORY STATE, supra note 132, at 4 ("If the tort system is to ensure
that the social costs of poor accreditation decisions are internalized and borne by those who can
best minimize them, it will have to provide an effective cause of action against accreditors.").
140. 7 PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1477, at 343 (1986) ("trade associations are routinely
treated as continuing conspiracies of their members"). But see Consolidated Metal Prods., Inc. v.
American Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 293-94 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[A] trade association is not
by its nature a 'walking conspiracy,' its every denial of some benefit amounting to an unreasonable
restraint of trade."). Whether a conspiracy is found may depend in part on the existence of process
protections. See infra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
141. Such an attempt was rejected by a congressional committee. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY,
supra note 49, at 155-64. There are some exceptions, however. See 7 U.S.C. § 608b(a) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (exemption from the antitrust laws for agricultural marketing agreements); see also
infra part IV.D.1. Regarding the general grants of immunity to peer reviewers and peer review
organizations, see infra note 168 and accompanying text.
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tions have been recognized as beneficial even when operating within a significant
regulatory program. 142
It is difficult to predict the impact of antitrust litigation even in a particular
program, much less to extend any concepts generally to systems of audited
self-regulation, since liability likely does not turn on the structure of the program
from the outset but rather on the particular impact on the antitrust plaintiff in
a given case. Nonetheless, the process protections discussed in part III.B above
are also relevant to antitrust analysis in two respects: they may permit a court
to imply an exemption from the antitrust laws, and they may help define the
boundaries between permissible conduct and illegal conspiracies.
An antitrust exemption will be implied only where necessary for the underly-
ing regulatory scheme to work, and only if the agency has made the antitrust
inquiry of whether the restraints on competition are both reasonable and the
least-restrictive means toward the regulatory end. 1' Thus, the agency must have
the benefit of a fully developed record in order to make an antitrust inquiry
adequate for the reviewing court. 144 Process protections are vital in developing
such a record. The same considerations would hold true for the deliberations
of the self-regulatory organization. Initially, rules for antitrust immunity in the
context of audited self-regulation arose primarily from cases in the securities
industry. 45 In a dispute between the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and
one of its members, 46 the Supreme Court found "unjustifiable" action by the
NYSE because it proceeded without notice or hearing in its regulation. 147 Al-
though failure to observe procedural fairness is no longer considered tantamount
to an antitrust violation, 14 process requirements nonetheless likely remain rele-
vant in determining whether an exemption should be implied. 49 In a later
142. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 49, at 164. See also supra note 138 and accompanying
text.
143. See 1 AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, supra note 140, 22
4
e.
144. Id. at 152. Areeda and Turner focus on the need for deliberation at the agency level, but
the same considerations hold true for deliberations of the self-regulatory organization. See Silver
v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 361-62 (1963).
145. Perhaps this is because the audited self-regulation in the securities industry is the most
well-established and developed of any model. See Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-
Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws. Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L.
REV. 475, 476-78 (1984). Smythe notes that it is possible but unlikely that similar antitrust protection
would be given to largely voluntary regulatory efforts. Id. at 514-15.
146. Silver, 373 U.S. at 341.
147. See id. at 361-62.
148. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 291-93 (1985) (limiting Silver to its facts, where lack of procedural protections were relevant
in not finding an implied exemption from the antitrust laws in the Securities Exchange Act and
holding that due process concerns generally do not affect analysis of conduct otherwise actionable
under the antitrust laws). If there is no impact on competition, therefore, even arbitrary exclusion
of a competitor may not be actionable under the doctrines set forth in Northwest. See Moore v.
Boating Indus. Ass'n, 819 F.2d 693, 710-13 (7th Cir. 1987); Goss v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 
7
89
F.2d 353, 354-55 (5th Cir. 1986). See generally Robert Heidt, Industry Self-Regulation and the Useless
Concept "Group Boycott", 39 VAND. L. REV. 1507 (1986).
149. The repudiation of Silver in Northwest extended only to the suggestion that procedural protections
could save otherwise actionable conduct. See Northwest, 472 U.S. at 293. The Court in Northwest did
not hold that due process protections were irrelevant for purposes of determining whether a regulatory
program effected an implied repeal of the antitrust laws, which was the issue before the Court in Silver.
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case, the Court cited the pervasive oversight by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) of NYSE rules in granting an exemption from antitrust
liability for price-fixing, an activity otherwise clearly illegal. 5 ' The Court relied
upon the existence of oversight authority and the actual use of that authority
in balancing competitive and regulatory concerns.' 5 ' Although later cases have
suggested it is unlikely that an exemption will be implied,152 the decision is in
any event very dependent on the particular facts of each case.'
53
Process protections are also relevant in determining whether there is conduct
actionable under the antitrust laws. Disregard or manipulation of process has
been held to be actionable anticompetitive conduct, 5 4 while a showing of compli-
ance with that process can remove the unfairness or impropriety that is an
essential element of an actionable conspiracy.' Process is all the more important
in a program of audited self-regulation, since by definition there is conduct in
restraint of trade;' 56 the only protection may be a fair process that prevents a
court from finding any conspiracy. Even in the case of unregulated trade associa-
tions, extensive procedural protections have been recommended. 157 Those should
150. See Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 681-82 (1975). See also Austin Mun. Secs., Inc. v.
National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 757 F.2d 676, 694-95 (5th Cir. 1985) (implied immunity
from antitrust liability for investigation by NASD of its members); Harding v. American Stock
Exch., 527 F.2d 1366, 1370 (5th Cir. 1976) (implied immunity for delisting of a company's stock
from trading on a stock exchange).
151. Smythe, supra note 145, at 507; Austin Mun. Secs., 757 F.2d at 695.
152. See AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, supra note 140, 223.2, at 235-40 (Supp. 1993)
(reviewing recent cases, all of which failed to find an implied immunity).
153. 1 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 140, at 135-36.
Regulatory regimes also vary widely in the comprehensiveness of their powers over the firms
they regulate and in the degree to which ordinary competitive forces are left to operate. Thus,
the room left for the continued operation of normal antitrust rules will differ greatly among
regulated industries. Such variations mean that the antitrust result will depend on the particular
language and structure of each regulatory statute. Id.
154. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 570-71 (1982);
Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817 F.2d 938, 946-47 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'd,
486 U.S. 492 (1988). There, of course, must be separate evidence of an economic impact. See supra
note 148.
155. See Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 488-89 (1st Cir. 1988).
156. See supra text accompanying note 10 (regulation is defined as alteration of behavior "backed
by the use of penalties"). In most cases, even unregulated trade associations are engaging in
"continuing conspiracies." 7 AREEDA, supra note 140, at 343-46. Thus, voluntary associations that
certify only products or services are not in violation of the antitrust law where fair practices or
procedures are followed, since there is no actionable conduct. See Wilk v. A.M.A. 895 F.2d 352,
374 (7th Cir. 1990); Consolidated Metal Prods., Inc. v. American Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284,
292 (5th Cir. 1988).
157. See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Federal Agency
Interaction with Private Standard-setting Organizations in Health and Safety Regulation, I C.F.R.
§ 305.78-4 (1994). Paragraph 6(c) of that Recommendation states that the standard-setting associa-
tion should ensure that: (1) membership includes all affected groups; (2) notice of action is given to
interested parties; (3) interested parties have an opportunity to participate; (4) careful consideration is
given to minority views and objections; (5) supermajority approval is required for a standard to
be effective; (6) there is an adequate opportunity for review; (7) there is a record maintained
sufficient to document compliance with process requirements; and (8) the entire process is open
to public scrutiny and review. Id.
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be extended to audited self-regulation, which has all the more anticompetitive
potential.
Thus, there appear to be three separate sources of process requirements in
a system of audited self-regulation: the nondelegation doctrine, the due process
clause, and antitrust law. The nondelegation doctrine focuses on the control of
discretion, the due process clause focuses on protection of the property interest
of the regulated entities, and the antitrust laws focus on the protection of the
competitive process. Despite these distinct purposes, there clearly is some overlap
between each of these sets of standards. Establishing minimum procedural stan-
dards will not only further compliance with the nondelegation doctrine'58 but
also likely assure more widespread acceptance by the industry and the public. "9
In addition, the requirement of plenary agency authority over the self-regulator
and the regulated entities themselves insulates self-regulation from nondelegation
and antitrust attacks, and provides more complete assurance, through agency
supervision, of the efficacy and legitimacy of the self-regulation itself."'
2. Tort Liability
Audited self-regulation involves private organizations regulating the conduct
of others. Any such limitations on conduct necessarily bring the possibility of
claims for damages. No matter how good the procedure, a regulated entity
might attack the self-regulatory organization's decision on its merits.
Lawsuits against self-regulatory organizations fall generally into two catego-
ries. First, the regulated entity may directly challenge the particular action: a
hospital that had its accreditation stripped, making it no longer eligible for
Medicare reimbursement, or a securities broker who was censured, fined, or
expelled by the stock exchange. Second, injured third parties may sue for dam-
ages: patients whose Medicare coverage was terminated, investors who were
defrauded by a poorly regulated market or an unscrupulous broker, or students
at a college where accreditation was not renewed, thus eliminating any possibility
for federally guaranteed student loans.' 6 '
158. Smythe, supra note 145, at 509 n.164 ("[D]elegation to the private sector, if done on the
securities industry model, would . . .avoid the constitutional [nondelegation] problems.").
159. BARAM, supra note 19, at 60.
160. Jennings, supra note 48, at 679-90 (positing that "any . . .public institution to which has
been 'delegated governmental power' should be subject to greater governmental oversight in several
respects" and presaging several reforms, such as agency review of membership denials and disciplin-
ary actions, review of self-regulatory organization rules, and independent authority to make and
enforce self-regulatory organization rules that came to pass in amendments to the securities laws
in 1975); Smythe, supra note 145, at 509 & n.164 (the framework adopted by the 1975 amendments
will provide maximum protection from antitrust immunity, nondelegation attacks while avoiding
"an increasingly cumbersome and insensitive federal bureaucracy").
161. There are, of course, other actions as varied as tort law that are not relevant to this article.
For example, the same underlying facts discussed in the hypotheticals in the text might support
actions for defamation, fraud, or abuse of process. These actions, however, require some greater
intent on the part of the defendant and are thus distinguishable from actions sounding in negligence,
which are the main concern of self-regulators. See JOHN D. BLUM ET AL., PSROs AND THE LAW
183-91 (1977). In addition, there are occasional claims for damages caused by self-regulators but
unrelated to the merits of the regulation. See, e.g., Dilk, supra note 29, at 593 (discussing Lavitt
v. United States, 177 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1949), an action "to recover damages . .. for the burning
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The first type of action, direct attack on the self-regulator, may be foreclosed
by a decision to grant immunity (ordinarily reserved for members of the govern-
ment) 162 to self-regulatory organizations that exercise quasi-governmental func-
tions, notably prosecution or enforcement.163 Since governing statutes or regula-
tions provide for agency and ultimately judicial review of the organization's
decision, a disappointed regulated entity will ultimately have a cause of action
for the relief sought. 164
The second type of action by third parties-a suit for damages-is more
troublesome. Cases involving such allegations, however, generally are resolved
in favor of the self-regulatory organization by imposing a high standard of
actionable misfeasance, higher standards for reliance and causation, 161 or sim-
ply refusing to extend the accreditor's duty to third parties at all. 167 In some
instances there are explicit statutory grants of immunity. 68 Such statutes are
rare, however, and courts in other areas have been willing to expand the duties
of a potato warehouse through the alleged negligence of three potato inspectors"); KAPLIN, supra
note 130, at 570-71 (discussing Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1980), an action alleging
defamation of a law school faculty member by an American Bar Association consultant during an
accreditation inspection).
162. See generally Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (granting immunity to Secretary of
Agriculture in initiating administrative action against commodities dealer); Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731, 744-48 (1982) (discussing the background and development of the governmental
immunity doctrine).
163. See e.g., Kwoun v. Southeast Missouri Professional Standards Review Org., 811 F.2d 401
(8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988) (immunity from damages caused by action of
peer review organization resulting in exclusion of physician from participation in Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursement programs); Austin Mun. Secs., Inc. v. National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers,
Inc., 757 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1985) (immunity from damages caused by institution of disciplinary
proceedings by NASD against member).
164. Indeed, access to the courts on direct review has been relied upon by courts in several cases
finding immunity from liability, assured that there remain safeguards against arbitrary conduct. See
Butz, 438 U.S. at 515-16; Kwoun, 811 F.2d at 408; Austin Mun. Secs., 757 F.2d at 690.
165. See 7 U.S.C. § 25(b)(4) (1988) (requiring that a plaintiff in action for damages based on
violation of provisions of Commodity Exchange Act must establish that the defendant "acted in
bad faith in failing to take action or in taking such action as was taken, and that such failure or
action caused the loss"). This language, added in 1982, codified the previously understood standard
implied under the Act. Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271, 276 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Hochfelder
v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 367-68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974) (holding
that a stock exchange is not liable for failure to enforce its own rules regarding actions of president
of member firm unless it knows or has reason to know of the individual's misfeasance, or there
are acts or events which would put the exchange on notice of possible violations); Spicer v. Chicago
Bd. Options Exch., No. 88-C-2139, 1990 WL 172712, at 16-17 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 1990) (holding
that stock exchanges and their members were not liable to investors in market in aftermath of
"Black Monday" 1987 for "negligence or simple errors of judgment" (citations omitted)). But see
Evans v. Kerbs and Co., 411 F. Supp. 616, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (referring to Hochfelder as "essen-
tially a negligence standard").
166. Schuck, supra note 139, at 4-5.
167. Id. at 6-8.
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (immunity for peer review organizations);
id. § 1111 (a)(1) (immunity for peer review generally). Agricultural marketing orders, see infra part
IV.D.1, provide in each instance for limited liability of the citizens serving on each marketing
committee. For example,
[no member or alternate of the committee nor any employee or agent thereof, shall be held
personally responsible, either individually or jointly with others, in any way whatsoever, to any
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of those who provide information about a provider of services to the third-party
consumers of those services.1
69
The extent of private liability is not necessarily relevant in designing a pro-
gram of self-regulation unless it is essential to the program that any such liability
be eliminated entirely. Otherwise, there are other factors more important to
the development of tort law generally and decided only on a case-by-case basis
that should determine the outcome of those cases. As with antitrust liability,
however, adherence to pristine procedure may nonetheless be advantageous. It
will not, of course, prevent liability for otherwise actionable conduct. But if
proper standards of care are observed, documentation of the rules and proce-
dures followed will greatly assist scrupulous self-regulators in their own de-
fense. 170
IV. Survey of Current Uses of Audited Self-Regulation
This part surveys existing programs"' in several widely different regulatory
areas. Each program possesses most or all of the required attributes of audited
self-regulation as defined in part I. In each instance, the program is measured
against the requirements for effective implementation discussed in part III, and
the benefits of the program are compared with the benefits predicted in part
II.
A. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, SERVICES, AND PRODUCTS
Federal regulation of financial institutions is extensive. Each of the areas
where audited self-regulation is used or has been considered is discussed below.
1. Securities Exchanges and Market Participants
The long-established model of supervised self-regulation is regulation of the
nation's securities exchanges and broker-dealers by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in conjunction with the exchanges and the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD). Collectively, the exchanges and the NASD
are referred to as self-regulatory organizations (SROs).'72
Although the regulation of securities exchanges and broker-dealers is relatively
handler or to any other person for errors in judgment, mistakes, or other acts, either of commission
or omission . .. except for acts of dishonesty.
7 C.F.R. § 905.88 (1994).
169. Schuck, supra note 139, at 13-20.
170. BLUM ET AL., supra note 161, at 185-86.
171. The discussion below of the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, see infra part IV.C,
does not technically describe an existing program of self-regulation, because the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission was prohibited by statute from using the rules of the self-regulatory organization in
lieu of its own rules. See infra notes 423-25 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, this example is
included in this article because it is similar to other programs of formal reliance on self-regulation,
and it continues to be an example of informal reliance on self-regulation.
172. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(26), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (1988).
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uniform today, each has a separate origin. 173 The nation's securities exchanges
were first federally regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 74 Before
1934, the exchanges on their own had imposed a significant degree of regulation
on their members. 1 75 In drafting regulatory legislation, "Congress assumed that
its task included incorporating the existing self-regulatory institutions (i.e., the
stock exchanges) into the new regulatory system." 7 Direct government regula-
tion was discussed,
177 but rejected as impractical.
178
The original regulation of securities exchanges was modest by current stan-
dards. Each exchange was required to register with the SEC, agree to comply
with the Act, enforce compliance by its members, and adopt rules governing
their members-including rules requiring discipline for conduct "inconsistent
with just and equitable principles of trade.' ' 79 The SEC was given authority
to suspend or revoke an exchange's registration and to adopt rules for the
exchanges in certain areas.180
• The securities brokers and dealers themselves were subject to regulation by
the exchange if they were at exchange member firms, subject to the above
requirements of the Act. A significant amount of other trading, however, took
place outside the exchanges, or "over the counter," by brokers and dealers
who were not exchange members. Regulation of this group proceeded on a
parallel track. Because little was known about this market, Congress originally
provided in the 1934 Act general rulemaking authority for the SEC over brokers
and dealers who were not exchange members.' 8' In exercising that authority,
the SEC required the registration of these firms, and in 1936 Congress amended
173. The history of the development of regulation of the securities markets has been widely
researched. The following discussion is only a brief summary of much fuller treatments elsewhere.
See 6 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2787-2816 (tracing the development
of the regulation of the securities markets), 2788 n.3 (including a listing of major works that give
full treatment of the development of securities regulation) (3d ed. 1990).
174. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
175. Jennings, supra note 48, at 667-69; Smythe, supra note 145, at 480-81; Miller, supra note
83, at 869.
176. Smythe, supra note 145, at 481.
177. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 105, at 501. In a later study, a Congressional committee
concluded that "[e]vents preceding [the Securities Exchange Act] caused public regard for the
exchanges to be so low that it would have been politically feasible to have made even greater
changes than those made by that Act." SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 49, at 80.
178. "Self-regulation was originally advanced and adopted as a feature of Federal control on
the ground of practicality. Initially, attention was focused on the exchanges ...and it was thought
that the extent of the control necessary, either actually or potentially, made direct governmental
intervention ineffective, if not impossible." SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 105, at 501.
179. Securities Exchange Act § 6(b), 48 Stat. at 886 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f(b)(5) (1988)).
180. See generally Jennings, supra note 48, at 670-71 (summarizing new requirements in 1934).
The power to suspend or revoke a registration was regarded, even at its origin, as severe, and has
rarely been used. Id. at 671; Smythe, supra note 145, at 483; Douglas C. Michael, The Untenable
Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards, 47 Bus. LAW. 1461, 1502 n.242 (1992).
181. Securities Exchange Act § 15, 48 Stat. at 895-96. "The brevity and generality of this
treatment arose from a realistic recognition of the great difficulties of working out in any detail a
suitable plan of regulation at that time, in view of the fact that so little was then known concerning
these markets." S. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 4 (1938).
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the Act to require registration of all broker-dealers who effected transactions
outside a registered exchange. 82
Regulation of broker-dealers outside the securities exchanges suffered from the
lack of any preexisting organization comparable to the exchanges on which to
build a self-regulatory system. The Investment Bankers Conference Committee,
largely created at the SEC's behest, was organized for that task. '83 New legislation
was considered necessary to properly constitute that committee as a self-regulatory
organization, with regulation patterned after the securities exchanges. 8 4 As with
the exchanges,' 85 direct government regulation was considered and rejected.' 86
Although regulation of over-the-counter brokers was patterned on regulation
of the exchanges, it differed in at least two respects. First, Congress was con-
fronted with organizing the SRO from the outset, whereas the exchanges had
had a long history of voluntary regulation, and was thus able and willing to
improve on the exchange model.'87 Second, "[wihereas the stock exchanges
... resisted governmental oversight, the [over-the-counter dealer SRO was]
an outgrowth of a desire by responsible representatives of the ...business for
some form of industry self-regulation."'
88
The resulting legislation, known as the Maloney Act, 8 9 provided for registra-
tion with the SEC of "national securities associations" similar to the securities
exchanges but governing nonmember broker-dealers and trading of securities
not listed on the exchanges. In addition to the powers granted the SEC over
the exchanges, the statute added the ability of the SEC to review disciplinary
proceedings and to propose rule changes, which were considered significant
additions.'90 The SEC informally approved the idea of a strong national securi-
182. See Pub. L. No. 74-621, § 3, 49 Stat. 1375, 1377-79 (1936). See 15 DAVID A. LIPTON,
BROKER-DEALER REGULATION § 1.01, at 1-3 to 1-7 (1988). Because most broker-dealer firms that
were stock exchange members also effected transactions over the counter, this resulted in registration
of virtually all broker-dealers (except specialists and floor brokers, who did their trading only on
the floor of the exchange) with the SEC. Id. § 1.01, at 1-6.
183. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 105, at 604-05. The Committee originated as the Investment
Bankers Code Committee, one of several "industry code" groups formed under the National Industrial
Recovery Act. Even when that Act was declared unconstitutional in 1935, Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the code committee continued its activities and reorganized
itself, all with the SEC's encouragement. SPECIAL STUDY, supra, at 605; accord Smythe, supra note
145, at 484.
184. See Hed-Hofmann, supra note 48, at 205 & n.81.
185. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
186. See Howard C. Westwood & Edward G. Howard, Self-Government in the Securities Business,
17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 518, 526 (1952); SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 49, at 82-
83.
187. In the wake of the failure of the National Industrial Recovery Act, the SEC recognized
that government regulation must be more comprehensive (to be legally sufficient) as well as less
intrusive (to be politically realistic). At the same time, a major scandal at the New York Stock
Exchange provided the impetus to distinguish the new SRO from the NYSE, then held in low
esteem. See Hed-Hofmann, supra note 48, at 205 & n.82.
188. Jennings, supra note 48, at 675.
189. Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938).
190. Jennings, supra note 48, at 675-76; SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 105, at 705-06. These changes
were referred to as "a substantial advance over the pattern of self-regulation applicable to the stock
exchanges," Jennings, supra, at 677, and as "[t]he existing allocation of regulatory responsibility
between the exchanges and the Commission . .. , but 'with 1938 improvements,' " SPECIAL STUDY,
supra, at 606.
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ties association,' 9' and the NASD was registered as the first national securities
association shortly after passage of the Maloney Act. It remains the only such
organization today.'92
Thus established on parallel tracks, self-regulation by the securities exchanges
and the NASD ran until they were joined in 1975. The change was precipitated
by the "paperwork crisis" of 1968-70, when a marked increase in trading
volume overwhelmed the antiquated trade-settlement mechanisms in the indus-
try, forcing trading to be curtailed and many securities firms into insolvency.'
93
Congress responded initially with the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970114 to safeguard investors from losses due to their brokers' financial difficult-
ies, 195 and then with a comprehensive reform of the self-regulation of the securi-
ties industry. In the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,196 the self-regulation
and SEC oversight was unified and strengthened. Reversing the process of the
1934-38 era, Congress used the pattern of SEC supervision of the NASD as
the model, now imposing the stricter provisions of that law on the securities
exchanges as well, collectively referring to them in the statute as "self-regulatory
organizations."' 97 In addition, the Act expanded the supervision of the SROs'
self-regulation. 98 It provided for complete review and approval by the SEC
over the SROs' rulemaking,' 99 allowed the SEC to proceed administratively
against a substandard SRO, 00 and gave the SEC independent authority to
enforce SRO rules in court.2'
Finally, in 1983, Congress closed the remaining gap in self-regulation. Since
1964, all broker-dealers that were not members of the NASD or an exchange
had been subjected to similar self-regulatory rules imposed directly by the
SEC.20 2 Congress found that the more flexible sanctions available through the
NASD were preferable to the limitations on direct SEC action, confirming "the
191. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 105, at 606. But see Hed-Hofmann, supra note 48, at 206
("One of the unexpected results of the Maloney Act was the emergence of only one organization
of broker dealers instead of many."); Westwood & Howard, supra note 186, at 526.
192. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 49, at 82; Lipton, supra note 12, at 528 n.1;
Smythe, supra note 145, at 478.
193. For descriptions of the crisis, see SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 49, at 3-13; H.R.
REP. No. 123, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45 (1975); SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY
OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS, H.R. Doc. No. 231, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1971); 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 173, at 2897-907.
194. Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-
78111 (1988)).
195. See H.R. REP. No. 123, supra note 193, at 45.
196. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
197. See H.R. REP. No. 123, supra note 193, at 48-49; S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., lst Sess.
26-28 (1975); accord SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 49, at 112.
198. See S. REP. No. 75, supra note 197, at 26-36.
199. Securities Exchange Act § 19(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)-(c) (1988).
200. See id. § 19(g)-(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)-(h).
201. See id. § 21(d)(1), (e)-(), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1), (e)-(O.
202. This was known as the "SEC Only" or "SECO" program, because these broker-dealers
were subject to regulation by the SEC directly and not through any SRO. 6 Loss & SELIGMAN,
supra note 173, at 2815.
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desirability of self-regulation" heralded in the 1975 amendments. 23 Direct SEC
regulation was eliminated, and all broker-dealers are now required to be mem-
bers of either an exchange or the NASD.0 4
This system of supervised self-regulation, continuously modified over the sixty
years since its inception, is certainly the longest and most comprehensive federal
government experience with audited self-regulation. At each point of major
reform, the fundamental soundness of the system has been reaffirmed. 25 Al-
though its origin may have been in part due to the "historical accident" of a
preexisting self-regulatory structure in the case of the securities exchanges,2 6
it has been built up far beyond this original structure. As it stands today, the
system of audited self-regulation contains the attributes identified in part III
above as necessary for effective self-regulation.
Has the audited self-regulation of securities exchanges and broker-dealers
produced the benefits that analysts project from such a system? As measured
against the theories in part II, the results are encouraging. There have been
assertions that the securities industry self-regulation does not result in better
rules, 20 7 more precise and efficient enforcement, 208 congruence with members'
preexisting self-interest,20 9 or lower overall costs of regulation.210 In retrospect,
however, most of the reformers call not for scrapping the system, but for recog-
nizing the full power of the agency as a supervisor of self-regulation. 2 1 At each
point of reform discussed above, the agency's powers were in fact broadened.
It appears that the ability and willingness of the SEC to perform its "audit"
tasks vigilantly remains the key to success.
2. Commodity Exchanges and Market Participants
The Commodity Exchange Act 2 12 provides for comprehensive regulation of
the nation's futures21 3 markets under the supervision of the Commodity Futures
203. H.R. REP. No. 106, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1983). The legislation affected few broker-
dealers and generated a small cost savings to the SEC. See supra note 51.
204. See Securities Exchange Act § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (1988).
205. See H.R. REP. No. 123, supra note 193, at 48-49; SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note
49, at ix; SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 105, at 504.
206. Smythe, supra note 145, at 478.
207. Commentators have questioned the assumed expertise of the self-regulators, see Miller, supra
note 83, at 862, as well as their ability to write better rules in "ethical" areas, see Hed-Hofmann,
supra note 48, at 209-10. But see Jennings, supra note 48, at 678 (concluding that in this area "the
Commission, the Congress, and the industry seem justified in supporting the extension and refine-
ment of the self-regulatory philosophy").
208. The enforcement has been criticized as too dilatory, see Hed-Hofmann, supra note 48, at
210-12, and as too swift and unfair, see Miller, supra note 83, at 865-67.
209. Hed-Hofmann, supra note 48, at 206-08; Miller, supra note 83, at 867-68.
210. Hed-Hofmann, supra note 48, at 212; Miller, supra note 83, at 864-65; Jennings, supra note
48, at 677.
211. See Miller, supra note 83, at 885-87; Hed-Hofmann, supra note 48, at 217; Jennings, supra
note 48, at 690.
212. Ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-23 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993)).
213. "Futures" is a shorthand reference for a variety of instruments. The original agreement
that was the source of business for the nation's boards of trade was a futures contract, which is
"a binding agreement to take delivery of or to deliver a known quantity of a commodity which
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Trading Commission (CFTC). The history of this regulation provides one of the
best studies of the progress of audited self-regulation from its earliest origins-
regulation of commodity exchange products and trading practices-to one of
its most modern applications, the regulation of participants in those markets.
Futures markets were first federally regulated in the Grain Futures Act of
1922,214 which provided primarily for registration of commodity exchanges with
the Department of Agriculture and prohibited futures trading outside these
registered exchanges.2 15 The original purpose of the regulation was to prevent
manipulation by forcing all trading onto a registered exchange and requiring
those exchanges to police and prevent manipulation. 21 6 Exchanges had only to
file required reports with the government and to prevent the dissemination by
their members of false or misleading information and manipulation of prices.
21 7
Although the new authority was used by the Department of Agriculture to
conduct numerous investigations into abnormal trading, "its role was one of
investigation and . . . actual regulation was conducted by the exchanges."
218
The underlying rationale for relying on self-regulation of commodities markets
fits with several of the hallmarks for successful self-regulation discussed in part
III. The exchanges were recognized as having an economic self-interest in assur-
ing a minimum level of fair play in the trading on their markets.1 9 In addition,
the exchanges had demonstrated a level of expertise in what was recognized,
even in the formative stages, as a complex and technical subject best understood
by the participants.220
There followed for the next fifty years increasing dissatisfaction with the self-
is of a uniform quality at a price specified at the time the contract is made." Marshall J. Nachbar,
Contract Market Self-Regulation Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 573, 574 n.2
(1982). The growing trade in primarily agricultural commodities required standardization of these
contracts, which was the original impetus for the formation of the nation's commodity exchanges
or boards of trade in the mid-nineteenth century. JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULATION 4-5 (1987). Since that time, these contracts have grown
dramatically in scope, covering not only agricultural commodities but also other physical products,
financial instruments, foreign currency, and market indexes. In addition, the types of contracts
have grown in variety, including options on commodities and options on futures contracts. Nachbar,
supra, at 575-76 & n.4; MARKHAM, supra, at 179-249 (describing instruments traded and regulated).
214. Ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922). The Act was given its current name in 1936. See Commodity
Exchange Act, ch. 545, § 1, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)).
215. Ch. 369, §§ 4 & 6(a), 42 Stat. at 999-1001 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6 & 8 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993)).
216. See MARKHAM, supra note 213, at 15 (noting that the Grain Futures Act "forms the core
of the current regulatory scheme").
217. Ch. 369, § 5, 42 Stat. at 1000-1001 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1988)).
218. MARKHAM, supra note 213, at 18. The exchanges had a long though spotty history of disciplin-
ing their members. Though "abuses were rampant" at the exchanges, id. at 5, disciplinary actions
brought by the exchanges against their members were uniformly upheld in the state courts, see
Jonathan Lurie, Commodities Exchanges as Self-Regulating Organizations in the Late 19th Century: Some
Perimeters in the History of American Administrative Law, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 1107, 1130-38 (1975).
219. "[T]he purpose of self-regulation is to protect the integrity of the marketplace. An exchange
which does not assure the public customer of a fair deal will suffer a large number of dormant
contracts." Nachbar, supra note 213, at 578.
220. Lurie, supra note 218, at 1137-38 (describing deference by state courts in the 1800s to
exchange decisions on design of contracts as well as disciplinary proceedings, based on the exchanges'
expertise).
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regulatory abilities of the commodity exchanges. In 1936, the Act was signifi-
cantly amended to require federal registration of brokerage firms (known as
futures commission merchants, or FCMs) and traders on the floor of the ex-
changes,2 l to prohibit by federal statute fraud and excessive speculation,222 and
to require the exchanges to enforce their own rules. 223 Again in 1968, federal
authority was further extended to expand the types of prohibited conduct, 224 to
give the Department of Agriculture administrative enforcement authority over
any market participants 25 and authority to review exchange rules,2 26 and to
establish for the first time minimum financial requirements for FCMs. 2 7 Far
from extending self-regulation, the 1968 amendments "reflected a deep animos-
ity between the Agriculture Department and the industry it was regulating."228
In 1974, additional authority was granted to the government, and administra-
tion of the Act was transferred from the Department of Agriculture to the new
CFTC. 29 In addition to expanding government regulation, Congress for the
first time since 1922 reexamined and reaffirmed the basic structure of audited
self-regulation of the industry.230 The new CFTC was given authority over the
commodities exchanges similar to that previously given the SEC over securities
markets.231 In general, the CFTC had to approve all exchange rules 32 and was
authorized to require new exchange rules in certain areas 3 and to require the
exchanges to enforce their own rules.
2 34
The above regulatory structure includes most of the elements listed in part
221. See Commodity Exchange Act §§ 4d-4e, ch. 545, § 5, 49 Stat. 1491, 1494-95 (1936)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6d-6e (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
222. See Commodity Exchange Act §§ 4a-4c, ch. 545, § 5, 49 Stat. at 1492-94 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6a-6c).
223. See Commodity Exchange Act § 5a, ch. 545, § 7, 49 Stat. at 1497 (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. § 7a).
224. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4b, amended by Pub. L. No. 90-258, § 5, 82 Stat. 26, 27
(1968) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
225. See Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c), Pub. L. No. 90-258, § 5, 82 Stat. at 31 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 13b).
226. See Commodity Exchange Act § 8(a)(7), Pub. L. No. 90-258, § 5, 82 Stat. at 33 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7)).
227. See Commodity Exchange Act § 8(a)(3)(I), Pub. L. No. 90-258, § 5, 82 Stat. at 32 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 12a(3)(I)).
228. MARKHAM, supra note 213, at 52. Industry opposition to the legislation was strong. Id. at
54-55.
229. See Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(2)-(11), Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 101, 88 Stat. 1389,
1389-90 (1974) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
230. MARKHAM, supra note 213, at 63. For a general summary of the provisions of the 1974
legislation, see id. at 65-72.
231. The pattern of supervised self-regulation established in 1938 with the Maloney Act, dealing
with the SEC-NASD relationship, was relied upon in the 1974 legislation. That pattern was itself
extended the following year to SEC regulation of the securities exchanges. See supra part IV.A.I.
232. Commodity Exchange Act § 5a(12), Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 210, 88 Stat. 1389, 1401 (1974)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7a(12) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
233. Commodity Exchange Act § 8a(7), Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 213, 88 Stat. at 1404 (codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7)) (changes may be made in areas including but not limited to trading and
execution requirements, financial responsibility rules, solicitations, and recordkeeping).
234. Commodity Exchange Act § 6b, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 212(b), 88 Stat. at 1403-04 (codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 13a). See generally MARKHAM, supra note 213, at 68-70 (summary of new provisions
relating to CFTC's authority over contract markets).
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III as needed for effective audited self-regulation. The increasing resort to direct
regulation of the commodities exchanges suggests, however, the government's
growing frustration over the years with the exchanges' abilities. The resulting
failure to obtain many of the benefits listed in part II can be attributed to the
lack of incentive of the commodities exchanges to comply. One commentator
has argued that the exchanges' monopoly on trading futures-type products has
reduced their economic incentive to maintain fair markets, as evidenced by the
recent undercover investigation of the exchanges by government agents.235 When
these exchanges were first regulated in 1922, no comparable authorities existed
to regulate off-exchange trading, and such trading was simply prohibited. Today
that void has been filled by federal and state securities laws. 236 Thus, if off-
exchange trading were allowed, it is argued, "competition could assure that
exchanges remain innovative by creating new, more attractive futures contracts
and that their marketplaces remain free of fraud and achieve maximum effi-
ciency." 237 Although the economic self-interest underlying effective audited self-
regulation may be waning in the regulation of commodities exchanges, it there-
fore could be returned.
In contrast to this checkered history of audited self-regulation in the commodi-
ties markets, the relatively recent regulation of the participants in those markets
makes extensive use of this regulatory technique. From the outset, Congress
and the CFTC recognized the need for audited self-regulation in oversight of
the entities directing trades on the commodity exchanges.
In the same 1974 legislation that reformed regulation of commodities markets ,238
Congress authorized the CFTC to register a new type of self-regulatory organiza-
tion, a "futures association," to regulate industry members.239 The CFTC would
have full oversight of a futures association, comparable to SEC oversight of the secu-
rities markets.2 41 Such an association "would benefit the [CFTC] by reducing its
regulatory burden while allowing it to focus resources on oversight and enforcement
functions most appropriate to a Federal agency." 24 Although modeled after the
creation of the NASD in 1938, this futures association was fundamentally different.
Because there is no over-the-counter trading in commodity futures, unlike securi-
ties, there was no preexisting organization, nor would there be an economic self-
235. Jerry W. Markham, The Commodity Exchange Monopoly-Reform Is Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 977, 987-93 (1991).
236. Id. at 1002.
237. Id. at 1003.
238. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
239. See Commodity Exchange Act § 17, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 301, 88 Stat. 1389, 1406-07
(1974) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 21 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
240. Compare id. (limiting the scope of the CFTC's oversight authority under Commodity Ex-
change Act § 17(k), 7 U.S.C. § 21(k) to certain subjects) with Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§§ 15A & 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3 & 78s (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (containing no such limitation
of the SEC's oversight authority under Securities Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)). See
also supra part IV.A.1; CFTC REPORT, supra note 51, at 147-49. At least one court, however, has
indicated that the SEC's § 19(c) powers might be restricted in areas not closely related to its
regulatory responsibilities. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(stating in dictum that with respect to rules "which do not regulate members and are not related
to the purposes of the [Exchange] Act, the (SEC]'s . . . powers will be quite limited").
241. CFTC REPORT, supra note 51, at 15.
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interest in regulation among its members. 24 2 Initial attempts to organize such an
association were stymied until Congress in 1978 authorized the CFTC to make
membership in such an organization mandatory243 and in 1982 authorized the
CFTC to delegate to such an organization all of its registration responsibilities under
the Act. 24 '4 These provisions were added to dispel concerns about antitrust and non-
delegation problems. 245 The first and only such organization, the National Futures
Association (NFA), was registered by the CFTC in 1981 and has assumed responsi-
bility for broad portions of the Act dealing with all registered industry members,
including proficiency testing, audit and financial surveillance, sales practice rules,
registration and arbitration.
246
In the NFA, Congress and the CFTC have provided for a distinct type of
self-regulation. It contains the elements of effective audited self-regulation listed
in part III. Interestingly, though, the NFA had no preexisting structure or pur-
pose; its sole function was to take over administration of significant portions of
the Act from the CFTC in order to save federal staff resources. The NFA appears
to have fulfilled many of the advantages of a system of audited self-regulation
discussed in part II. The technique results in a substantial cost savings to the
government, those costs being largely shifted to the regulated industry.247 More
important, however, the self-regulation results in many areas in programs that
are more detailed, informal, and complete than could be undertaken by the CFTC,
even if it were fully funded to undertake those programs directly. 248 Thus, in a
complement to the regulation of commodities exchanges, one of the oldest exam-
ples of audited self-regulation, Congress and the CFTC have created a novel
entity, a private organization that "exists solely for the purpose of regulating and
does not conduct any commercial function." 2 49 Although it was created not by
the self-interest of its members but by government-mandated membership, 250 it
nonetheless fulfills the functions and meets the goals generally recognized for
audited self-regulation.
3. Investment Advisers
Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,5 l the SEC is charged with regis-
tration of investment advisers. 252 Among other requirements, registered advisers
242. Id. at 16.
243. See Commodity Exchange Act § 17(m), Pub. L. No. 95-405, § 22(4), 92 Stat. 865, 876
(1978) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 21(m) (1988)).
244. See Commodity Exchange Act § 17(o), Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 233(5), 96 Stat. 2294, 232 1-
22 (1983) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 23(o) (1988)).
245. CFTC REPORT, supra note 51, at 17. For a discussion of the nondelegation doctrine and
application of antitrust laws to self-regulatory organizations, see supra part III.B.1.
246. See CFTC REPORT, supra note 51, at 20-23.
247. CFTC staff estimated that in 1983-85 the NFA's operations resulted in $3.5 million in
direct savings and $16.2 million in avoided additional costs. Id. at 132.
248. Id. at 61, 73 (review of sales practices), 83 (avoidance of multiple registration compliance
costs), 99-100 (informal disciplinary actions).
249. Id. at A-L.
250. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
251. Pub. L. No. 76-768, Tit. II, 54 Stat. 789, 847 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
252. Investment Advisers Act § 203(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c).
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must keep books and records as required by SEC regulations. 253 All such records
are subject to "reasonable . . . examinations by representatives of the Commis-
sion as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.,
2
1
4
In the early 1980s, the number of registered investment advisers began to
increase dramatically, 255 so much so that by 1992 the SEC was able to inspect
each adviser, on average, only once each twenty-five to thirty years.256 By the
mid-1980s, the SEC was looking for other ways to meet its inspection obliga-
tions257 and ultimately proposed a system of supervised self-regulation for inspec-
tion of investment advisers as described below.
In 1986, the NASD began a voluntary experimental program of inspection
of its own members that were conducting advisory activities. 258 In a report
issued in 1988, the SEC concluded that this program "demonstrated both
the feasibility and ability of the NASD inspectors to conduct adviser examina-
tions. " 2 11 In 1989, the SEC submitted proposed legislation to Congress to
authorize registration with the SEC of investment adviser self-regulatory or-
ganizations to conduct adviser inspections subject to SEC oversight. 260 The
legislation was patterned after the self-regulation of broker-dealers under the
Exchange Act. 261' The new self-regulation was intended to provide more effec-
tive inspections, facilitate the development of fair and ethical business prac-
tices, and to do so at private rather than public cost. 26 2 In addition, it was
expected that the investment advisers, having "acquired an interest in regula-
tion to establish their trustworthiness," would be willing to undertake the
effort and expense of self-regulation.
263
The proposed arrangement thus bore the main hallmarks of a program of
successful audited self-regulation. There were several preexisting industry groups
253. See id. § 204, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4. The implementing regulation is Investment Advisers Act
Rule 204-2, 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (1994).
254. Investment Advisers Act § 204, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4.
255. From 1981 through 1991, the number of registered advisers more than tripled, and the
amount of assets they had under management increased more than ten times. H.R. REP. No. 883,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1992); S. REP. No. 312, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992).
256. See S. REP. No. 312, supra note 255, at 4. The SEC does, however, inspect the five hundred
largest investment advisers every three years. Id.
257. Financial Planners and Investment Advisors. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, 118 (1988) (Financial
Planners Report prepared by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter
Financial Planners Report].
258. Id.
259. Id. at 54.
260. See HR. REP. No. 883, supra note 255, at 16-17; S. REP. No. 312, supra note 255, at 4-
5.
261. See S. REP. No. 312, supra note 255, at 4. The system of broker-dealer supervised self-
regulation is described supra part IV.A.I.
262. Letter from David S. Ruder, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, to the
Honorable Dan Quayle, President of the Senate, June 19, 1989, reprinted in [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,422, at 80,188.
263. 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 81 (Supp. 1992).
Audited Self-Regulation 213
with demonstrated willingness and ability to undertake the regulatory program.
The expected benefits were more-efficient inspections, rules more tailored to
the experiences of the regulated entities than government rules might be, as
well as significant cost savings to the government. Prior to the 1980s, the invest-
ment adviser industry was not considered a candidate for self-regulation, though
self-regulation of it had been proposed as early as 1963, because of the lack of
a strong organization in a very diverse industry and the resulting lack of profes-
sional or economic motivation. 264 There was, however, significant industry oppo-
sition to the proposed legislation, and it was not enacted.265 Some industry
members believed that the likely self-regulatory organization, the NASD, did not
sufficiently understand the specialized nature of investment advice in contrast to
the sales and distribution orientation of broker-dealers with which it was more
familiar. 266 In addition, the industry believed that direct government regulation
would in fact be less expensive, an assertion borne out by the SEC's own
study. 267
After the defeat of the 1989 legislative proposal, the SEC began considering
direct government regulation funded by special registration fees assessed on
the investment advisers subject to inspections. 268 Legislation to that effect was
introduced and passed both houses of Congress in 1992,269 but the versions were
never reconciled in conference. The House bill provided that the SEC, at its
option, could designate one or more of the existing broker-dealers SROs-the
exchanges and the NASD-to perform inspections on members not primarily
engaged in the investment advisory business.270 Otherwise, however, the option
of supervised self-regulation was eliminated.
This experience of the SEC in investment adviser inspections indicates that
self-regulation efforts will founder absent the support of a relatively unified
industry. The SEC faced an industry motivated to reform but otherwise still
bearing the fragmentation that made self-regulation unworkable prior to the
1980s. 271' Furthermore, the government demonstrated its ability to perform the
function at a lower cost, with no additional expense to the taxpayer, since
industry would fund the inspections through increased registration fees. 272 The
264. See id. at 38 (1978).
265. See H.R. REP. No. 883, supra note 255, at 17; S. REP. No. 312, supra note 255, at 5.
266. SEC Oversight of Investment Advisers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1992) (statement of SEC Chairman
Richard Breeden).
267. See id. at 129-30 & n.15.
268. This change of heart was due to the lack of support for the legislation, a change in leadership
of the SEC, as well as the possibility, which existed in 1990 but not earlier, that investment adviser
fees might be raised to fund the government's own direct regulation. See SEC Reconsidering Adviser
SRO, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1060, 1061 Uuly 20, 1990).
269. See H.R. 5726, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 2226, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Similar
legislation was introduced in the 103d Congress; see Markey Introduces Bills to Reform Gov't Securities
Market, Advisers Act, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 120 (Jan. 29, 1993).
270. See H.R. 5726, supra note 269, § 4.
271. See supra notes 264-66 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 312, supra note 255, at 6-7.
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option of direct government regulation thus remained realistic. There is still
the potential that the SEC rules will not be as well-tailored to the industry as
SRO rules would have been,273 but the industry has to date demonstrated little
confidence in its own organizations to outperform the government in this area.
4. Accountants
The activities of accountants in preparing, reviewing, and opining on financial
statements have been the subject of two systems of audited self-regulation: the
first under the federal securities laws, proposed in 1987 and ultimately aban-
doned, and the second adopted under 1991 banking reform legislation. Each
is discussed separately below.
Various sections of the federal securities laws require that financial statements
submitted to the SEC or to investors be "audited," that is, certified by an
independent accountant. 74 In order to certify a financial statement, the indepen-
dent accountant must ordinarily ensure that the statement is prepared in accord
with authoritative accounting rules known collectively as "generally accepted
accounting principles" (GAAP).2 75 The procedures followed by the accountant
in reviewing the financial records and preparing the certificate in turn are dic-
tated by authoritative literature known collectively as "generally accepted
auditing standards" (GAAS). 7 6 The SEC, long concerned with audit quality
as a cornerstone of the integrity of financial disclosure under the securities
laws, 77 proposed in 1987 that the accountants themselves be subject to "peer
review" of their audit programs by another accountant.278 That peer review
273. The proposed legislation did not specify standards for SEC rules, so that the SEC would
have the "flexibility to provide the greatest amount of investor protection within the available
resources." Id. at 6.
274. See, e.g., Securities Act Schedule A, pts. 25-26, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25)-(26) (1988) (balance
sheet and income statement in registration statements for securities registered for offer and sale
under the Act); Securities Exchange Act § 12(b)(1)(j)-(K), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(1)(J)-(K) (1988)
(balance sheets and income statements of issuers registering securities under the Act may be required
by the SEC to be so certified); id. § 17(e)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(e)(1)(A) (1988) (balance sheets
and income statements of registered broker-dealers filed annually with the SEC must be so certified);
Regulation S-X, art. 3, 17 C.F.R. § 210, art. 3 (general requirement that financial statements
required under the securities laws shall be audited unless otherwise indicated).
275. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Stan-
dards No. 1, § 150.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972).
276. See CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS, Statement on Auditing Stan-
dards No. 58, § 508.08 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1988). Compliance with GAAS
is required under the terms of the accountant's state-issued license to practice. See REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 69 (1987) [hereinafter
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING]. For a general review of audit procedures and standards,
see HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 5-5 to 5-9 (Robert S. Kay & D. Gerald Searfoss
eds., 2d ed. 1989).
277. See Independent Accountants; Mandatory Peer Review, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,665, 11,668 (1987)
[hereinafter Peer Review Release] ("As a result of improved audits, the Commission believes that
the completeness and accuracy of financial disclosure is improved and the integrity of the financial
reporting process is enhanced.").
278. See id.
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would be done under the auspices of a "peer review organization" (PRO),
which would have to be approved by the SEC. 27 9
As with the establishment of regulation of over-the-counter brokers,280 this
system was proposed with one preexisting industry organization at hand. Most
accountants are members of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun-
tants (AICPA); accounting firms are members of the AICPA's Division for
CPA Firms. Almost all publicly held companies (those subject to SEC reporting
requirements) are audited by firms that are members of that Division's SEC
Practice Section (SECPS).8 1 The SECPS had a mandatory preexisting program
of peer review for its member firms. No firm was at that time required to join
the SECPS, and membership in the AICPA is of course voluntary, though most
accountants are members.282
This proposal by the SEC for mandatory peer review was not classic audited
self-regulation, because a PRO under the SEC's proposal would have no direct
enforcement authority. If a reviewed accounting firm received an unsatisfactory
peer review, it would simply so report. 283 The SEC would make the final determi-
nation whether that accountant's certificate met the requirements of the securi-
ties laws. 284 In addition, no accountant would be required to join any PRO;
the SEC staff would supervise the peer review in that instance.
285
Though not a complete model of audited self-regulation, the peer review pro-
posal did meet several of the requirements for successful self-regulation. The
detailed rules would be made by the self-regulating body, the PRO, which the
SEC believed would have the ability to make more detailed, relevant, and construc-
tive rules and applications. 286 The SEC would retain the role of initially approving
and supervising the PRO, 287 and would retain final independent enforcement
authority. 288 The proposal contained most of the requirements recognized by com-
mentators as necessary for effective regulation of audit quality.289 It would meet
the need for regulation with the least intrusion and the least cost compared to
direct governmental regulation or creation of a new statutory SRO.29 °
The missing element, however, was industry support for supervised self-
regulation. The accounting industry generally was supportive of peer review,
279. See id. at 11,672-75.
280. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
281. See HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING, supra note 276, at 45-16 (SECPS member
firms audit 89 % of all publicly traded companies, accounting for 99 % of the aggregate sales volume
of these companies).
282. See FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING, supra note 276, at 69-70.
283. See Peer Review Release, supra note 277, at 11,674.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 11,675-76. This is similar to the "SECO" program for broker-dealers in effect
from 1964 through 1983; see supra note 202.
286. See Peer Review Release, supra note 277, at 11,669.
287. See id. at 11,675.
288. See id. at 11,676-78.
289. See FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING, supra note 276, at 70-73.
290. Id. at 71.
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but chafed at the suggestion that allegedly substandard audits should be subject
to full review by a PRO and by the SEC as well. 291' A compromise that provided
the SEC staff limited access to SECPS investigation of allegedly substandard
audits was reached in 1985,292 but the SEC in its 1987 proposal made clear
that it should have unrestricted access to these records. 291 Instead, in 1990 the
AICPA approved a rule requiring its member firms that audit companies subject
to SEC reporting requirements to join the Association's SEC Practice Section
and be subject to peer reviews.294 This identical proposal had been voted down
by the AICPA membership in 1986, before the SEC proposal was announced.295
This action was expected to take most of the momentum away from the SEC
proposal,296 and in 1992 the SEC announced withdrawal of the mandatory peer
review proposal.297
A similar regulatory scheme for accountants performing audits of financial
institutions succeeded in mandating and overseeing accountants' peer reviews
where the SEC proposal had failed. In the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA),299 Congress required both annual
and periodic reports from federally insured financial institutions and that those
reports be examined by independent public accountants. 299 An accountant must
300perform an annual audit of the institution's financial statements, review man-
agement's report on internal financial accounting controls,'O and review the
institution's compliance with certain laws and regulations. 2 The audits and
reports prepared by the accountants are to meet the existing professional ac-
counting standards as modified if necessary by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).3 °3
The FDIC is authorized to set qualifications for accountants performing the
work required by the Act.30 4 To be qualified, an accountant must have "received
291. Peer Review Release, supra note 277, at 11,673-74. A later survey of accountants indicated
their strong preference for self-regulation, particularly in the area of ethical standards. See Cohen
& Pant, supra note 49, at 47, 53.
292. See HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING, supra note 276, at 45-20.
293. See Peer Review Release, supra note 277, at 11,675.
294. See HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING, supra note 276, at 45-2 (Supp. 1992).
295. AICPA Members Approve Proposal to Require Mandatory SRO Membership, 22 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 80 (1990).
296. See HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING, supra note 276, at 45-2 (Supp. 1992).
297. See Securities Act Release No. 6958A, 57 Fed. Reg. 45,287, 45,288 n.24 (1992) (noting
that the SEC "will continue to monitor enrollment in and the peer review activities of the SEC
Practice Section").
298. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2242 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
299. Id. at tit. 1, § 112(a), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831m (Supp. V 1993).
300. 12 U.S.C. § 1831m(d).
301. Id. § 1831m(c). The institution's management is required to report annually on the institu-
tion's internal controls and the effectiveness of those controls. Id. § 1831m(b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(B)(ii).
302. Id. § 1831m(e). The institution's management is required to report annually on the institu-
tion's procedures for ensuring compliance and its actual compliance with "laws and regulations
relating to safety and soundness" as designated by federal regulators. Id. § 1831m(b)(2)(A)(iii),
(b)(Z)(B)(ii).
303. Id. § 1831m(c)(2), (d)(1), (e)(2), (f)(1).
304. Id. § 1831m(g)(3).
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a peer review that meets guidelines acceptable to the [FDIC.''3 °5 The FDIC's
implementing regulations adopt the guidelines of the AICPA's peer review pro-
306cess.
Thus, by incorporating private standards in the Act, Congress effectively
delegated to the accounting and auditing standard-setters the promulgation of
standards for the financial institutions' financial reports as well as the accoun-
tants' review of those reports, management's internal control report, and man-
agement's compliance report. By requiring that accountants be approved in a
peer review process, the FDIC delegated to peer review organizations3 7 the
enforcement of those standards. If an accountant does not perform according
to the required standards, there is the possibility of a qualified peer review
opinion, resulting in disqualification under the Act. In addition to this delega-
tion, the FDIC retains the independent authority to require additional or differ-
ent auditing standards"' and accounting standards, 30 9 and may also institute
its own enforcement actions against an accountant, which may result in that
accountant's disqualification. 1 °
In both the proposed SEC program and the new FDICIA requirements,
effective programs of self-regulation would have been or were created. The bulk
of standard-setting and review would be delegated to the private groups with
the expertise and incentive to enforce them. 31' The government's ability to
achieve a federal mandate in the financial institution area, but the SEC's failure
to adopt mandatory peer review for auditors of public companies generally, can
probably be attributed to the more intense public concern over bank and thrift
failures in the late 1980s compared to the concern over audit failures in the
late 1970s and early 1980s.
B. ACCREDITATION FOR GOVERNMENT BENEFIT PROGRAMS
The other major long-standing use of audited self-regulation is the qualifica-
tion of recipients under government benefit or grant programs. The use of
305. Id. § 1831m(g)(3)(A)(ii).
306. Annual Independent Audits and Reporting Requirements, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,332, 31,338
(1993) (guidelines for compliance stating that "[t]he peer review should be generally consistent
with AICPA standards").
307. For a description of the SECPS, the only existing peer review organization, see supra notes
281-82 and accompanying text.
308. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831m(f)(l) (Supp. V 1993) (noting that reports prepared by accountants
under the act shall meet "generally accepted auditing standards and other applicable standards
recognized by the [FDIC]").
309. A separate section of the FDIC Improvement Act concerns accounting standards. Pub. L.
No. 102-242, § 121, 105 Stat. 2250, 2250-51 (1991) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831n (Supp. V
1993)). The FDIC and other financial institution regulators are given the authority to require
different standards "no less stringent than generally accepted accounting principles." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831n(a)(2)(B).
310. 12 U.S.C. § 1831m(g)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1993). See also Annual Independent Audits and
Reporting Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg. 42,516, 42,527 (1992) (restating independent enforcement
authority in proposed rules).
311. Cohen and Pant suggest that a combination of a common set of high moral and ethical
values and a need to maximize self-interest accounts for the willingness of the accounting profession
to self-regulate. Cohen & Pant, supra note 49, at 46.
SPRING 1995
47 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 171
private accrediting organizations, a form of audited self-regulation, is prevalent
under certain programs in health care and education.
1. Health Care Financing
A. HOSPITALS AND OTHER PROVIDERS AND SUPPLIERS
Under the federal programs of Medicare 312 and Medicaid," 3 payments are made
by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) to health care providers and others who treat
eligible patients. Medicare and Medicaid benefits, for example, are available for
inpatient hospital services.11 4 A hospital, however, must meet several requirements
regarding licensing, types and qualifications of staff, operations, environment,
quality assurance, and recordkeeping before it is eligible to receive Medicare
reimbursement for services rendered. 3'5 The Medicare and Medicaid Act and
regulations provide that, in certain instances, accreditation of the hospital by the
312. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 290 (1965) (amending
the Social Security Act of 1935) (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Briefly summarized:
The Medicare program, designed to finance acute medical care primarily for elderly Americans,
also covers some categories of the disabled and those with end-stage renal disease. The program
is divided into two parts: Part A, which provides hospital insurance (HI), and Part B, which
covers supplementary medical insurance (SMI). The HI component includes short-term hospital-
ization, skilled nursing care, and home health services, while the SMI portion covers physician
services, outpatient hospital care, and laboratory fees, as well as home health care.
ALAN L. SORKIN, HEALTH EcONOMICS 187 (3d ed. 1992).
313. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 343 (1965) (amending
the Social Security Act of 1935) (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396u
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Briefly summarized:
Medicaid is a combined federal and state program that provides medical assistance to certain
categories of low-income persons, including those on welfare and some of the medically indigent
(persons whose incomes are too low to pay for medical care). The program is administered and
roughly half the costs are absorbed by the state and local governments.
Mandatory eligibility is now required for persons receiving cash assistance under federally
funded income-transfer programs. Therefore, persons eligible . . . under Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) are automatically eligible for Medicaid .... Persons who are man-
datory recipients of Supplemental Security Income (SSI)-a federal program for the aged, blind,
or disabled-are also automatically eligible for Medicaid. ...
Optional Medicaid beneficiaries are those for whom states may receive federal matching funds
but whose coverage is not required by federal legislation. This group includes medically needy
families with dependent children whose incomes are above the state AFDC limit, as well as
elderly persons who do not qualify for cash assistance. Many of the latter have large medical
or nursing home bills.
SORKIN, supra note 312, at 197-98. The two programs may overlap in coverage as well. "State
Medicaid programs frequently serve to complement Medicare for low-income elderly persons. Med-
icaid may finance cost-sharing amounts as well as other noncovered services for eligible Medicare
beneficiaries who are too poor to pay these bills." Id. at 187.
314. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395d(a)(1) (Medicare coverage), 1396d(a)(1) (Medicaid coverage) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
315. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e), 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.21-42 (1993) (Medicare requirements for basic
hospital functions). Identical requirements apply under Medicaid. 42 C.F.R. § 440.10(a)(3)(iii)
(1993) (mandating that services be provided at a hospital that "meets the requirements for participa-
tion in Medicare as a hospital").
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Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO)16
shall be deemed to be compliance with the above statutory conditions." 7
The JCAHO is a private organization sponsored by groups of health care
professionals and was founded long before the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams.3" 8 Currently, JCAHO accredits most hospitals in the United States, not
only for Medicare and Medicaid but for various other federal and state programs
as well. 319 The remaining hospitals are evaluated for eligibility by HHS under
contract with state survey agencies.
320
The JCAHO-HCFA relationship is comparable with the model of audited
self-regulation in the securities industry. At the outset of each program, the
government was faced with the need to acquire expertise in a technical area
involving several thousand regulated individuals and firms.321 The relationship
did not begin as one of audited self-regulation, however. JCAHO-accredited
hospitals were conclusively deemed to meet conditions for Medicare participa-
tion, indicating Congress's deference to "professional" standards, in 1965.1
22
The "auditing" of the JCAHO and other accrediting agencies by HCFA was
316. Originally the organization was known as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospi-
tals, but the Joint Commission now accredits several different types of health care facilities and
programs, and thus changed its name. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Recognition of Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations' Home Care Program Standards and
the National League for Nursing's Standards for Home Health Agencies, 52 Fed. Reg. 49,510,
49,510 (1987).
317. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (Medicare); 42 C.F.R. § 488.5 (1993)
(Medicare and Medicaid).
318. JCAHO had its origins in efforts in the early 1900s by the American College of Surgeons
to standardize conditions at hospitals and to certify hospitals that met those minimum standards.
See James S. Roberts et al., A History of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, 258 JAMA
936, 937 (1987). For a comprehensive background and early history of the JCAHO, see Timothy
S. Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private Regulation of Health Care and the Public
Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV. 835, 840-52 (1983).
319. See Roberts et al., supra note 318, at 940.
320. The Act requires HHS to contract with states willing to perform the survey and accrediting
function for hospitals that do not have or seekJCAHO accreditation. 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(a) (Supp.
V 1993). The results of those surveys are transmitted as recommendations to HCFA, which makes
the final decision. 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.11-12 (1993). See also Timothy S. Jost, Background: Medicare
and the joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, in PRIVATE ACCREDITATION IN THE
REGULATORY STATE (American Bar Ass'n Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory Practice ed., May
21, 1993) (on file with the author) (JCAHO accredits more than 5,000 hospitals; "[a]pproximately
900 of the hospitals certified for participation in Medicare are not Joint Commission accredited.
Rather they are certified by state survey agencies under contract with the Secretary.").
321. [Tjhere was substantial political pressure to get the Medicare program fully operational
rapidly. President Johnson, with a large political stake in Medicare, believed that its success
depended on maximum access from the beginning of the program, and thus on immediate near
universal hospital participation. Those who had to administer the program were greatly relieved
to have a fully developed quality certification system. ...
Jost, supra note 318, at 853-54 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of similar problems with
broker-dealer regulation, see supra notes 176-178.
322. "Linking the conditions for participation to the requirements of the Joint Commission
provides further assurance that only professionally established conditions would have to be met by
providers of health services which seek to participate in the program." S. REP. No. 404, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1970.
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added in later amendments to the Act in 1972323 and 198424 for Medicare, and
by HCFA regulations for Medicaid.325
Currently, the HCFA has access to the JCAHO accreditation survey for each
accredited hospital,326 may independently accredit or remove accreditation of a
hospital,"2 7 retains authority to add more or different requirements for participa-
tion than those of the JCAHO, 2 and can hear informal appeals from denials
of accreditation or findings of deficiencies by the JCAHO. 2 9 Similar oversight
and independent regulatory authority were provided in HCFA's recent recogni-
tion of the Community Health Accreditation Program (CHAP)30 and the
JCAHO33' to accredit home health agencies for participation in Medicare and
Medicaid.
In 1984, Congress amended the Medicare provisions to expand significantly
the types of entities on which HCFA may rely to accredit private organizations
for participation in Medicare. 332 HCFA has proposed general rules for recogniz-
323. JCAHO accreditation was stripped of its exclusivity in 1972. The Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare (now HHS) was given independent authority to survey accredited hospitals
and to "dce-accredit" those that, despite JCAHO accreditation, did not meet the Act's requirements
according to the Secretary. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 244,
86 Stat. 1329, 1422-23 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395aa(c), 1395bb(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
These amendments were the result of consumer pressure on the JCAHO in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, as well as reports thatJCAHO standards were not kept high and were not well enforced.
See Jost, supra note 318, at 855-56. These amendments may yet be mostly unrealized potential:
"Implementation of these amendments has been largely inadequate." Id. at 915.
324. Audited self-regulation was given a boost in 1984 amendments that significantly expanded
the list of health care providers whose qualification for Medicare could be determined by an outside
accrediting agency. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2346, 98 Stat. 494,
1096 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Congress had two primary
concerns in expanding the potential universe of self-regulators. The first was competence. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1330 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445,
2018 (their standards must be at least as stringent as the Secretary's and must be satisfactorily
applied). The second was the potential for undue restriction of services. Id. (the Secretary must
assure that "the adoption of such standards will not adversely affect competition in the provision
of Medicare health services").
325. Although similar conditions for participation were not articulated under the Medicaid
program, HCFA has by regulation made the conditions for participation in both programs equiva-
lent. See, e.g., supra note 315 (hospitals), 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.20(a)(3)(ii) (outpatient services),
440.40(a)(1)(ii) (skilled nursing facility services), 440.70(d) (home health agencies) (1993).
326. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
327. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
328. There are additional requirements, notably a utilization review plan, which are not
"deemed" to be met by JCAHO accreditation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a)(3) (1988), 42 C.F.R.
§ 488.5(a) (1993). The Secretary also has the authority to adopt more stringent standards than
theJCAHO. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a)(4), 42 C.F.R. § 488.5(c). Although HHS has promulgated
detailed conditions of participation for hospitals, it is much less detailed and less-frequently revised
than the JCAHO standards. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.1-66 (1993) (HHS conditions of partici-
pation for hospitals); see also Jost, supra note 320, at 6 (HHS standards include 13 conditions of
participation, promulgated in 1986; JCAHO accreditation manual contains 28 chapters and is
updated annually).
329. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.6(0 (1993).
330. CHAP is a subsidiary of the National League for Nursing. See 57 Fed. Reg. 22,773 (1992).
331. See 58 Fed. Reg. 35,007 (1993).
332. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2346, 98 Stat. 494, 1096. The
background of prior law and the effect of this amendment are discussed in HCFA's proposed generic
accreditation rules. See 55 Fed. Reg. 51,434, 51,436 (1990) [hereinafter Generic Accreditation Rule].
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ing any accrediting organization's accreditation as sufficient for participation
in these programs.333 These rules impose conditions similar to the hospital and
home health agency rules discussed above with respect to oversight by HCFA,334
and in addition provide HCFA with plenary authority to directly survey any
accredited supplier or provider in order to evaluate the adequacy of the accredit-
ing organization's decisions.
3 35
The proposed generic accreditation rules differ markedly from HCFA's first
attempt at general recognition of private accreditation. In 1982, HCFA proposed
to recognize JCAHO accreditation of skilled nursing facilities and home health
agencies as sufficient for participation in Medicare and Medicaid; and JCAHO
accreditation of intermediate care facilities, which are ineligible for Medicare,
as sufficient for participation in Medicaid . 6 The proposed rule contained only
a one-sentence description of HCFA's oversight ability and responsibility,
37
and was withdrawn after considerable public and congressional pressure. 338 The
1990 proposed rules reflect a greater understanding of the requirements for
effective audited self-regulation consistent with the requirements set forth in
part II of this article.
The HCFA-JCAHO relationship has fared fairly well when measured against
other costs, benefits, and requirements of audited self-regulation. It has with-
stood all challenges based on the nondelegation doctrine to date. 339 There re-
mains, however, significant controversy about the anticompetitive effects of pub-
lic reliance on private accreditation.3 0 In addition, HCFA has expressly denied
333. See Generic Accreditation Rule, supra note 332.
334. See id. at 51,437 (describing validation surveys), 51,441 (proposed rule, to be codified at
42 C.F.R. § 488.7).
335. See id. at 51,437-38 (discussing review of accrediting bodies), 51,441-42 (proposed rule,
to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 488.9).
336. See Medicare and Medicaid; Survey and Certification of Health Care Facilities, Proposed
Rules, 47 Fed. Reg. 23,404 (1982).
337. "We would also provide that HCFA may revoke deemed status ofJCAH-accredited facilities
if it determines that accreditation no longer provides reasonable assurance that the facilities meet
Federal requirements." Id. at 23,406. Compare id. with Generic Accreditation Rule, supra note 332,
at 51,437-38 (discussing review of accrediting bodies), 51,441-42 (proposed rule, to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. § 488.9).
338. See Jost, supra note 318, at 844 & nn.63-64. HHS ultimately withdrew the proposal; see
Jost, supra note 320, at 7.
339. See Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 86-89 (3d Cir. 1984). Although Cospito dealt directly
only with the particular and somewhat distinct regulations governing psychiatric hospitals, the court
indicated in dictum that a nondelegation doctrine attack on HCFA's reliance on private accreditation
of general hospitals would also fail. See id. at 88. Professor Jost is critical of this analysis, noting
that delegation to the JCAHO "reveals 'an obvious attempt by the legislature to confer benefits
on the member groups of JCAH to secure their support. . . . [As such, it] is a suspect delegation."
Jost, supra note 318, at 921 (footnotes omitted). He finds especially pernicious the virtually absolute
power of the JCAHO over psychiatric hospitals in certain circumstances where accreditation of
one or more "distinct parts" of the hospital is not possible. See id. Interestingly, it was this "separate
part" accreditation that the court relied on in Cospito, see 742 F.2d at 87-88, over a vigorous dissent.
See id. at 90-91 (Becker, J., dissenting).
340. For a comprehensive summary of the procompetitive and, in the author's opinion, the
dominant anticompetitive effects of private accreditation, especially as currently conducted by the
JCAHO, see Clark C. Havighurst, The Place of Private Accreditation Among the Instruments of Government,
in PRIVATE ACCREDITATION IN THE REGULATORY STATE (American Bar Ass'n Section of Admin. Law
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that cost savings, either overall or merely to the federal government, are a
motivation in adopting this program of audited self-regulation. In both notices
approving private accreditation of home health agencies, HCFA observed that
the expenditures saved on direct surveys of providers and suppliers will be
spent instead on oversight of the private accrediting organization, resulting in
negligible overall costs or savings.
3 41
B. CLINICAL LABORATORIES
The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1967 (CLIA)3 42 requires certifi-
cation by the Secretary for any laboratory to "solicit or accept materials derived
from the human body for laboratory examination."- 4' The 1967 Act relied on
private accreditation of clinical laboratories, exempting certain privately accred-
ited laboratories from the certification requirement discussed above, with mini-
mal oversight.344 In rewriting CLIA in 1988, Congress extended its coverage 45
& Regulatory Practice ed., May 21, 1993), and articles cited therein. For a similar comprehensive
summary of antitrust arguments, finding objectionable anticompetitive conduct on the part of the
JCAHO but noting then-recent reforms, see Jost, supra note 318, at 892-913.
In approving JCAHO's accreditation of home health agencies, HCFA noted some commentators'
concerns that JCAHO accreditation of those agencies was explicitly tied to JCAHO accreditation
of the hospital to which the home health agency was connected, and that one was required as a
condition of the other. HCFA demurred, noting simply that
[t]he Medicare Act does not restrict the ability of a home health agency to choose among accredit-
ing organizations. It is also our general belief that competition is a healthy force in the marketplace.
We have raised the issue with the JCAHO, however, and believe that the Commission itself
is taking steps to deal with the emergence of other accrediting bodies.
58 Fed. Reg. 35,007, 35,010-11 (1993). Implicit in this response is that this "tying" by theJCAHO
does raise some anticompetitive concerns.
341. See 58 Fed. Reg. 35,007, 35,017 (1993) (regulatory impact statement cost-benefit analysis
on recognition ofJCAHO accreditation); 57 Fed. Reg. 22,773, 22,779 (regulatory impact statement
cost-benefit analysis on recognition of CHAP accreditation).
342. CLIA was added in 1967 as § 353 of the Public Health Service Act of 1944. Pub. L. No.
90-174, sec. 5, § 353, 81 Stat. 533, 536 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (1988)).
343. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(b) (1988). As the text makes clear, federal regulation of clinical laboratories
is not limited to those participating in Medicare or Medicaid. Strictly speaking, therefore, this is
not entirely a program of accreditation for government benefits, as indicated in the title of part
IV.B, but rather is a program of general health and safety regulation. Nonetheless, it is discussed
here because it is partly related to the Medicare and Medicaid programs and follows a similar
pattern of reliance on private accrediting organizations.
344. The statute named the JCAHO, the American Osteopathic Association, and the College
of American Pathologists as approved private accrediting organizations, and permitted the Secretary
to approve other accrediting organizations. Pub. L. No. 90-174, sec. 5, § 353(d)(2), 81 Stat. 533,
537. These organizations were required only to ensure that their standards were equal to or more
stringent than the governing federal standards as established by statute and regulation, and that
each accredited laboratory continued to meet those standards. Id. See also Clinical Laboratories
Improvement Act Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,992 (1992) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§
493, 498) [hereinafter 1992 CLIA Release].
345. Under the 1967 Act, only laboratories in Medicare or Medicaid or that tested specimens
in interstate commerce were subject to the certification requirement. See 1992 CLIA Release, supra
note 344, at 33,992. Compare this limited coverage with the blanket coverage of all laboratories
in the 1988 Act, supra note 343 and accompanying text.
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and added details to the accreditation process, consistent with principles of sound
audited self-regulation, that were missing from the 1967 Act.
The 1988 Act requires accrediting organizations to inspect laboratories with
qualified personnel and as frequently as the Secretary of Health and Human
Services requires, and to report any denials; the Act also permits the Secretary
to adopt additional criteria.3 46 Each accredited laboratory must submit to inspec-
tion by the Secretary at any time,3 47 make its records available directly to the
Secretary,3 48 and authorize the accrediting organization to make its inspection
reports available to the Secretary.3 49 HCFA's implementing regulations essen-
tially impose most of the requirements of audited self-regulation: the accrediting
organizations must demonstrate that they have the capacity and capability to
require compliance with the Act by the accredited laboratories, 350 and are subject
to comprehensive review by HCFA in a periodic sample or in response to
allegations of noncompliance.35'
Closer oversight of the accrediting organizations was necessary, according to
the 1988 Act's legislative history, because those organizations did not view
enforcement as an integral part of their mission. 352 This reinforces a primary
component of self-regulation: the ability to alter conduct. To the extent that
any private accrediting organization considers itself to be only "educational,"
its program is actually one of self-certification only. Implicit in almost every
instance, however, is the ability of the accreditor or auditor to hold the possibility
of an adverse decision over the regulated entity if "suggested" changes were
not made. The success of this type of action determines whether there is any
effective enforcement at the self-regulator's level.
Congress mentioned cost savings to the federal government as a rationale for
private accreditation.353 It is clear, however, that the total cost of regulation to
the nation's accrediting organizations-and thus to clinical laboratories, provid-
ers, and ultimately to patients-will be higher,35 4 even if the federal govern-
ment's share has been successfully transferred to other entities.
346. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(e)(2)(A)-(B) (1988).
347. Id. § 263a(d)(1)(C).
348. Id. § 263a(d)(1)(D).
349. Id. § 263a(e)(1)(B).
350. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.506 (1993).
351. See id. § 493.507-511.
352. [T]he Committee . . . discovered that reliance on private accreditation has created weak-
nesses in the administration of quality standards. The Department has effectively delegated all
responsibility for enforcement to accrediting bodies. Yet, these bodies have made plain their
preference and capacity is for education, not enforcement. Education is an important but limited
tool in enforcement.
H.R. REP. No. 899, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3828, 3834.
353. See id. ("The Committee recognizes that accrediting bodies are committed to assuring quality
in laboratory testing and that they conserve federal resources by substituting for public agency
surveys.").
354. One private accrediting organization estimated that it would have to double its fees to
comply with the regulations promulgated pursuant to the 1988 Act. See 1992 CLIA Release, supra
note 344, at 34,010.
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C. PEER REVIEW OF MEDICARE SERVICES
Payments under Medicare355 to providers and suppliers are restricted to
eligible patients and services. The most far-reaching limitations, however,
are that the service or product must be "reasonable and necessary''" 6 and
for actual treatment of an illness.357 Congress has provided for a program
of audited self-regulation in applying these particular restrictions and also
in determining whether the quality of care provided meets professional stan-
dards or could have been provided at a lower cost.358 This program is known
as "peer review," and is provided by peer review organizations (PROs)
under contract with HCFA.359
PROs are charged with reviewing samples of health care activities subject to
payment under Medicare in their geographic areas.360 If the PRO determines
that treatment was not "reasonable and necessary" or could have been provided
at a lower cost, it has the ability to deny Medicare reimbursement.36 Finally,
if the PRO determines that the quality of care provided by any person does
not meet cost and quality standards, it may deny to that person any further
ability to receive Medicare reimbursement.3 62 In total, "[t]he power of PROs
over Medicare providers, practitioners, and beneficiaries is sweeping.
' 363
The existing peer review process had two predecessors. Initially, in 1965,
hospitals were required to have a utilization review plan in order to qualify for
Medicare reimbursement.3 64 In 1972, dissatisfaction with the focus of the utiliza-
tion review program on quality of care to the exclusion of escalating costs due
to overutilization led Congress to create the Professional Standards Review
Organization (PSRO) program. 65 The PSRO program used "regional non-
profit physicians groups to review independently the use of medical services by
355. For a brief summary of Medicare coverage, see supra note 312.
356. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1) (1988).
357. See id. § 1395y(a)(9).
358. See id. § 1320c-3(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
359. See id. § 1320c-2(a) (1988).
360. See id. § 1320c-3(a)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 466.71(c) (1993), revised in 59 Fed. Reg. 45,330, 45,402
(1994) (final rule with comment period). For a discussion of the sampling and review process, see
Timothy S. Jost, Administrative Law Issues Involving the Medicare Utilization and Quality Control Peer
Review Organization (PRO) Program: Analysis and Recommendations, 50 OHio ST. L.J. 1, 6-9 (1989).
361. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 42 C.F.R. § 466.71(a) (1993).
362. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 42 C.F.R. § 466.71(b) (1993). "As
a practical matter, exclusion from Medicare may make it impossible for a physician to practice;
thus the PRO's power over physicians is nearly as great as that of state licensure boards." Jost,
supra note 360, at 2.
363. Jost, supra note 360, at 2.
364. 42 U.S.C. § 1
3
95x(e)(
6
) (Supp. IV 1965-1968). The requirement remains today, but is
superseded for all practical purposes by the PRO program, since no utilization review requirement
is imposed where a PRO has assumed binding review for the hospital. 42 C.F.R. § 482.30(a)(1)
(1993). See also Peter M. Mellette, The Changing Focus of Peer Review Under Medicare, 20 U. RIcH.
L. REV. 315, 323 (1986).
365. Jost, supra note 360, at 4-5; Mellette, supra note 364, at 326-28. See Social Security Amend-
ments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1429 (1972). This is the same Act
that significantly curtailed the role of the JCAHO in accrediting hospitals under Medicare; see supra
note 323 and accompanying text.
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beneficiaries of federal medical assistance programs. 36 6 The PSROs could,
however, delegate their review functions to hospital review committees, and
PSRO recommendations for denial of payment had no binding effect. These
two factors were prime contributors to the PSRO program's inability to either
provide consistent utilization guidelines or cost control.367 As a result, "PSROs
never succeeded in meeting the expectations of their supporters or overcoming
the criticisms of their increasingly vocal detractors. ' 36" By the late 1970s, criti-
cism of the PSRO program was mounting, and Congress adopted the PRO
system, along with a new method of calculating hospital reimbursements under
Medicare, in 1982.369 The PROs cover a larger geographic area, cannot delegate
review functions, and have broader powers to deny payment. 37' Despite the
much larger coverage area,37' the PRO was intended to be a physician-sponsored
group, akin to a medical society.37  Although no longer local, most PROs are
physician-sponsored, and to that extent conform to the model of self-
regulation.3 73 The combination of a fixed-sum Medicare payment determination,
based on the diagnosis, and the limited review of PRO denials374 of payments was
intended to create a system with much greater emphasis on cost containment.
Throughout the development of peer review programs in Medicare, it was
considered paramount to enlist private entities in the regulatory effort, for at
least two reasons that often appear whenever audited self-regulation is consid-
ered. First, there was significant preexisting peer review activity. The medical
366. Jost, supra note 360, at 5. "PSRO proponents in Congress anticipated that local medical
societies would apply for and receive PSRO designation." Mellette, supra note 364, at 328. See also
BLUM ET AL., supra note 161, at 21-26 (discussing problems in implementation of PSRO program
regarding size of PSRO area and local physician acceptance).
367. See Mellette, supra note 364, at 340 (delegated review), 350 (nonbinding effect of denials).
368. Jost, supra note 360, at 5.
369. See Mellette, supra note 364, at 337-41. For a brief description of the operation of this
"diagnosis-related group" (DRG) method of prospectively determining payments to be made to
hospitals under Medicare, see 42 C.F.R. § 412.1(a) (1993). The adoption of the DRG method
also changed the magnitude of decisions the new PROs would be required to make regarding
utilization of hospital services, which was "the object of much review activity by PSROs." Mellette,
supra note 364, at 341.
370. Jost, supra note 360, at 5.
371. In designating the PSRO areas, HEW chose a minimum population size of 50,000. BLUM
ET AL., supra note 161, at 21-22. By contrast, each PRO was to cover an entire state. Jost, supra
note 360, at 5.
372. The local medical society was one of the models for the PSROs. See supra note 366.
373. See Jost, supra note 360, at 6 (noting that 84% of PROs are physician-sponsored). The
others are typically insurance companies. Although they employ physicians in medical payment
reviews, see id., the insurance company PRO is different from the model of self-regulation used
in this article, since the self-regulatory organization can be said to be composed of the regulated
entities in only a very indirect way. See supra part I.A.
374. This finality of the self-regulatory organization decision is unusual in models surveyed in
this article. Although a beneficiary has a right to appeal outside of the PRO, the practitioner or
provider who supplied the goods or services has a right only to a reconsideration from the PRO.
42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Although later amendments to the PRO Act required
consultation between the PRO and the provider before the decision to deny payment is made, the
finality of that decision was not altered. See Jost, supra note 360, at 67. Although this lack of judicial
review is disturbing from the standpoint of proper design of a self-regulatory system, it has minimal
practical impact due to the relatively small amounts in controversy in each case. Id. at 66-67.
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profession had recognized the need for peer review as early as the early 1900s.3 75
Second, the alternative of direct government regulation has always been consid-
ered problematic, not only because of the staffing requirements but also because
of the perceived impact of that regulation on physicians' treatment decisions.
Thus, the federal government has relied from the outset on the professional
discretion of practicing physicians. 76 At each turn, however, Congress became
increasingly frustrated with the profession's emphasis on quality of care, to the
apparent exclusion of effective cost control.377 It is impossible to fault the medical
profession for their focus, indeed, it is likely that physicians could not make
medical decisions on any other basis.3 7 That focus, however, resulted in the
government regulators' removal of much of the discretion from the self-
regulatory system. This suggests, as in the case of health and safety regulation
generally, 379 that it is difficult for a self-regulatory program to succeed if opposing
groups are not given meaningful input in the process.35 ° Until the PRO program,
cost containment policies had no effective place in peer review, since the only
375. See BLUM ET AL., supra note 161, at 1-2 (early developments in peer review); MEDICAL
PEER REVIEW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 11-12 (Paul Y. Ertel & M. Gene Aldridge eds. 1977) (early
twentieth-century developments in the practice of medicine leading to the necessity of peer review).
See also Mellette, supra note 364, at 324-26 (discussing specific hospital-based programs developed
in the 1940s and 1950s).
376. Government involvement with peer review since 1965 gives evidence of two definite trends:
First, the government's desire to delegate the review task to physician committees; and second,
the government's inability to settle on an acceptable review methodology. Government review
delegation can be attributed to both a lack of manpower and a wish to temper governmental
control over review to make it more acceptable to the medical profession.
BLUM ET AL., supra note 161, at 3. See also Mellette, supra note 364, at 327-28 (emphasis on cost
control but also on professional judgment and discretion in 1972 amendments); S. REP. No. 494,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 817 (report on 1982 amend-
ments, noting that "peer review has afforded practicing physicians an opportunity on a voluntary
and publicly accountable basis to undertake review of the medical necessity and quality of care
provided. The [PSRO] program has demonstrated that the concept of peer review is a valid one.").
377. SeeJost, supra note 360, at 4-6; Mellette, supra note 364, at 326-27 (cost-control shortcomings
of utilization review), 334-35 (cost-control shortcomings under PSRO program).
378. Professors Havighurst and Blumstein examined in detail how physicians determined "need"
in relationship to cost of services. See Clark C. Havighurst & James F. Blumstein, Coping With
Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 6, 25-38 (1975).
They concluded that
a sincere concern for his patients' welfare is probably dominant in [the individual physician's]
numerous decisions for more and better services. Cost issues, while sometimes admitted, are
seen as irrelevant when life, health, and comfort and convenience-in short, the needs-of the
patient are at stake. Indeed, with cost constraints lifted by the availability of third-party payment,
the physician may regard it as his ethical responsibility to help the patient get all the benefits
he can from the common fund.
Id. at 27.
379. See supra text accompanying note 108.
380. [I]n a regulatory environment, organized consumer pressure is likely to be opposed to
stringency and to favor increased quantities and quality of care, especially where such care is
at public expense. Provider interests would of course take similar positions.
[T]he functioning of governmental and professional decision-making mechanisms is impaired,
though in varying degrees, by the quality imperative and cost-escalating pressures from interest
groups ...
Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 378, at 63.
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party seeking cost control, the federal government, was by definition removed
from the self-regulatory process. What needs to be decided is the appropriate
level of government intervention in the cost/quality tradeoff38' and how much
of this decisionmaking should be delegated to any private group.38 2 But the
progression from utilization review to PSRO to PRO in the peer review process
has demonstrated the ability of Congress, HCFA, and the health care industry
professionals to successively balance, shift, and rebalance the elements of an
effective system of self-regulation, a process that promises to continue.
2. Higher Education Financing
A variety of federal laws in aid of postsecondary education have been enacted
since the end of World War II, providing aid for programs, capital construction,
and significant financial assistance to students. Typically, that federal aid has
been limited to institutions that meet minimum standards, so that today "[m]ost
postsecondary institutions and programs attain eligibility for federal funds by
obtaining accreditation from one of the accrediting bodies recognized by the
Secretary [of Education]." '383 Those standards, in turn, have been provided
primarily by private accrediting organizations, subject to an unusual and often
controversial oversight role by the Department of Education.
The statutory basis for federal reliance on private accreditation of higher educa-
tion institutions was laid principally in the Korean GI Bill.38 4 Student aid was
available only for courses offered by an institution "accredited and approved by
a nationally recognized accrediting agency or association," 385 and the Commis-
sioner (now Secretary) of Education was required to publish a list of such "nation-
381. Mellette, supra note 364, at 354 ("PRO review groups are now making many of the same
decisions on patient admissions that the attending physician made a few years ago .... The govern-
ment's role in the health care marketplace under prospective payment and the PRO Act has shifted
from that of a partner to a controlling interest."). Congress itself seems unsure of the appropriate
cost/quality mix, since despite this increasing emphasis on cost control, which led to the PRO
program, most legislation since has related to potential problems with lower quality health care.
See Jost, supra note 360, at 5-6. For a comprehensive discussion of this cost/quality tradeoff, see
Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 378. A more recent review of the prospective payment system,
see supra note 369 and accompanying text, suggests that it does not help to control costs, because
although it
does recognize legitimate deviations from the norm, . . . the norm and the allowed variations
are managed at such a great conceptual, spatial and regulatory distance from our hospitals that
the regulatory task is essentially unmanageable. For those reasons there will continue to be a
wide gulf separating our federal regulators from those working within actual institutions.
David M. Frankford, The Medicare DRGs: Efficiency and Organizational Rationality, 10 YALE J. ON
REG. 273, 345 (1993) (footnote omitted).
382. Jost notes, for example, the tensions that exist in the PROs' sanctioning of providers or
suppliers, "[b]y far the most controversial function of the PRO program." Jost, supra note 360,
at 30. "Many of the problems in the PRO sanction process can ultimately be traced to the difficulty
of engrafting enforcement functions onto what is basically a peer monitoring and education pro-
gram." Id. at 47.
383. KAPLIN, supra note 130, at 573.
384. Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-550, 66 Stat. 663.
385. Id. § 253(a)(1), 66 Stat. at 675 (repealed 1958).
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ally recognized" agencies. 86 That language was borrowed by later acts providing
a variety of federal assistance, requiring, in each instance, that the Commissioner
prepare a list of accrediting organizations recognized under each act.387
The system of self-accreditation embraced by Congress dates back slightly
more than a century. At that time, colleges began to coordinate their admissions
standards and seek some uniformity in preparation in the secondary schools.
3 88
This concern with uniformity and the lack of an acceptable definition of a
"college" extended the accreditation effort to institutions of higher education
by 1913.389 From this beginning grew the six regional associations of colleges
that today accredit thousands of institutions of higher education on a general
or institution-wide basis.39 ° There developed along parallel tracks two other types
of accrediting bodies: one for proprietary (for-profit) institutions, which were
excluded from the regionals,3 9' and another type for specialized accreditation
programs, schools or colleges within an institution.
392
The early emphasis of accreditation was on uniformity of standards, first for
secondary and then for higher education. 93 But the later and modern emphasis
is on the assessment of the institution's compliance with its own standards and
progress toward its own goals.3 94 Thus, private accreditation is today not a
comparison to uniform standards, but rather a judgment, by peers, that an
386. Id. § 253(a)(4), 66 Stat. at 675 (repealed 1958). For a comprehensive legislative background,
see Matthew W. Finkin, Federal Reliance on Voluntary Accreditation: The Power to Recognize as the Power
to Regulate, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 339, 343-48 (1973).
387. See Finkin, supra note 386, at 348-68 (citing 15 acts passed between 1958 and 1972 dealing
with institutional or special accreditation); see also YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 240 ("This
language reappeared in new legislation as 'boiler plate' over the next thirty years.").
388. See WILLIAM K. SELDEN, ACCREDITATION: A STRUGGLE OVER STANDARDS IN HIGHER EDUCA-
TION 30-31 (1960) (discussing the foundation of the first regional association, the New England
Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, in 1885).
389. See id. at 35-38; YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 3.
390. See YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 26-28 (describing the six regional accrediting associations
and their membership).
391. Id. at 29.
392. See id. at 24; KAPLIN, supra note 130, at 561-62; Oulahan, supra note 130, at 193 (each
describing differences between institutional and specialized accreditation). The national accrediting
bodies are institutional accrediting organizations. See supra note 390.
393. See YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 56; SELDEN, supra note 388, at 42.
394. See, e.g., SELDEN, supra note 388, at 42 ("As proportionately more colleges and universities
have been accredited-that is, accepted into membership of the regional associations-increasing
emphasis has been placed [upon] ...stimulating institutional self-improvement [rather than admis-
sions or maintenance of minimum academic standards]."). Another writer describes the change
comparatively:
During the past seventy years, accreditation has changed-
* From a quantitative approach (expressed in scientific requirements) to a qualitative approach
(based on more general standards).
" From an emphasis on making institutions more alike to recognizing and encouraging institu-
tional individuality.
* From a system heavily dependent on external review to a system based more on self-evaluation
and self-regulation.
" From an initial focus on judging (and accepting or rejecting) an institution to a primary goal
of encouraging and assisting an institution to improve its educational quality.
YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 9.
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educational institution has set its goals and ways to meet them.395 The move
away from standardization once basic admissions and other rules were set was
not revolutionary but rather a return to the norm. Higher education in the
United States has a tradition of diversity in and local control over academic
programs that predates accreditation programs.
3 9 6
Part of the tradition of local control of higher education, of course, is a lack
of federal control. Even with the extensive institutional and student aid programs
of the postwar era, there is little federal control over basic decisions about what
should be taught in United States colleges and universities.397 When Congress
began the aid programs in 1952, it chose to rely on accrediting organizations
partly to avoid any such federal control398 and partly because the accrediting
organizations were recognized as expert and reliable.3 99
The Commissioner of Education implemented these statutes by publishing the
required list and also by promulgating a list of standards to be met by any accredit-
ing organization in order to be listed. The standards, though originally borrowed
from a then-existing accreditation review organization,0 0 were important because
395. [Accreditation] is distinctive in postsecondary education for its respected and carefully devel-
oped procedures, based on three fundamental precepts: (1) that the institution must publicly
declare its educational purposes and should be evaluated primarily on that basis, (2) that the
institution should play the major role in accreditation through the self-study process, and (3)
that peer review serves as a necessary validating mechanism.
YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 66. Accord Oulahan, supra note 130, at 198-99.
396. See SELDEN, supra note 388, at 17-20.
397. This is not to say that federal laws do not have an impact on higher education. For a
survey of the more important noneducation laws affecting colleges and universities, see KAPLIN,
supra note 130, at 473-511. Funding, however, is the main focus:
The federal government's major function regarding postsecondary education is to establish na-
tional priorities and objectives for education spending and to provide funds in accordance with
those decisions. To implement its priorities and objectives, the federal government attaches a
wide and varied range of conditions to the funds it makes available. . . . Cumulatively, these
conditions exert a most substantial influence on postsecondary institutions, often leading to institu-
tional cries of economic coercion and federal control. In light of such institutional criticism, the
federal role in funding postsecondary education has become a major political and policy issue.
Id. at 511. The idea of federal control of academic decisions, however, has remained an anath-
ema. Congress has said as much, prohibiting any federal employee from directing or controlling
"the curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel of any educational institu-
tion. ... ." 20 U.S.C. § 1232a (1988).
398. See Matthew W. Finkin, Reforming the Federal Relationship to Educational Accreditation, 57 N.C.
L. REv. 379, 380-81 (1979).
399. See id. (noting that reliance on accrediting agencies to avoid federal control requires that
review by the federal government would be very limited). Others have offered less sophisticated
explanations, suggesting that, as with the securities and health care accreditation decisions, man-
power may have been a concern.
[Tlhe more likely explanation is that Congress did not want to get the federal government
embroiled in the thankless task of deciding which institutions would and, more important, which
would not be eligible for the expanded funding. Accreditation was not that well understood, but
the postsecondary education community seemed to have much faith in it.
YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 251.
400. See YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 242 (concluding that the original 1952 criteria were
"a slightly edited version of the [National Commission on Accreditation) criteria."). See also Finkin,
supra note 386, at 347 (discussing development of original criteria).
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of the new federal imprimatur. 40 ' Despite this effect, the initial standards them-
selves were relatively innocuous." 2 The criteria remained unchanged over the
next seventeen years, despite major developments in the relationship of federal
law to private accreditation. By the mid-1960s, however, reliance upon accredita-
tion had become commonplace, reaching its zenith perhaps in the Higher Educa-
tion Act of 1965 43 In addition, Congress's single experiment with direct accredita-
tion by the Commissioner of Education in 1964 was dismissed as a failure and
replaced in 1968 with delegation to multiple private accreditation organizations.4 4
Thus, by the late 1960s, determination of nationally recognized accreditation
organizations had developed into a significant regulatory task.4 °5
401. By publishing this first list, the federal government profoundly altered the nature of accredita-
tion and, more important, its relationship to the postsecondary education community. First, the
federal government had never previously purported to make an explicit statement about who
was an accrediting body and what such a body did. . . . Second, accrediting bodies were now,
by virtue of the statutory provision, judged to be both "recognized" and "reliable."
YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 242.
402. These required inter alia that: the scope of the organization be national or regional (i.e.,
encompassing several states); it serve a definite need; it perform no function that might prejudice
its independent judgment; it make available to the public current information on its standards,
operations and accredited programs or institutions; it only accredit institutions which are found
on examination to meet pre-established standards; it has some experience in accrediting; and,
it has gained general acceptance of its criteria and decisions.
Finkin, supra note 386, at 347.
403. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965) (codified as amended principally at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1145f (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Notable additions in the 1965 Act were reliance on
accreditation for guaranteed student loans and defining an "institution of higher education" for
any purpose in the Act. See id. § 435, 79 Stat. at 1247-48 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §
1085(b) (1988), repealed by Higher Education Amendments of 1992, § 427(b), 106 Stat. 448, 549);
id. § 801(a), 79 Stat. at 1269 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1988 & Supp. V
1993)); see also Finkin, supra note 386, at 359.
404. See Finkin, supra note 398, at 383-85; YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 253 (each referring
to the Nurse Training Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-581, 78 Stat. 908). Direct accreditation by
the Commissioner was authorized in the act to accommodate the numerous unaccredited nurse
training programs, and the "sheer force of numbers" would have forced him to do so. YOUNG ET
AL., supra, note 41, at 253. The ultimatum was delayed, however, until 1968 when Congress
approved a compromise. "[T]he alternative chosen to deal with the problem was to increase the
number of alternative agencies that could be relied upon, rather than to continue the system of
direct federal accreditation (which had never actually been used) or to authorize administrative
controls over the private agency." Finkin, supra, note 398, at 385.
Congress apparently learned an important lesson from this episode and was cautious about making
specialized accreditation a requirement for eligibility in the future. In fact, in the few cases in
which it did, such as medical and dental capitation grants, virtually all the schools were accredited
by well-established, nationally recognized accrediting bodies and had been for quite some time.
YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 253.
405. In a fundamental turnabout, the Office of Education [OEl now saw itself as a guardian
and protector of the rights of recognized accrediting bodies.
As always, with rights come responsibilities. . . . No longer would OE have to seek out the
accrediting bodies that presumably were doing reliable work for use in eligibility determinations.
Rather, accrediting bodies would now be expected to petition OE and demonstrate that they
deserved a place on the list.
YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 255. This is probably the genesis of the Commissioner's (and later
Secretary's) assumption of power "as a guardian and protector," which has been criticized as
unauthorized by the underlying statutes. See Finkin, supra note 398, at 390-402; Finkin, supra note
386, at 370-74.
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Amendments to the criteria for "listing" in 1969 and 1974 changed the character
of these criteria from "innocuous" to more proscriptive, relying less on the accred-
iting bodies and more on standards for their composition and operation. °6 In 1972
and 1976, Congress, concerned with continuing abuses in student loan programs,
amended the 1965 Act to extend the Commissioner's direct regulatory authority
over the administrative and financial capabilities of each individual institution
of higher education.0 7 Significantly, though, Congress did not alter the role of
accreditation but rather sidestepped it, targeting needed reforms with direct regu-
lation. 4°8 The criteria for "listing" of accrediting organizations were reorganized
and expanded once again in 1988, the major changes being addition of examina-
tion of assessment of student achievement and limitations on "shopping" for
accreditation by institutions. 40 9 Even these changes drew concerns from commen-
tators that the Secretary was unduly interfering in educational programs.41
Much of this landscape was swept clean by the Higher Education Amendments
of 1992.411 Prior recommendations of the Secretary's statutory advisory council
recognized a "triad" partnership among the federal and state governments
and the private accrediting agencies.412 Congress essentially codified this triad
relationship, specifying requirements for state review, 413 direct federal regulation
similar to that begun in the 1970s,414 and, most important, Secretarial recogni-
tion of accrediting agencies.41 5 In particular, the 1992 Act requires the Secretary
406. See Finkin, supra note 398, at 385-87; YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 256-63.
These revisions express a fundamental lack of confidence that accrediting agencies adequately
function to protect the public interest. They are premised upon the perceived need to make
listed accrediting agencies more responsive to the demands of consumer protection, the need for
educational change, and the observance of ethical institutional practices, both directly, by so
providing in the recognition criteria, and indirectly, by changing the composition of the governing
bodies of listed accrediting agencies.
Finkin, supra note 398, at 386-87. Or, as stated more succinctly, "[t]hese new regulations made
the commissioner the conscience of education and the public about which accrediting bodies were
good and how they could be better." YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 259.
407. See Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 133(a), 90 Stat. 2081, 2150-
51 (repealed 1980). Similar provisions already existed regarding the guaranteed student loan pro-
gram, having been added in 1972; the 1976 Act extended these requirements to other federal student
aid programs. See S. REP. No. 882, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4713, 4744-45.
408. See Finkin, supra note 398, at 390 ("the post-1968 legislation indicates that when Congress
sought to tighten controls over institutional activity, unrelated to educational quality, to effect
policies of consumer protection or financial responsibility, it chose to act directly by means unrelated
to the system of institutional or programmatic accreditation."). Accord YOUNG ET AL., supra note
41, at 262-63.
409. Secretary's Procedures and Criteria for Recognition of Accrediting Agencies, 53 Fed. Reg.
25,088, 25,088-89 (1988) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 602 & 603) [hereinafter 1988 Accreditation
Rules].
410. See id. at 25,089-90.
411. Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 448 (1992).
412. See, e.g., 1988 Accreditation Rules, supra note 409.
413. See Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 494, 106 Stat. 448, 635-41 (1992) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §
1099a to 1099a-3 (Supp. V 1993)).
414. See id. § 498, 106 Stat. at 647-53 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1099c to 1099c-1 (Supp. V
1993)). For a discussion of prior legislation, see supra notes 407-08 and accompanying text.
415. See Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 496, 106 Stat. 448, 641-47 (1992) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §
1099b (Supp. V 1993)).
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to detail, by rule, standards with which to measure each accrediting organiza-
tion's evaluation of each institution's performance in twelve specific areas that
form the core of an institution's educational program.
416
The program of recognizing accrediting agencies bears many of the hallmarks
of audited self-regulation. There was a preexisting self-regulatory program, with
an economic or institutional and professional incentive to make that self-regulation
meaningful. The regulators had collected expertise in their professional judgment
as educators that was not easily reproduced by outsiders. They were also a ready
source of manpower, saving the federal government from the expense of duplicat-
ing their efforts with federal employees. Until the 1992 Act, however, any mean-
ingful "auditing" was noticeably absent. The Act requires the Secretary to estab-
lish standards for measuring, among other things, the adequacy of the accrediting
organization's standards, its enforcement of its own standards, and the fairness
of the process used in determining whether to grant or withhold accreditation. 17
Several essential features, however, are missing from this regulatory scheme
when compared with a model of audited self-regulation. First, the decision of
the accrediting agency may not be appealed. Second, the federal agency lacks
the ability to specifically approve or adopt rules or standards for the accrediting
organizations.4 18 Most important, no independent federal authority exists to
416. These areas are:
(A) curricula;
(B) faculty;
(C) facilities, equipment, and supplies;
(D) fiscal and administrative capacity as appropriate to the specified scale of
operations;
(E) student support services;
(F) recruiting and admissions practices, academic calendars, catalogs, publications,
grading and advertising;
(G) program length and tuition and fees in relation to the subject matters taught and
the objectives of the degrees or credentials offered;
(H) measures of program length in clock hours or credit hours;
(I) success with respect to student achievement in relation to its mission, including,
as appropriate, consideration of course completion, State licensing examination,
and job placement rates;
(J) default rates in the student loan programs ...
(K) record of student complaints received by, or available to, the agency or
association; and
(L) compliance with its program responsibilities . . . including any results of financial
or compliance audits, program reviews, and such other information as the
Secretary may provide to the agency or association. ...
20 U.S.C. § 1099b(a)(5).
417. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(a)(4)-(6). There are no similar provisions in the existing regulations,
except perhaps 34 C.F.R. § 602.16(c), (e) & (g), requiring decisions to be based on published
criteria, an "appropriate and fair" appeals process, and precluding conflicts of interest and inconsis-
tent application of standards. Previously, the scope of "due process" in the accrediting decision,
now addressed by 20 U.S.C. § 1099(b)(6), was determined case by case. See, e.g., Marlboro Corp.
v. Ass'n of Indep. Colleges and Schools, 556 F.2d 78 (1st Cir. 1977); Marjorie Webster Junior
College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Sch., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); Oulahan, supra note 130, at 223-26.
418. The Secretary must, however, develop "standards" to measure the standards by which the
accrediting organization assesses individual institutions. See 20 U.S.C. § 1099(b)(5). This is one
step removed from rulemaking or review.
SPRING 1995 Audited Self-Regulation 233
accredit or "de-accredit" individual institutions. All of these features are present
in most other models of self-regulation, as well as in federal regulation of these
same institutions' fiscal and administrative ability and responsibility. 41 9 This
difference may be explained by the traditionally limited federal role in higher
education. The role of the Secretary is limited even by the 1992 Act,4 2° and it
has been suggested that the limited authority of the past did not even support
that modest regulation.421 Curiously, the idea of dropping the requirement of
accreditation for access to these federal programs surfaces occasionally,422 indicat-
ing that this scheme of reliance on private regulation is not entirely settled.
C. NUCLEAR POWER PRODUCTION
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has responsibility for licensing
the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. 423 Following the 1979
accident at Three Mile Island, the nuclear power industry created the Institute
for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) to set and police its own industry stan-
dards. 424 The NRC also began a program of improving its regulations. Ulti-
mately, in the area of personnel training, the NRC adopted INPO's standards.422
Enforcement power was not specifically delegated to INPO, although the NRC
noted that meeting INPO standards was essentially a condition of granting an
initial or continuing license. 426 The NRC indicated that it would itself directly
419. See supra note 414 and accompanying text.
420. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(g) prohibits the Secretary from establishing additional standards not
required by the Act, but the accrediting agencies themselves are permitted to do so. Additionally,
there is the overlay of 20 U.S.C. § 1232a, which prohibits federal employees from directing the
curriculum of educational institutions. See supra note 397 and accompanying text.
421. Professor Finkin argues stridently that many of the existing regulations are clearly beyond
the scope of the Secretary's authority. See Finkin, supra note 386, at 370-74; Finkin, supra note
398, at 390-402.
422. See YOUNG ET AL., supra note 41, at 266 (proposal in the 1980 reauthorization of the Higher
Education Act); H.R. REP. No. 447, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
334, 407 (original bill ultimately becoming Higher Education Amendments of 1992, approved by
committee, would have eliminated the accreditation requirement).
423. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131, 2133-34 (1988); 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.20-23 (1994).
424. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NRC's RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INSTITUTE
oF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS 2 (1991) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. "INPO was formed after
the 1979 Three Mile Island accident to promote safety and reliability in the operation of nuclear
power plants. INPO is a nonprofit corporation whose membership includes all operators of nuclear
power plants in the United States." Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 874
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
425. The Commission adopted INPO's standards for training several categories of personnel,
at first on a temporary basis. See Commission Policy Statement on Training and Qualification of
Nuclear Power Plant Personnel, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,147 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Policy Statement].
After a period of review of INPO and licensee activities, the standards were adopted on a permanent
basis. See Commission Policy Statement on Training and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant
Personnel, 53 Fed. Reg. 46,603 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Policy Statement]. For an overview of
the INPO accreditation history and process, see Accreditation of Nuclear Training, NUCLEAR NEWS,
Apr. 1993, at 46.
426. Although the Commission's policy statement indicated that it considered INPO's accredita-
tion as only one method of meeting the license requirements for personnel training, it was "under-
stood" that each licensee would submit to the INPO standards. See 1985 Policy Statement, supra
note 425, at 11,148. By 1990, all licensees had INPO-accredited training programs. Walter J.
Coakley, Training and Accreditation in the Nuclear Power Industry, NUCLEAR NEWS, Apr. 1991, at 48.
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review INPO's accrediting procedures42' and would retain plenary enforcement
authority.428
The NRC thus found effective use of audited self-regulation superior to direct
regulation. By taking advantage of a preexisting or at least contemporaneous
industry organization with the incentive to engage in meaningful self-regulation,
the NRC was able to endorse that organization's regulatory standards as its
own. Ultimately, however, the scheme foundered for failure to comply with the
statutory directive that the NRC "promulgate regulations, or other appropriate
...guidance, for the training and qualifications of civilian nuclear power plant
... personnel. "439 The D.C. Circuit ultimately held that the NRC's reliance
on INPO was not sufficient, 3 ' and the NRC has since promulgated final rules
of its own that directly mandate training program standards and indicate that
accreditation will constitute compliance.4 3 The past NRC Chairman has noted
that similar initiatives are needed in the area of plant maintenance. 432 As with
training, the regulation is suitable for audited self-regulation because the rules
are technical and widely divergent, depending on the particular regulated entity
involved. 4" To date, however, in part due to legal challenges 434 and public and
congressional scrutiny,433 the NRC has not been able to rely on INPO regula-
tions or standards to any meaningful extent.
D. AGRICULTURAL MARKETING
In several areas, the Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Marketing
Service (AMS) uses various forms of self-regulation in administering various
statutes.
427. See 1985 Policy Statement, supra note 425, at 11,148 ("To assure that the nuclear industry's
training program improvements are effective, the NRC will continue to closely monitor the process
and its results .... ").
428. See id.; 1988 Policy Statement, supra note 425, at 46,604 (removing statement of discretionary
enforcement from 1985 Policy Statement for violations of the accreditation requirement).
429. 42 U.S.C. § 10226 (1988).
430. Public Citizen v. NRC, 901 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990).
431. See Training and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,904,
21,908 (1993). The Commission will rely on private accreditation and will conduct its own inspec-
tions of nonaccredited programs. Id. This is reminiscent of the SEC's "SECO" program of broker-
dealer regulation; see supra notes 202-204 and accompanying text.
432. See Carr: Looking at Maintenance, Standardization, Industry "Coziness", NUCLEAR NEWS, Nov.
1989, at 36 (interview with then NRC Chairman Kenneth M. Carr) ("What I want to see is some
sort of a system that gets good maintenance accomplished. . . .We must have something-either
a rule put out by us or something the utilities do, like they did with their training program.").
433. See id. ("It's hard to write a good maintenance rule. In the first place, there are too many
different kinds of plants, so you can't write a rule to cover them all. And rules must be enforced,
so you've got to be careful what you put in them.").
434. See supra note 430 and accompanying text.
435. See GAO REPORT, supra note 424, at I (indicating that the report was prepared upon the
request of several congressmen). The GAO Report ultimately concluded that the NRC does not
rely to a great extent on INPO reports or information in its regulation, although the GAO recom-
mended that the NRC itself issue public information notices based on INPO reports it receives,
because the INPO reports themselves have been held to be exempt from public disclosure. See id.
at 5-7; see also Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 931 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding
certain INPO reports exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act).
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1. Marketing Agreements and Orders
Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,436 the Secretary
of Agriculture is authorized to facilitate, or in some cases impose, agreements
between producers and handlers437 of certain agricultural products, in order to
regulate the quality and quantity of the products brought to market. 48 Two types
of arrangements are authorized by the Act: a marketing agreement, essentially a
voluntary agreement between the Secretary and producers, 43 9 and a marketing
order, an agreement among handlers made binding on all handlers in a desig-
nated marketing area. 440 Although the two arrangements are provided for sepa-
rately and apply to different groups of commodities, 441 "[t]he terms ...often
are used interchangeably, because a marketing agreement rarely is established
without a marketing order or a marketing order established without an
agreement. ' ' 442 It is the implementation of the marketing order that provides
useful examples of self-regulation.443
Two types of self-regulation are involved in agricultural marketing orders.
First, before any order may be effective, it must be under a marketing agreement
among handlers of more than half of the volume of that commodity in the
436. This statute has a difficult history, having been caught up in the constitutional struggles
of early New Deal legislation. The agricultural marketing laws were first enacted in 1935 as amend-
ments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. See ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) (as amended by
ch. 641, 79 Stat. 750 (1935)) (codified principally at U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (1988)). The 1935 amend-
ments were enacted to clarify the extent of the government's power in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), which held
the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional as an improper delegation of legislative power.
See S. REP. No. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
8 (1935). The nondelegation doctrine is discussed in detail supra part III.B. 1. This portion of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act as so amended was in turn reenacted and named the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act by ch. 296, § 1, 50 Stat. 246, 246 (1937) in order to establish that
portion's continuing validity in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1936), which held unconstitutional certain taxation provisions of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act. See S. REP. No. 468, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 4565, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937). The 1937 Act was subsequently held to be a valid delegation of legislative
power. See United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 574-78 (1939).
437. Handlers are "processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in the handling
of any agricultural commodity or product thereof...." 7 U.S.C. § 608c(l) (1988).
438. See generally 1 JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & JAMES B. WADLEY, AGRICULTURAL LAW 284-88
(1982).
439. See 7 U.S.C. § 608; JUERGENSMEYER & WADLEY, supra note 438, at 284-88.
440. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c; JUERGENSMEYER & WADLEY, supra note 438, at 288, 293-95.
441. Marketing agreements may be reached by producers and the Secretary with respect to
"basic agricultural commodit[ies]." See 7 U.S.C. § 608(2). These are defined in § 611 as "wheat,
rye, flax, barley, cotton, field corn, grain sorghums, hogs, cattle, rice, potatoes, tobacco, sugar
beets and sugarcane, peanuts and milk and its products, and any regional or market classification,
type or grade thereof." 7 U.S.C. § 611. Marketing orders, in contrast, may be imposed by the
Secretary on distributors with respect to a convoluted listing of commodities, consisting primarily
of fruits, vegetables, nuts, milk, and milk products. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(2).
442. JUERCENSMEYER & WADLEY, supra note 438, at 294. The Act requires that, for any marketing
order to validly issue, there must have been proposed a marketing agreement regulating that com-
modity in the same manner and applicable to the same classes of activity. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(10).
443. Because a marketing agreement, standing alone, is a voluntary consensual arrangement,
see supra note 439 and accompanying text, it lacks the compulsion (apart from the law of contracts)
that is an essential element of regulation. See supra part I.A.
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marketing area 4 4 4 and must be approved by the producers in the marketing
area. 44 Second, the implementation of the marketing order is left to local individ-
uals or groups. The Secretary of Agriculture is required to provide for the
selection of an "agency" and define its powers and duties, which include limited
powers of self-regulation. 446 Pursuant to this authority, each of the forty-three
marketing orders relating to fruits, vegetables, and nuts447 provides for selection
of an administrative committee, to include both producer and handler represen-
tatives. 4 48 The general regulations applicable to each of the forty milk marketing
orders 9 provide for a market administrator, appointed by the Secretary, whose
duties parallel those set forth in the statute.450
The first method of self-regulation-approval by producers and, in most in-
stances, handlers as well-was intended to limit the discretion of the Secretary
in restricting production and distribution of these commodities. The legislative
history of the Act reveals the significant concern of both producers and handlers
with the unchecked use of government power to limit access to markets. 5 '
444. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(8). A marketing order may be approved without such handler agreement
if the Secretary determines that the handlers' refusal will impair the objectives of the Act and if
two-thirds by number and production volume of producers also approve the order. Id. § 608c(9).
445. With or without handler approval, the marketing order must be approved by two-thirds
of the producers, measured both by number and by production or sale in the marketing area. Id.
446. These "agencies" have only the following powers:
(i) To administer such order in accordance with its terms and provisions;
(ii) To make rules and regulations to effectuate the terms and provisions of such order;
(iii) To receive, investigate, and report to the Secretary of Agriculture complaints of violations
of such order; and
(iv) To recommend to the Secretary of Agriculture amendments to such order.
7 U.S.C. § 608c(7)(C).
447. See generally 7 C.F.R. §§ 905.1-993.602 (1994).
448. See, e.g., id. §§ 905.19-905.36 (establishing the Citrus Administrative Committee under
the marketing order for oranges, grapefruit, tangelos, and tangerines grown in Florida).
449. See id. §§ 1001.1-1139.86. A "market administrator" is appointed by the Secretary for
each milk marketing order. Id. § 1000.3.
450. See 7 C.F.R. § 1000.3(b).
451. The Senate report on the bill notes that "[t]hese and other restrictive provisions are, in
the opinion of the committee, adequately drawn to guard against any fear that the regulatory power
is so broad as to subject its exercise to the risk of abuse." S. REP. No. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
3 (1935). In Congressional testimony, Chester Davis, Administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration, noted that
[t]he Agricultural Adjustment programs are founded upon the democratic principle of majority
rule. . . . No one can say with any basis in fact that under the proposed amendment the Secretary
of Agriculture could exercise arbitrary power over groups of farmers against their will. The
requirement for consent of two-thirds of the producers affected insures that the wishes of the
farmers will be carried out.
Amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 16 (1935) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings]. In keeping with that "democratic principle," the
ability of the Secretary to implement a marketing order notwithstanding the objection of a majority
of the handlers, see 7 U.S.C. § 608c(9), was the most strenuously opposed provision in the agricultural
marketing law passed in 1935. See 1935 Hearings, supra at 11 (testimony of Administrator Davis
that "this is the point on which I think most of the objections from distributors, handlers and
processors of agricultural products will be based"). The limitation of marketing orders (except for
milk orders), see 7 U.S.C. § 608c(11)(B), to the smallest practicable area was also intended as a
limit on the power of the regulators. See infra note 453 and accompanying text.
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Although the scope of self-regulation is clearly more limited than other examples
in this study because it extends only to approval or disapproval of the proposed
regulatory scheme as a whole package, the rationale for producer and handler
approval follows one of the main purposes of self-regulation discussed above:
widespread acceptance by the regulated entities.452
The second method of self-regulation-delegation of operational activities to
administrators and boards-is more classic audited self-regulation. The local
committees or boards have the power to interpret and implement the act. Such
delegation allows flexibility in administration of the more than eighty local mar-
keting orders. "It is clear that Congress contemplated widespread regional varia-
tions in the standards governing production of agricultural commodities.
453
Local administration by interested parties is a classic response to the need for
flexibility. 54 In addition, in the case of marketing agreements other than for
milk, administration is vested in a committee that includes both producers and
handlers, providing representation for both potentially antagonistic interests.455
The use of local boards and administrators in the agricultural marketing
statutes and regulations has followed requirements for effective audited self-
regulation in other respects as well. 456 Although these agencies lack direct en-
forcement authority, they may recommend enforcement actions to the Secre-
tary,457 who retains independent investigation and enforcement authority.458 Any
aggrieved party may petition the Secretary for review of a marketing order,459
452. See supra part II.A.3.
453. JUERGENSMEYER & WADLEY, supra note 438, at 313. The limitation to small areas was intended
not only to be more efficient and flexible but also to reduce the risk of abuse of regulatory power
by the Secretary. See S. REP. No. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 1241,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935).
454. See supra part II.A. 1-2. From the outset of the agricultural marketing program, local varia-
tions were wide. "The marketing agreements . .. which have been issued and entered into . ..
have contained a great variety of provisions in order to adapt each particular program to the peculiar
problems and circumstances presented in a given area by a particular commodity." H.R. REP.
No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935). In addition, "Congress has approved the use of such
... committees on the theory that the most sound decisions will result from permitting those in
the area with the greatest knowledge of the industry's needs to make recommendations to the
Secretary." Chiglades Farm, Ltd. v. Butz, 485 F.2d 1125, 1134 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing S. REP.
No. 566, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1962)), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974).
455. See 1935 Hearings, supra note 451, at 32-33 (testimony of Administrator Davis, Agricultural
Adjustment Administration, that "as a rule [the committees] represent the growers and the business
interests equally with the odd member either chosen by the two groups .. .or appointed by the
Secretary of Agriculture"). Of the forty-four existing marketing orders covering nonmilk commodi-
ties, only one provides majority representation to handlers, see 7 C.F.R. § 987.21 (California dates),
and five others provide equal or nearly equal representation to producers and handlers, see id.
§§ 907.20 (Arizona and California navel oranges), 908.20 (California valencia oranges), 925.20
(southeastern Arizona and California grapes), 955.20 (Georgia Vidalia onions), 981.31 (California
almonds). All other committees have producer majorities.
456. This might be expected, because the legislation was drafted with the nondelegation doctrine
in mind (see supra note 436) and because Congress arguably was aware of the antitrust implications
of marketing orders, since the Act provides an explicit antitrust exemption for marketing agreements.
See 7 U.S.C. § 608b.
457. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(7)(C)(iii). See statute quoted supra note 446.
458. 7 U.S.C. § 608a(7).
459. Id. § 608c(15), 7 C.F.R. § 900.52,
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and the Secretary retains the independent power to terminate a marketing order
or any provision thereof.
40
Beyond this facially complete self-regulation, however, the government
retains control over the local self-regulators to a degree not found in other
programs. Although the statute permits the local boards to implement the
marketing orders and adopt rules and regulations to do so, 46' in practice all
regulations are "recommended" to the Secretary, who then determines
whether to begin rulemaking proceedings, and the ultimate regulations are
those of the Secretary. 462 The Secretary even retains the ability to summarily
reconstitute the membership of each local agency. 463 This retention of power,
however, does not make the local agencies superfluous. They apparently
have some limited independent authority46 4 "and are intended to relieve the
Secretary of much of the day-to-day burden of administering the marketing
orders.' 465 Retention of such complete direct regulatory authority where the
statute might permit further delegation seems at odds with the principles of
supervised self-regulation, but may be appropriate in the particular context
of agricultural marketing orders. These regulations limit the type and often
the quantity of a commodity which may be brought to market, and are often
amended several times each growing season.466 A regulatory scheme allowing
the local agencies to exercise more authority subject to administrative review
by an aggrieved party might create delays unacceptable in a market-
461adjustment scheme where time is of the essence.
In addition to these practical reasons for strict control of marketing orders
by the Secretary, the strict control makes the local agency's actions more easily
defended against legal challenges. Although the statute was drawn against the
background of the nondelegation doctrine, the Secretary's total authority has
been relied on in some instances as a defense against an attack on the local
460. Id. § 608c(16).
461. Id. § 608c(7)(C)(i)-(ii). See statute quoted supra note 446.
462. In all but three of the forty-three nonmilk marketing orders currently on the books, the
Secretary retains the authority to replace any agency member or alternate at any time and to
summarily disapprove of any agency action, making it void except for acts previously done in
compliance with it. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 905.35,906.53, 907.81,908.81,910.82, 911.62,915.62,916.62,
917.30, 918.85, 920.62, 921.62, 922.62, 923.62, 924.62, 925.62, 927.34, 928.62, 929.67, 931.62,
932.66, 945.81, 946.72, 947.82, 948.82, 950.82, 953.77, 955.81, 958.82, 959.82, 965.82, 966.82,
967.81, 971.82, 979.82, 982.80, 984.83, 985.65, 989.95, 993.83.
463. See id.
464. In some marketing orders, for example, the agency is given the authority to initially decide
whether a producer is exempt from the order. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. §§ 927.110-114, 948.132, 987.52.
In others, the agency has the authority to dispose of the quantities of a commodity initially withheld
from the consumer market. See, e.g., id. §§ 981.66, 984.56, 985.57, 989.67, 993.65.
465. Farmers Alliance for Improved Regulation v. Madigan, No. CIV.A. 89-0959, 1991 WL
178117, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 1991).
466. See, e.g., id. at *4 ("This regulation takes place through week-by-week control over the
volume of each type of fruit. . . . The amount of fruit which can be shipped in a given week is
set by the Secretary, acting with the advice of the relevant Administrative Committee.").
467. Telephone Interview with Tom Walsh, Assistant General Counsel, Marketing Division,
Department of Agriculture (July 27, 1993) [hereinafter Walsh Interview].
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agencies as repositories of improperly delegated authority... and as a defense
against antitrust challenges to otherwise unprotected conspiracies.
69
2. Research and Promotion Boards
Federal statutes currently authorize research, consumer information, and pro-
motional activity on behalf of fifteen different commodities through research
and promotion boards authorized to assess fees on all handlers of that commod-
ity.470 The first such legislation, which was passed in 1954 and related to wool
and mohair, generally authorized the Secretary to make agreements with private
entities for advertising and sales promotion programs, with funding for such
programs provided by a reduction in price support payments otherwise made
to producers.471 Subsequent statutes, however, have been considerably more
detailed in the exact regulation to be undertaken by the Secretary,and the
amount of assessment to be paid by handlers to fund research and promotion
programs, and each statute provides for a private board to administer those
programs, under the Secretary's supervision.4  These boards propose budgets
and research and promotion programs that are effective upon the Secretary's
approval. Although the scheme of statutes and regulations may seem similar
to the marketing orders discussed above, more latitude is usually given to the
468. See, e.g., Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Giannini, 909 F.2d 332, 337 (9th Cir. 1990)
(refusing to consider nondelegation doctrine challenge because "no such delegation has been estab-
lished in the record"); Chiglades Farm, Ltd. v. Butz, 485 F.2d 1125, 1134 (5th Cir. 1973) (no
due process issues raised by operation of local committee because of substantial control of the
committee by the Secretary), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974); Whittenburg v. United States, 100
F.2d 520, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1939) (noting that total control by Secretary over board avoids delegation
problem because the boards "have no actual power").
469. See, e.g., Wileman Bros., 909 F.2d at 334-36 (holding that conduct not approved by the
Secretary may, because of that lack of approval, be outside the antitrust immunity granted in 7
U.S.C. § 608b). The court did not agree with the defendants' allegation that the Secretary's failure
to exercise his summary authority to disapprove any local agency action (see supra note 462) was
equivalent to approval of that action. See Wileman Bros., 909 F.2d at 337-38.
470. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1781-1787 (wool and mohair), 2101-2119 (cotton), 2611-2627 (potatoes),
2701-2718 (eggs), 2901-2918 (beef), 3401-3417 (wheat), 4301-4319 (flowers and plants), 4601-
4612 (honey), 4801-4819 (pork), 4901-4916 (watermelons), 6001-6013 (pecans), 6101-6112 (mush-
rooms), 6201-6212 (limes), 6301-6311 (soybeans), 6401-6417 (milk) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). The
wheat promotion program authorized by the above statute was terminated due to lack of industry
interest in 1986. Wheat and Wheat Foods Research and Nutrition Education; Termination Order,
51 Fed. Reg. 39,738 (1986). Although the earliest research and promotion statute, for wool and
mohair, was passed in 1954, most are of comparatively recent origin. The last five programs listed
(pecans, mushrooms, limes, soybeans, and milk) were added as part of the Food, Agriculture,
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990. See Pub. L. No. 101-624, §§ 1905-1933, 1951-1976, 1999A-
1999R, 104 Stat. 3359, 3838-65, 3870-904, 3914-26.
471. 7 U.S.C. § 1787 (1988).
472. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2106(a) (Cotton Board), 2617(a) (National Potato Promotion Board),
2707(a) (Egg Board), 2907(a) (Beef Board), 3405(a) (Wheat Industry Council), 4306(1) (Floraboard),
4606(c) (Honey Board), 4808(a) (National Pork Board), 4906(b) (National Watermelon Promotion
Board), 6005(b) (Pecan Marketing Board), 6104(b) (Mushroom Council), 6204(b) (Lime Board),
6304(b) (United Soybean Board), 6407(b) (National [Milk] Processor Advertising and Promotion
Board) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
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decisions of the research and promotion boards, even though the dollar amounts
involved are usually larger. 73
The use of supervised self-regulation in funding research and promotion is
a case where the organized industry has created a self-funded program of promo-
tion of its product. There are declining federal revenues available for direct
support of these programs,4 74 and each of these fifteen industries has demon-
strated a broad consensus for such a program. 475 Each group of industry mem-
bers would have particular expertise in the needed research, promotion, and
advertising required in each area.476 Thus, the need for local expertise and
control makes self-regulation an appropriate response. The degree of control
retained by the Secretary has been sufficient to rebuff challenges to the research
477and promotion boards as unconstitutional delegates of legislative power.
473. Marketing orders typically do not involve collection of fees from handlers nor do they entrust
the local boards with money to spend, apart from reimbursement for their administrative costs.
Research and promotion orders, on the other hand, impose assessments on each handler and result
in considerable sums being placed at the disposal of the board responsible for research and promotion
for that commodity. Walsh Interview, supra note 467.
474. Id. Although many of the assessments under earlier research and promotion programs were
voluntary, permitting any handler to request a refund of the assessment, most of those provisions
have now been removed entirely or removed subject to approval by a referendum of handlers. See 7
U.S.C. §§ 2110(b) (refunds terminated if approved by referendum), 2
6
1
7
(g) (providing for refunds,
repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 1940, 104 Stat. 3359, 3866 (1990)), 2712(b) (directing Secretary
to amend orders to eliminate refundability), 2907 (refunds terminated if approved by referendum),
4608(h) (refunds terminated unless defeated in referendum), 4813 (refunds terminated if approved
by referendum), 6007(f) (same). Only the flowers and plants and watermelon orders retain the
unconditional right to a refund of assessments. See id. §§ 4312, 4906(h). The removal of the refund-
ability of assessments is partly industry response to the decline in federal funding of promotion
programs. Walsh Interview, supra note 467. The most recent of these amendments eliminated
refundability of assessments in the Egg Research and Consumer Information Act Amendments of
1988 and was premised on the same need for funding.
The egg industry realizes the need to provide sufficient funding to research and address the
problems facing them today. A poll was conducted by the egg board of all commercial egg
producers .... Sixty-nine percent of the egg industry, representing seventy-nine percent of the
total U.S. production, voted in favor of eliminating refunds of producer assessments.
Borrowing from the success of similar orders that exist for the beef, dairy, and pork industries,
the Committee believes that it is essential and in the public interest to authorize and enable the
establishment of an orderly procedure for the development and the financing (through an adequate
assessment) of an effective and continuous egg research and consumer information program. The
hallmark . . . must be the contribution by all commercial egg producers of their fair share.
H.R. REP. No. 1024, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3819,
3820-21.
475. Not only is such broad support a de facto requirement for introduction of such legislation in
Congress, but must be demonstrated through a referendum typically required by each act.
476. One court described these programs
as a "self-help" measure that would enable the . . . industry to employ its own resources and
devise its own strategies to increase . . . sales, while simultaneously avoiding the intrusiveness
of government regulation and the cost of government "handouts." . . . [This type of program]
resembles a number of recent congressional enactments designed to make various federal regula-
tory programs partially or entirely self-financing.
United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1122 (3d Cir. 1989), (discussing specifically the Beef
Promotion and Research Program, but noting that other programs are "identical in most respects"),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990).
477. See id. at 1128-29.
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V. A Model for the Successful Use of Audited Self-Regulation
Part IV analyzed the collected experience of audited self-regulation of seven
agencies or departments in twelve programs spanning more than seventy
years. 478 Parts II and III summarized the literature of audited self-regulation
generally, suggesting some of its benefits and the likely characteristics of an
environment suitable to its use. This part compares those theories and the results
from the survey, concluding that there is substantial correlation between theory
and practice, and extrapolates from this combination the necessary conditions
for the successful use of audited self-regulation.
A. ADVANTAGES OF SELF-REGULATION DEMONSTRATED IN THE SURVEY
Part II discussed various purported advantages of audited self-regulation. The
benefits most often cited in adopting programs of audited self-regulation were
a significant savings of federal staff compared to equivalent direct federal regula-
tion, reliance on the expertise of the regulated entities, and the ability to avoid
having government decisionmakers involved in areas which, for policy reasons,
should remain insulated. 4 9 In some areas of audited self-regulation, powers
were reclaimed by Congress or the agency from the self-regulatory organization
when it was apparent that more direct supervision or regulation was needed.48 °
Some of the programs were unable to succeed not because of problems related
to the design of the audited self-regulation, but because of lack of support from
the regulated entities.48'
This experience suggests that the most likely advantages from the list of advan-
tages of audited self-regulation postulated in part II to actually appear in practice
are first, superior technical expertise, and second, flexibility. In some cases,
incentives for compliance were lacking, and none of the programs documented
a significant cost savings overall or even just for the federal government alone;
in fact, in many programs any suggestions of anticipated cost savings were
disclaimed.
B. ELEMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION DEMONSTRATED IN THE SURVEY
Part III listed elements of the industry, agency, and regulation that would be
necessary for an effective program of self-regulation. The successful industries, it
was predicted, would be made up of firms with the expertise and incentive to
shoulder the regulatory load. These characteristics need not, however, be dis-
played in a preexisting organized form. The survey shows that successful self-
478. The earliest regulatory program discussed in this part was regulation of futures exchanges
in 1922. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
479. Examples of such forbidden areas include the practice of medicine, instruction at colleges
and universities, and production and distribution decisions of farmers.
480. Examples of such reclamation of authority include futures market regulation and review
of nonmedical (administration and finance) issues in eligibility of health care suppliers for reimburse-
ment under Medicare.
481. Lack of support from the regulated entities made it difficult for the SEC to pursue its
programs of audited self-regulation for accountants and investment advisers.
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regulatory organizations can be established contemporaneously with the regula-
tion; in almost half the programs, this was the case.482 Where programs were
abandoned or modified, these elements of expertise and incentive were missing.
The SEC's attempt to regulate investment advisers in this fashion foundered
because existing self-regulatory organizations' expertise was not trusted by the
investment advisers themselves. The CFTC's regulation of futures exchanges
and HCFA's regulation of the peer review process each were substantially modi-
fied as the agencies discovered through experience that the self-regulatory organi-
zation in some instances lacked the incentive to do the job.
The regulations, predicted the literature in part III, would be the "social
regulation" type, cutting across industry lines in health, safety, and environmen-
tal areas. Interestingly, none of the programs of group self-regulation were of
this type. Each was very industry-specific, yet self-regulation was advantageous
for the same reason: it effectively deals with diversity. In these programs, the
diversity is not in regulated entities scattered among different industries, but
in regulated entities that are all in the same industry but nonetheless are to be
treated differently. Each broker, physician, accountant, farmer, or university
president makes decisions individual to his or her client, patient, crop and
market, or institution, at that time and in those circumstances.
The theories in part III indicated that the best regulations for a self-regulatory
program would be those that were sufficiently specific to limit discretion and
that were output-or result-oriented. The programs surveyed are a fairly even
blend of both. In hospital accreditation, for example, the accreditors are moving
to include outputs-quality of care-as well as inputs in determining hospital
status. Accreditation in higher education is clearly output oriented; facilities
and faculties are no doubt evaluated, but the important question is whether
the institution is fulfilling the education mission it has adopted. Standards for
securities and commodities brokers are a mixture of inputs-passing standard
exams, capital invested in the business, and so forth-and results or outputs,
for example, rules against fraud and manipulation. The qualities sought by
looking at output standards are clarity and simplicity of measuring results. These
apparently are equally available with input standards in the regulatory programs
surveyed; it seems to be the clarity that is important. The two programs with
arguably the most subjective standards-higher education accreditation and peer
review of accountants-are also the programs with the most difficulty in imple-
menting regulation. The higher education accreditation program is singular in
its insulation from review, and the peer review program failed, at least with
the SEC, to become mandatory at all.
482. Self-regulatory organizations created contemporaneously with the regulation are the NASD,
NFA, INPO, agricultural marketing order administrative committees, and agricultural research
and promotion boards. Although INPO was created at the same time as the NRC's commandment
to examine the operations and personnel policies of nuclear power plants more carefully, there is
no suggestion that INPO was created specifically to fulfill that role in lieu of the NRC, although
that was the result until litigation revealed that the NRC could not rely directly on INPO programs.
See supra part IV.C.
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The agencies, predicted the literature in part III, would be successful only
if they possessed the necessary technical expertise in the subject and in auditing
regulation by the self-regulatory organizations. The programs reviewed do not
show any preexisting conditions that will demonstrate presence or lack of these
abilities. They do show, however, that expertise can be developed in the agency
as it can in the industry. Many of the programs of audited self-regulation,
particularly where not developed in response to a manpower shortage, were
implemented gradually, 483 allowing both sides to develop the necessary skills.
Thus, it appears that agency expertise is not a prerequisite; among the broad
types of programs and agencies surveyed, each agency appeared capable of
developing the necessary expertise. Self-regulatory programs that failed did not
fail due to lack of ability on the part of the agency.
The process requirements discussed in part III, applicable to programs of
group self-regulation, were followed in their entirety by virtually every agency
program. The major exception appears to be the four programs in health care
and accreditation, which provide comparatively limited rights to appeal outside
the self-regulatory organization to the government agency.
C. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL AUDITED SELF-REGULATION
The above conclusions can be restated in two groups of conditions that are
necessary for audited self-regulation to be successful. First, the regulation must
be effective, that is, it must realize the goals of the regulatory program; second,
the regulation must be fair to regulated entities and the public alike.
1. Effectiveness
Audited self-regulation should be considered only where it might be effective.
It should be considered by Congress in developing any program of regulation
that requires diverse application to individual regulated entities, where there
exists or can be created a self-regulatory organization with the expertise and
motivation to implement the regulation, and where the federal agency through
which the delegation is made has similar expertise and motivation to oversee
that implementation, each in a manner consistent with the public interest. Simi-
larly, a federal agency charged with implementing an existing program of regula-
tion should consider proposing legislation to Congress to permit audited self-
regulation where these conditions exist. Once such a program, agency, and
self-regulatory organization have been identified, Congress and the agency
should together determine the scope of substantive delegation of responsibility
to the self-regulatory organization. The agency's authority to delegate to the
self-regulatory organization should be explicitly stated in the implementing stat-
ute. 414 The agency also should have independent enforcement authority over all
483. For example, the regulation of securities and commodities exchanges continued to develop,
as evidenced by the continuous changes in both organic acts reviewed in part IV.A.1-2.
484. An important part of a successful program of audited self-regulation is explicit statutory
statements of the parameters of the program. See infra notes 490-93 and accompanying text.
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regulated entities and independent rulemaking authority for the self-regulatory
organization. Both the self-regulatory organization and the agency should be
required in their rulemaking to consider the impact of the rule on competition.
Self-regulatory programs have failed where these conditions have not been
met. The SEC, in proposing audited self-regulation of investment advisers, was
unable to convince the investment adviser industry that there existed or could
be created a self-regulatory organization responsive to their needs. 485 The De-
partment of Agriculture was reluctant to grant expansive self-regulatory powers
to the nation's commodity exchanges because of lack of confidence in those
exchanges' commitment to the public interest. 486 The SEC, in proposing audited
self-regulation for auditors of financial statements, was unable to impose upon
the AICPA a sufficient regard for the need for effective agency oversight. 487
HCFA and the Department of Education have continually modified their self-
regulatory programs in response to concerns that the self-regulatory organiza-•• 488
tions lacked concern about maintaining competition or vigorous enforce-
ment. 489
An additional component of effectiveness, apart from the self-regulatory orga-
nization's oversight of the regulated entities and the agency's oversight of the
self-regulatory organization, is congressional oversight of the agency to assure
protection of the public interest. Such oversight is best ensured if the program
of audited self-regulation is conducted pursuant to explicit congressional author-
ity. In almost all of the programs surveyed in part IV, Congress specifically
acted to create the self-regulatory program. The only exceptions are the SEC's
proposed peer review requirement for accountants and the peer review program
authorized by the FDIC. In neither instance did specific congressional legislation
explicitly provide for delegation by the agency to a self-regulatory organiza-
tion. 490 The FDIC's authority can, however, be fairly inferred from the statute,
491
and the SEC's program was never adopted. Significantly, the attempt by the
485. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
486. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
487. See supra notes 291-93 and accompanying text.
488. See, e.g., supra note 340 (anticompetitive effects of private accreditation of Medicare and
Medicaid providers).
489. See, e.g., HCFA's continuing development of a generic accreditation rule for Medicare and
Medicaid providers (supra text accompanying notes 332-35) and the amendment of the accreditation
of clinical laboratories (supra note 345 and accompanying text).
490. The SEC asserted that its authority to implement a peer-review system flowed from the
requirement for "certified" financial statements under the federal securities laws (see supra note
271) and its general authority under the federal securities laws to define that term. See Peer Review
Release, supra note 274, at 11,665. The FDIC asserted that its authority to require a peer review
system consistent with AICPA standards flowed from the statute itself, which required accountants
to receive "a peer review that meets guidelines acceptable" to the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. §
1831m(g)(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. III 1991); see Annual Independent Audits and Reporting Requirements,
supra note 306, at 31,335.
491. The language of the implementing statute (see supra note 490) suggests that the FDIC would
be permitted if not encouraged to rely on externally prepared peer review guidelines. In its proposed
rules, the FDIC noted that "any other accounting organizations that establish standards for peer
review may submit details concerning their programs to the FDIC for consideration and possible
approval." Annual Independent Audits and Reporting Requirements, supra note 306, at 42,521.
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NRC to rely on INPO standards was invalidated on the ground that the statute
required direct agency regulation.492 Thus, it is likely that explicit congressional
authority is necessary in any event493 and is certainly a practical requirement.
Congressional hearings and debates will provide legitimacy for the delegation
to the agency or department and ultimately to the self-regulatory organization,
and Congress in its authorization and subsequent reexamination has the power
to ensure that the agency and the self-regulatory organization continue to operate
with the public interest paramount.
2. Fairness
Audited self-regulation should be considered only where Congress is assured
that it can be implemented fairly and in the public interest. In order to maintain
standards of fairness consistent with the Constitution and the antitrust laws,
the following process protections should be imposed. The self-regulatory organi-
zation should engage in its rulemaking on the record, with notice and opportu-
nity for comment given to all affected groups to the extent possible, with particu-
lar emphasis on notice to nonmembers who might be adversely affected by the
proposed rule, and responses to all significant comments required in the rule-
making record. In its adjudication or other enforcement activities, the self-
regulatory organization should again provide notice and opportunity for a hear-
ing to the respondent, and that hearing should be before an impartial
decisionmaker who is required to place in the adjudication record his or her
findings and the reasons therefor. The agency, of course, will be subject to all
the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act in its operations and
should, in addition, be the first level of review for all rules and adjudications
of the self-regulatory organization, with power to disapprove rules and to modify
adjudications and sanctions.
Again, self-regulatory programs have failed where these conditions have not
been met. Antitrust liability can result in such instances.494 In addition, the
programs of private accreditation of health care delivery and higher education
have been generally criticized for the lack of agency review of self-regulatory
decisions.
95
These conditions should provide assurance that audited self-regulation can
result in better regulation in the public interest because the prerequisite elements
exist and because the program will have the features found in existing successful
492. See supra notes 429-31 and accompanying text.
493. Many federal departments and agencies have been given general rulemaking authority. See,
e.g., Securities Exchange Act § 23(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1988) ("The Commission ...
shall . . . have power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to
implement the provisions of this chapter."); 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a)(tenth) (1988) (the FDIC shall
have the power "[t]o prescribe . . . such rules and regulations as it may deem necessary to carry
out the provisions of this chapter .. "). These grants of authority, however, were not relied on
in any of the regulatory programs reviewed in this article.
494. See supra part III.C.l.
495. See supra notes 374 (limited review of denials of payment by Medicare PROs), 418-19 and
accompanying text (lack of direct authority over higher education accreditation agencies).
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programs. Ultimate responsibility to ensure the public interest rests, of course,
in the plenary authority of the agency and ultimately the Congress.
VI. Approaches to Encouraging Audited Self-Regulation
When self-regulation was initially adopted in the securities industry, it was
expected that it would serve as a model for other similar ventures. 496 It is evident
from the survey in part IV that the use of this model has been somewhat limited.
The survey also suggests, however, that audited self-regulation can be a useful
technique. It is frequently (but not always) successful and has a fairly strong
theoretical basis, in that the predicted advantages and elements seemed to be
borne out by agency experience.
Apart from the securities and commodities industries and regulators, systems
of audited self-regulation operate in the federal agencies largely ignorant of one
another. Many other industries may be unaware of the technique or its potential
application to their programs. To the extent that the benefits of audited self-
regulation could be realized from any such properly managed program, as sug-
gested in part V, it is possible that a systematic government-wide analysis of
the potential use of this regulatory technique could spread these benefits more
widely. Not only could its use be considered in applications where the regulators
are currently unaware of its potential, but different regulators could become
aware of programs already in place at other agencies that might be useful mod-
els.497 This part discusses the options for implementing more comprehensive
consideration of audited self-regulation across the federal government. It con-
cludes that mandating regulatory analysis to include an evaluation of audited
self-regulation will likely be counterproductive. Informal recommendations,
however, will probably serve to heighten awareness of the technique in interested
agencies, which may be more likely to give audited self-regulation genuine
consideration when it is in their best interests.
A. FUTILITY OF MANDATORY REGULATORY ANALYSIS
In some agencies, such as the SEC or CFTC, the widespread current use
of audited self-regulation has probably already served to sensitize the policymak-
ers to its potential use. In other agencies, such as HCFA, the burdens of direct
regulation have required them to consider alternatives generally, of which
audited self-regulation has proved promising. Elsewhere, however, consideration
of the technique appears to be fortuitous. If audited self-regulation is to be
given systematic consideration by agencies, it must be formally or informally
added as a step in their rulemaking processes.
An explicit requirement that this option be considered in each regulatory
analysis would dramatically increase the awareness across agencies of its potential
496. See Hed-Hofmann, supra note 48, at 187-88; Smythe, supra note 145, at 478-79.
497. See supra note 4.
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benefits.498 Whether it would do much beyond that, however, is doubtful. What
is needed to make regulatory analysis successful is a genuine interest in improv-
ing the agency's efficiency.499 Mandating the procedures does not necessarily
create the required motivation, 500 especially since the procedures are and proba-
bly must be insulated from outside review." 1 Judicial review is not a likely
result. Congress was unwilling to provide for judicial review in the Regulatory
Flexibility Act,50 2 and there is nothing inherently revolutionary about audited
498. This is the theory behind recent regulatory reforms requiring measuring of costs and benefits
and evaluation of alternative forms of regulation, see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, § l(b), 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,735, 51,735-36 (1993), or the impact on small entities, see, e.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1988). See Paul R.
Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 213, 229 (noting the "optimistic
assumption" of the Regulatory Flexibility Act that "highlighting the problems of small business and
offering suggestions will allow agencies to solve problems they have largely created"); Jeffry L. Davis,
Regulatory Reform and Congressional Control of Regulation, 17 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1199, 1220 (1982) (the
purpose of regulatory analysis such as cost-benefit evaluation "is essentially to sensitize [agencies]
to the costs imposed by their regulation by forcing them to give explicit consideration to such costs").
499. See Agency Procedures for Performing Regulatory Analysis of Rules, Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States, Recommendation No. 85-2, 1985 ACUS 5, 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-2, [herein-
after ACUS Recommendation] (concluding that "regulatory analysis can be a useful device in
rulemaking if it is taken seriously by upper level agency decisionmakers"; BARAM, supra note 19,
at 153 ("although Congress can and should provide the basic structural features and require compli-
ance by all agencies, the fully detailed structuring of discretion (the criteria to be used for choosing
among alternatives to deal with very specific health or safety problems) can come only from the
agency"); NOLL & OWEN, supra note 82, at 159-60 (summarizing "the collective and steady effort
of agencies to improve their capabilities for internal analysis and to use internal studies and general
inquiries for examining important policy issues").
500. In evaluating mandatory analysis, one government policy analyst concludes:
If the . .. regulatory agency . .. has a history of insensitivity to regulatory costs in general
• . . it is doubtful that an analysis extracted only by force of law will reflect a great deal of
creativity in recognizing and responding to such concerns. It is nearly always possible to marshal
a strong contingent of arguments in opposition to alternatives, if the agency is inclined to do
so. If, on the other hand, the agency has demonstrated the desired sensitivity and has attempted
to fashion reasonable accommodations, it is equally doubtful that a mandatory analysis will have
any substantive effect on the character of its regulations.
Davis, supra note 498, at 1220. This is not to suggest, however, that there is not an abundance
of such "sensitive" agencies.
Although many Regulatory Impact Assessments [required under Executive Order 12,291,3 C. F.R.
127 (1982), the predecessor to Executive Order 12,866, see supra note 498] were no doubt post hoc
rationalizations for decisions reached on other grounds, my examination of the process over a
two-year period has convinced me that the requirement has resulted in many genuine efforts to obtain
relevant information, analyze that information, probe alternatives, and reach sound regulatory
decisions. Whether the effort is worth its substantial costs, however, is open to debate,
Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 MD. L. REv. 253, 267-68 (1986) (footnote
omitted).
501. Lack of effective judicial review seriously limits the impact of the Regulatory Flexibility
Act. See Verkuil, supra note 498, at 271 (concluding that the Act will be effective if the Small
Business Administration's Office of Advocacy can expand its limited ability to "alert the courts");
Doris S. Freedman et al., The Regulatory Flexibility Act: Orienting Federal Regulation to Small Business,
93 DICK. L. REV. 439, 463 (1989) (concluding that the ultimate effectiveness of the Act is "question-
able" given the courts' preclusion of review). Executive Order 12,866, supra note 498, also explicitly
precludes judicial review. See id. § 10, 58 Fed, Reg. at 51,744.
502. See 5 U.S.C. § 611 (1988). See also supra note 495. The National Performance Review,
however, recommends providing for judicial review. See GORE, supra note 4, at 148 (Recommendation
SBAO1).
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self-regulation, despite its advantages, to suggest that Congress would treat it
differently. Executive review provides a limited enforcement mechanism,0 3 but
again it cannot internalize the genuineness with which agencies approach regula-
tory analysis. Other measures could be more effective but simply are not real-
istic.
5 4
Legislative reforms have a limited potential to spur regulatory reform. Experi-
ence with the Regulatory Flexibility Act suggests that mandated procedures will
have little if any substantive impact. Mandated program changes would be
workable only on a case-by-case basis.5" 5 Although effective, these efforts would
necessarily be limited by congressional resources to a few of the most important
industries. 506
B. ENCOURAGING SELF-INTERESTED REGULATION
Effective regulatory reform requires self-motivation from the agencies. It will
thus be the responsibility of the agencies to lay the groundwork for audited
self-regulation independently, within the bounds of existing legislation. When
the time comes for congressional action, 0 7 the agency will be ready with reforms
needed to make the program more effective. Until such time, however, audited
self-regulation will be implemented only if the agencies are self-motivated to
do so. In the final analysis, audited self-regulation lives by its own creed. It is
503. Under Executive Order 12,866, supra note 498, for example, the Office of Management
and Budget is authorized to require a rule's review under the Order and to require an agency to
reconsider its rule prior to effectiveness. See id. § 6(b), 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,742-43. Executive orders
are, of course, binding only on the executive agencies. Even then, the nature of the organization
suggests that that review will be less than searching.
The line agency . . . may have far more facts at its disposal and be more familiar with them.
Does the OMB possess the necessary manpower and expertise to deal with a one hundred page
proposed OSHA regulation on carcinogens in the workplace? Can it do more than scratch the
surface? Perhaps the OMB can deal with regulations that are on their face wasteful, ineffective,
or counterproductive, but typically, the advantages and disadvantages of proposals are known
only after detailed study of the substantive area at issue.
Stepheih Breyer, Reforming Regulation, 59 TUL. L. REV. 4, 9 (1984) (discussing predecessor to Execu-
tive Order 12,866).
504. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 498, at 1227 n.112 (requiring agencies to estimate compliance
costs in a regulatory budget and permitting regulated entities to pay "noncompliance fees" to avoid
the regulation in question), 1229 ("generic" budget cuts for each agency, permitting the agency
to select the regulations to be curtailed). Davis concludes that without congressional self-restraint
on delegation, there is little likelihood of effective regulatory reform. See id. at 1233.
505. It is difficult to hypothesize any form of mandatory legislation applicable across agencies to
implement a particular regulatory program. To be a valid delegation of power, it would of course
need to be accompanied by sufficient standards for use. See supra part III.B. 1. Such general standards
from Congress, applicable to all agencies, are no more likely to be effective than the general
command-and-control standards from agencies are across all industries. See supra part II.A.5.
506. Breyer contends that there are several regulatory programs that are candidates for individual
congressional attention. Although that is hard and long work, consisting of a significant initial
information-gathering effort by Congress, creating political visibility and building a coalition dedi-
cated to reform, he argues that it is the only direction to meaningful regulatory reform. Generic
or omnibus proposals, he concludes, are simply too weak to generate an impetus for reform. Breyer,
supra note 503, at 23; Stephen Breyer, Two Models of Regulatory Reform, 34 S.C. L. REV. 629, 646-
47 (1983).
507. The congressional process envisioned by Breyer, supra note 503, at 23, "takes time." Id.
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most effective when it is implemented by the agencies closest to each situation,
with the expertise and ability to make changes that will work because they are
in the agency's and the regulated entities' self-interest.
Most analysts of regulatory policy seem resigned to conclude that an agency's
self-interest requires its perpetuation. 8 Even if true, this is not a barrier to
effective use of audited self-regulation. Regulatory reform of this type is not
"deregulation"'09 and does not necessarily mean a reduced role for the agency,
510
but only a more efficient one.
Indeed, the agencies' self-interest can be encouraged. A recommendation of
the Administrative Conference would make the utility of audited self-regulation
more widely known to the policy analysts within each agency.51 The National
Performance Review recommends comprehensive analysis of alternative regula-
tory program designs, to be available to each agency.51 2 Thus, the principles
are more likely to be incorporated into each agency's regulatory analysis.
51 3
The success of this approach depends extensively on the strength of the regula-
tory analysis by each individual agency. Recommendations of the Administrative
Conference, or even elevation of those statements to precatory administrative
orders or regulations, will be valuable if they serve to educate, but we cannot
and should not expect more of them.
Other external factors may motivate agencies to consider audited self-
regulation. The resources of federal government are not infinite, nor is the
capability of American business to absorb the costs of regulations not borne
abroad.514 These limits have been recognized, for example, in the work of the
CFTC and Congress to create the NFA. 5 It is likely that agencies that might
be predisposed to considering audited self-regulation are unwilling "to generate
SROs from scratch ' 516 and to face an extended trial-and-error experience, as
did the SEC or CFTC. The model of audited self-regulation described in this
508. See MITNICK, supra note 1, at 421.
509. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
510. Indeed, the existence of any cost savings from self-regulation, though regularly invoked as
an advantage, is rarely proved; see supra part II.A.4. Regulatory reform simply means regulating
differently-more efficiently-and not necessarily less, although this may be one result. See NOLL
& OWEN, supra note 82, at 159-60.
511. See Marshall J. Breger et al., Providing Economic Incentives in Environmental Regulation, 8 YALE
J. ON REG. 463, 494-95 (1991) (Administrative Conference Chairman Breger noting that "[EPA
Assistant Administrator and General Counsel E. Donald] Elliot's suggestion that the Administrative
Conference study how to create regulatory systems that are more sensitive to market incentives
and performance standards is a useful reminder. We have done work in this area in the past.
. ..We should be doing more.").
512. See GORE, supra note 4, at 117-18.
513. See ACUS Recommendation, supra note 499, at 6. Recommendation No. 1 indicates that
agencies should incorporate a broad range of options at the very beginning of information-gathering
and analysis in respect of a rule.
514. See Stewart, supra note 58, 355-56 (citing these "external constraints," which ultimately
will require less cumbersome and more effective regulation); Dana A. Rasmussen, Enforcement in
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: Balancing the Carrots and the Sticks, 22 ENVTL. L. 333, 337
(1991) ("The reality of finite resources reminds us of our spending for environmental protection").
515. See supra part IV.A.2.
516. Miller, supra note 83, at 864.
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article, and distilled to its essential attributes in part V, draws in large part on
the experience of the agencies, the regulated entities, the courts, and scores of
distinguished observers over the past sixty years. This experience can be drawn
upon without being repeated. 17 Agencies can be exhorted to consider audited
self-regulation; many likely will be willing to experiment. In the meantime, the
tools can be readied for agencies ready to undertake the task; the seeds can be
planted by proclamation, education, and informal "sensitizing," and perhaps
sprout in genuine interest by an agency that recognizes when audited self-
regulation may serve everyone's self-interest. We cannot command that they
do so; but we can supply the methods and await the motivation. In the final
analysis, this is the most effective and perhaps the only way to achieve lasting
results.
517. The motivations of one researcher examining only the EPA's emissions trading program
can be extended to any program of regulation.
As anyone who has tried it knows, regulatory reform is easier said than done. Reform concepts
which appear so disarmingly simple in the abstract world of theory turn out to be distressingly
complex when applied. Regulations which from a distance seem so inherently unsupportable,
upon closer inspection are discovered to have significant bases of support among various special
interest groups. Since the status quo has so much inertia, many promising ideas end up strewn
along the wayside. Survivors are few and far between.
What is the price of survivorship? How much of the original idea has to be sacrificed as the
cost of gaining a place in the sun? One way to begin to answer these questions is to examine
closely those reform packages . . . that have survived.
TIETENBERG, supra note 31, at xi.
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Appendix
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
RECOMMENDATION 94-1
THE USE OF AUDITED SELF-REGULATION AS A REGULATORY TECHNIQUE
Adopted June 16, 1994
Audited self-regulation is defined as congressional or agency delegation of
power to a private self-regulatory organization to implement and enforce laws
or agency regulations with respect to the regulated entities, with powers of
independent action and review retained by the agency. This self-regulatory
organization is often an association of regulated entities formed for the explicit
purpose of self-regulation. Audited self-regulation is an alternative for Congress
to consider in legislating any regulatory program. Properly implemented and
monitored, a program of audited self-regulation may effectively advance the
statutory objectives consistent with the public interest and the interests of the
regulated entities.
In certain circumstances, this approach may result in better regulation because
the agency's statute and rules are supplemented and enforced by those entities
directly involved in the regulated activity, which may have more detailed knowl-
edge of the operational or technical aspects of that activity. The regulatory
program also may be more effective because it can be tailored to the individual
industry or group. In addition, the agency's regulatory enforcement costs may
be reduced by this approach, although such cost reductions should be considered
only if they can be achieved without eroding the effectiveness of enforcement.
On the other hand, audited self-regulation may present the significant risks
of uneven enforcement, capture of the regulators by the regulated industry, and
creating barriers to entry or competition. Where the potential for institutional
self-interest is too great, self-regulation is undesirable. Other risks can be les-
sened by requiring the self-regulatory organization to establish and follow proce-
dures similar to those that would be applicable if the self-regulatory organization
were an agency.' For these procedures to work, effective interest groups must
exist, and must have access to the agency, to raise concerns about the conduct of
the self-regulatory organization. And of course, the agency itself must vigilantly
oversee the activities of the self-regulatory organization and of the regulated
entities themselves.
A survey of agency experience with audited self-regulation 2 reveals several com-
mon elements typically present in effective programs: (1) industry members are
1. Such procedures generally provide for public participation and require all points of view to
be taken into account and addressed. For example, rulemaking ordinarily should provide notice
and opportunity for comment to all affected parties, and adjudications should be open to the public
and include notice and hearing safeguards.
2. Audited self-regulation has been used in diverse programs, including quality of medical care
under government insurance programs, stock exchange and commodities regulation and trading,
agricultural marketing agreements, and certification of medical testing laboratories.
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organized, expert, and motivated to comply; (2) the regulatory program requires
individualized application of clear rules which can be objectively applied; and
(3) the agency itself has sufficient expertise to audit the self-regulatory activity
effectively. The survey also revealed that audited self-regulation programs that
were terminated or not implemented lacked at least one of these elements.
In those cases where the prerequisites and safeguards discussed above are
present, Congress and the agencies should consider audited self-regulation as
a regulatory technique.
Recommendation
1. Congress and agencies should consider audited self-regulation as a regula-
tory technique when designing, revising, or reevaluating regulatory programs,
but only where it can be effective, as specified in Paragraph 2 below, and
only where it can operate fairly, as specified in Paragraph 3 below. Audited
self-regulation is defined as congressional or agency delegation of power to a
private self-regulatory organization to implement and enforce laws or agency
regulations with respect to the regulated entities, with powers of independent
action and review retained by the agency.
2. Effectiveness. Audited self-regulation can be effective if it meets the following
requirements.
a. The substantive standards, whether imposed by statute, regulation, or
otherwise, are clearly stated and are capable of objective application, even if
judgments must be made in applying them.
b. A self-regulatory organization with the ability and incentive to imple-
ment the substantive standards in cooperation with the agency exists or can be
created.
i. Ability. The organization must have the expertise, experience, au-
thority, and commitment to design, implement, and evaluate the effective com-
pliance measures. It must also, by itself or in combination with other self-
regulatory organizations, have jurisdiction over all regulated entities.
ii. Incentive. The organization must be motivated to undertake effective
and fair self-regulation consistent with the public interest, as that interest has
been articulated by Congress and the agency. This motivation can be provided
by, among other things: (A) the members' common incentives; (B) effective
monitoring by groups that may be harmed by noncompliance; (C) potential
legal liability of the self-regulated entities or the self-regulatory organization;
or (D) the potential for direct government regulation.
c. The agency responsible for implementation and oversight must have
the ability and incentive to implement the substantive standards through a self-
regulatory program.
i. Ability. The agency must have (A) statutory authority, including
at least the powers specified in Paragraph 2(d) below; (B) sufficient substantive
3. Note, for example, that Executive Order 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,735, 51,736 (Oct. 4, 1993), states that, to the extent permitted by law, agencies should
identify and assess alternative forms of regulation.
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expertise; (C) knowledge of organizational behavior and internal control proce-
dures of the self-regulatory organization and its members; and (D) sufficient
resources, including effective auditing capability to monitor compliance.
ii. Incentive. The agency must have the incentive to implement the self-
regulatory program effectively. Effective implementation requires that the agency
be committed to achieving the objectives of the statutory scheme through the self-
regulatory program. It also requires that the agency consider the rights and needs
of the intended beneficiaries of the regulatory program, who may be harmed by
noncompliance, as well as the rights and needs of the regulated entities.
d. The self-regulatory program is expressly authorized by legislation that
includes:
i. an explicit statement of the scope of permitted delegation to the self-
regulatory organization;
ii. authority for the agency (A) independently to enforce the law, agency
regulations, and rules of the self-regulatory organization relevant to the program;
(B) to enforce the organic requirements of the self-regulatory organization against
the organization, and require that the organization in turn enforce its own rules
against its members; (C) to review all rules and enforcement actions of the self-
regulatory organization relevant to the program; and (D) to amend, repeal or
supplement the rules of the self-regulatory organization or require the self-
regulatory organization to do so; and
iii. a requirement that the agency, in promulgating its own rules or
reviewing the rules of the self-regulatory organization, examine the effects of those
rules on competition.
3. Fairness. Audited self-regulation can operate fairly only if the procedures of
the self-regulatory organization ensure that the decisionmaker is properly in-
formed and unbiased. Procedures for adjudication and for establishing rules of
general applicability should conform generally to those that would be followed if
the proceeding were conducted by the agency. In addition to the agency's plenary
review authority referred to in Paragraph 2(d)(ii)(C), the agency should provide
parties with a right of appeal.
4. Access to records and proceedings of the self-regulatory organization. Congress and the
agency should provide public access to records of the self-regulatory organization
relating to the organization's regulatory activities, to the extent such records
would be available under the Freedom of Information Act if the self-regulatory
organization were an agency. Congress and the agency also should consider
whether to require any nonadjudicatory proceeding of the organization to be open
to the public.
5. Alternative dispute resolution. The rules of the self-regulatory organization
should provide for use of informal and consensual procedures to resolve disputes
where appropriate.4
4. The Administrative Conference has repeatedly encouraged agencies to use alternative dispute
resolution and negotiated rulemaking techniques in appropriate circumstances. The same factors
supporting those recommendations suggest the value of informal and consensual processes in the
context of self-regulatory organizations. See, e.g., Recommendations 82-4 and 86-3.
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